

diogenes

An International Review of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies

DIOGENES

Number 8

AUTUMN 1954

MEMBER ORGANISATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES

International Academic Union
International Federation of Philosophical Societies
International Committee for Historical Sciences
International Permanent Committee of Linguists
International Federation of Associations for Classical Studies
International Union for Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences
International Commission on Folk Arts and Folklore
International Committee for the History of Art
International Association for the Study of the History of Religions
International Federation for Modern Languages and Literature
International Union of Orientalists
International Society for Musicology
International Committee of Americanists

OFFICERS OF THE COUNCIL


President: Jacques Rueff (Paris)

Vice-Presidents: Dr. Charles Odegaard (Washington)
Professor Alf Sommerfelt (Oslo)

Secretary General: Professor Ronald Syme (Oxford)

Directors: Professor Majumdar (Benares)
Professor Carsten Hoeg (Copenhagen)

Editorial Committee for Diogenes: Professor D. W. Brogan (Great Britain)
Professor Gilberto Freyre (Brazil)
Professor A. Castro Leal (Mexico)
Professor W. Koppers (Austria)
Professor G. Levi della Vida (Italy)
Professor R. P. McKeon (USA)
Professor H. J. Pos (Holland)
Professor Alexander Rüstow (Germany)



diogenes

a quarterly publication of

THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES

DIOGENES

EDITOR: Roger Caillois

EDITORIAL SECRETARY: Jean d'Ormesson

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS EDITOR: Elisabeth Mann Borgese

The American edition of *Diogenes* is published quarterly in December, March, June and September. Office of publication: 1 Lefferts Avenue, Brooklyn 25, New York. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Brooklyn, New York.

The Anglo-American Edition of *Diogenes* is published for The International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies by Intercultural Publications Inc., 477 Madison Avenue, New York 22, New York, USA.

Distributed in Great Britain and the British Empire by Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 90 Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1, England. Price: 5s. By subscription (4 numbers): 21s.

Distributed to subscribers in the United States by Paragon Mailing Service, 1 Lefferts Avenue, Brooklyn 25, New York. Price: 75 cents. By subscription (4 numbers): \$2.75. Distributed to dealers by Selected Outlets, P.O. Box 761, Hoboken, N.J.

Business correspondence should be addressed to the distributors.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to Roger Caillois, Editor, International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, 19 Avenue Kléber, Paris 16e, France.

The French Edition of *Diogenes* is published by Librairie Gallimard, Paris; the Spanish language edition by Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, Argentina; the German edition by Kiepenheuer und Witsch, Cologne; and the Italian edition by Fratelli Bocca Editori, Rome. An Arabic edition is in preparation. It will be published by Maison Egyptienne d'Édition, Alexandria, Egypt.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Printed in England at The Curwen Press, Plaistow, London, E.13

CONTENTS

ERNEST BARKER	Elections in the Ancient World	I
AMÉRICO CASTRO	The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures	13
J. EMPERAIRE and A. LAMING	The Last Fuegians	37
JEAN DOMARCHI	The Decline of the Ancient World: The Economic Evolution of the Hellenistic States	69
GEORG DRZYMALLA	Freedom and Authority	86
ÉTIEMBLE	New China and the Chinese Language	93
HENRI MENDRAS	Cities and Countryside	III
REVIEWS:		
Augustin Renaudet: <i>Dante Humaniste</i> (PAUL-HENRI MICHEL)		120
R. C. Majumdar et al.: <i>The History and Culture of the Indian People. Vol III</i>		124
P. T. Raju: <i>Idealist Thought of India</i> (LOUIS RENOU)		127
Notes on the Contributors		130

To the reader:

The translation and publication of the Anglo-American edition of *Diogenes* has been made possible through a grant from The Ford Foundation to Intercultural Publications Inc. The Ford Foundation, established by the family of Henry Ford, is dedicated to works of philanthropy, social welfare and education throughout the world. It is one of the objectives of the Foundation to further friendship and understanding among the peoples of all countries through the exchange of cultural materials.

INTERCULTURAL PUBLICATIONS INC.

DIRECTORS: William J. Casey, Charles Garside, Joseph Hambuechen,
H. J. Heinz II, Alfred A. Knopf, James Laughlin, Richard
Weil, Jr.

PUBLICATIONS STAFF: James Laughlin, Publisher
Ronald Freeland, Associate Publisher

ELECTIONS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

I

It is with the Greeks that I shall be mainly concerned. I know much less about those sons of Aeneas, the Romans, whose mother was Venus (so legend and Lucretius tell us), but with whom, for all that, I have never fallen so much in love as I have with the Greeks. In speaking of elections among the Greeks I shall be concerned with their ideas about principles, mainly as those ideas are recorded by Plato and Aristotle, rather than with the methods which actually they used: in other words, I shall attempt an analysis of the general political thinking that lay behind their behaviour, rather than a description of the working of their particular electoral systems. But I must first of all lay a foundation—a foundation of distinctions and definitions—before I attempt that analysis.

The first distinction I have to make is that between election proper, or the deliberate practice of the citizen's choice, for which the Greek word is *hairesis*, the parent of our word 'heresy'—between election proper, on the one hand, and on the other hand the use of the lot, or the appeal to chance, which was also, I hasten to add, a way of giving *everybody* a chance, and for which the Greek word is *klēros*, the ancestor for our word 'clergy'.

Elections in the Ancient World

(It is curious, by the way, that these two Greek words, which are terms of politics, should have issued in our two ecclesiastical terms 'heresy' and 'clergy': but then the Greek word *ecclesia*, which designated a political assembly, has also issued with us in an adjective [the adjective 'ecclesiastical'] and in Latin countries a noun [for example, the French noun *église*], which indicates a religious society.) Now the Greeks regarded election proper as something aristocratic, thinking that *hairesis* meant the selection of 'the best', or the *aristoi*; and they regarded the lot or *klēros* as something democratic—something conducive to liberty and equality, if not necessarily to fraternity. If you want a mixed constitution which combines aristocracy and democracy, Aristotle accordingly argues, you need some sort of mixture of election and the lot. Actually, the use of the lot was far more usual in Greek city-states, at any rate when they were democracies—and they generally were, as Aristotle remarks, noting that the large populations of the cities of his day made any other form of constitution almost impossible—the use of the lot, I repeat, was far more usual than the practice of election. In Athens, for example, most of the officers were appointed by lot, as Aristotle's treatise on the constitution of Athens records; and only the generals and the other military officers, with the finance officials, were elected by vote.

What has just been said, in the last sentence, about the election of *officers* and *officials*, brings us face to face with another distinction, a second distinction, which has to be made. If you assume three branches of government—the deliberative, the executive and the judicial—you may say that today, when we speak of election, we mean election of the members of the deliberative body. The Greeks, when they spoke of election, meant something else: they meant, as a rule, election of the members of the executive body. In their small city-states the citizen did not elect members of parliament: he and his fellows were *themselves* the parliament, the primary assembly, meeting in person and *in pleno*, and not acting indirectly through agents or proctors who served as their representatives and discussed and decided issues on their behalf. Representative institutions were generally unknown to the Greeks, alike in their oligarchies and their democracies: in oligarchies, a fixed limited circle, determined by wealth, or by a mixture of birth and wealth, acted directly as a primary assembly: in democracies the rounded O of the whole civic body acted in the same way and the same capacity. It is not until the middle of the Middle Ages, about the thirteenth century of our era, that the idea and practice of the representative, the *procurator* with 'powers of attorney' acting on behalf

of a constituent body, begins to appear in the Spanish Cortes, in the English parliament, and in the general chapters of religious orders such as the order of the Dominicans. (It is one of my 'heresies', by the way, that representation was perhaps originally, or at any rate mainly, created by thought and ingenuity of the clergy—the clergy both regular and secular—as they developed their general monastic chapters and their provincial convocations of cathedral and diocesan priests.) But here I pause and digress to say that there *were* some hints or embryos of representation among the Greeks of the fifth, fourth and third centuries B.C. There are as many as four such hints or embryos which I should like to mention.

I take Athens first for an example. It is true that the sovereign Athenian assembly, the *ecclesia*, was a primary and not a representative body. But it is also true that Athens had a *boulē* as well as an *ecclesia*, and though this *boulē*, or Council, was subordinate to the *ecclesia*, introducing measures which the assembly then discussed and on which the assembly decided, it was by no means a nugatory body. Now, the Athenian Council—which consisted, by the way, of 500 members, and which met daily (while the Assembly met weekly)—had a basis which was partially, at any rate, elective, and a character which we may call semi-representative, or quasi-representative. The local demes or wards of Athens elected a number of candidates by *hairesis*, the more populous demes electing a larger number than the smaller demes, on a proportional system; and these candidates, if they satisfied a test of their qualifications, were then eligible for selection by lot, as members of the Council. This was a sort of indirect election, or at any rate a mixture of election and lot; and this method made the Council, so far as its powers went (and they were not inconsiderable), a sort of representative body, or an embryo of such a body. I take again, as a second example, the Boeotian League, with its remarkable federal system of cities, as it stood about 400 B.C., and I note that its federal synod of 660 members was *elected* in equal numbers from the eleven electoral divisions of the League, and had, as scholars have noted, 'a strongly representative character'. Indeed it is leagues, or federations, which tend by their nature—as groups of many cities, and as therefore requiring a central federal assembly with members drawn from each city—to foster the evolution of bodies of elected representatives. The individual city may be content, and more than content, with a primary assembly: the group of cities needs something more. Accordingly we find—and this is the third hint or embryo of representation which I would note—we find that the Second Athenian League, which was instituted in 377 B.C., and which sought to

avoid the centralisation and imperialism of the First or Delian League, made provision for a double parliament—one part consisting of the Athenian Council and Assembly, and the other being a 'synod' of representatives from all the other states of the League. The later Achaean League of the third century B.C., the last of my four examples, covered a more contiguous and homogeneous territory than the second Athenian League, and it had no similar device: its assembly, or 'synod', seems to have been a primary assembly composed of the citizens of all the member cities: but two provisions safeguarded what may be called the 'state rights' of these member cities and prevented them from being overwhelmed by the primary federal synod. One provision was that the synod should meet in rotation in each city to give all the cities an equal chance: this may remind us of Rousseau's idea of a movable metropolis, and also of an old Trade-Union practice in England by which Trade-Union branches in different towns were made in rotation the 'governing branch' for the whole of their union. The other provision which safeguarded the rights of the member-cities was that votes were taken in the synod by cities, and not *per capita*, just as votes were taken at Rome by centuries and not by individuals, or as our English Trade Unions give a group-vote in their Trades Union Congress; and each civic unit could thus assert itself and its claims. All this relates to the Achaean assembly or 'synod'; but there was also an Achaean *boulē* or Council, whose members seem to have been selected by lot from all the citizens of the League over thirty years of age. We know little about this Achaean *boulē*; but Dr. Tarn, in his book on *Hellenistic Civilisation*, speaks of it as 'an interesting if tentative experiment in the direction of representative government'.

I have allowed myself to run into some detail, and even to be guilty of digression, in dealing with these hints or embryos of representation in ancient Greece—representation, I mean, in the sense of the election of representatives to the deliberative branch of government. Let me now return to the point which I was making before I went off down the by-road—the point that the Greeks, when they spoke of election, generally meant election of members of the executive rather than election of members of a deliberative assembly. There are two passages in the *Politics* of Aristotle which are here relevant. In both he is discussing the rights of the people and their powers of choice: in both he speaks only of their power of choosing *magistrates*. In the first of these passages he is concerned with the legislation of Solon. Solon, he suggests, gave the people the necessary minimum of power. 'He gave them', I quote Aristotle's words, 'simply

the rights of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; and if the people do not enjoy these elementary rights, they must be a people of slaves, and thus enemies to the government.' The second paragraph comes in that great chapter, the eleventh chapter, of the third book of the *Politics*, in which he is discussing the general issue of the rights of the masses. In that chapter he repeats what he has previously said in dealing with the legislation of Solon. There is a risk, he argues, in not letting the masses have *some* share in the enjoyment of power; a state with a body of disfranchised citizens who are numerous and poor must necessarily be a state which is full of enemies. The alternative is to let them share in the electoral functions; and thus, he says, we find Solon, and some of the other legislators, giving the people the two general functions of electing the magistrates to office and calling them to account at the end of their period of office.

But in actual practice—the actual practice of Athens and the other Greek democracies—there was really very little *election*, in the strict sense of the word, of the members of the executive. The magistrates, as I began by noting, were mainly appointed by lot, with the one exception of the generals and other military officers and the finance officials. Election by show of hands (*cheirotomia*) was regarded as an aristocratic or oligarchical method; and thus Aristotle, reporting the view entertained by some writers about the legislation of Solon, tells us that the method which he introduced of *electing* the executive magistrates was held by them to be the aristocratic element in his system. On the other hand selection by lot—or in other words by the chance of the bean, or *kuamos*, those who drew white beans being the lucky ones—was held to be democratic; and here again we may cite Aristotle, who, enumerating the attributes of democracy, begins by listing the election of officers *by* all and *from* all, but goes on at once to add the method of appointing by lot to all offices—or, at any rate, as he proceeds to add, to all which do not require some practical experience and professional skill. The use of the bean seems strange to us; but now that we are embarked on the egalitarianism of the welfare state we too may come down to beans. To the Athenian, at any rate, it was a symbol and guarantee of equality; and there is this to be said in his favour that he surrounded the bean with safeguards. There was no system—or rather chaos—of a pure lottery; nor was it every chance Tom, Dick and Harry who was carried into office and kept in it by the luck of the lot. The safeguards devised by the Athenians were triple: first, there was a test of fitness, a *dokimasia*, to be satisfied before entry on office; next, there

Elections in the Ancient World

was liability to what may be called a vote of censure (an *epicheirotomia*, or 'additional show of hands') by the assembly during an officer's tenure of office, if it held that there was ground for questioning his conduct; and finally there were regular scrutinies, or *euthunai*, at the end of each officer's tenure of office, which included not only a financial audit but also an examination of the general behaviour of officers. The lot might light on any man; but every man had to think of the fences ahead of him before he started his run.

If there were safeguards against the dangers of the lot, the lot itself was also a safeguard against the possible evils of the alternative system of *election*. In the Greek city-state, as in some of our British municipalities, corrupt practices might easily creep into elections. There were no regular parties in ancient Greece; but there were party clubs—*synōmosiai* or 'conjurations' of persons bound together by oath—which often sought, in the days before the use of the lot, to manage and manipulate elections, for the advancement and in the interest of some particular person or group; and the introduction of the lot—the substitution of the *kuamos* or bean for the *psēphos* or voting pebble—was not only an offering on the altar of equality, but also a prophylactic against election intrigues. Aristotle notes in the *Politics* that at Heraea, a city in Arcadia from which we might have expected an honest rural simplicity, the use of the lot was substituted for the method of election because the results of elections were determined by intrigues; and he also notes that where the offices are filled by vote, and the whole of the people has the vote, candidates begin to play the demagogue in order to get their vote. Similarly he notes in the *Constitution of Athens* that when the demes had a voice and vote in making appointments to office, they were in the habit of selling themselves (for there were rotten boroughs even before the days of eighteenth-century England), and they were therefore deprived of their function. Small bodies, he remarks, are liable to be corrupted by bribes and by favours. In the small Greek city-states personal considerations and interests found a favourable hot-house. Democracy let in the air and cleared the atmosphere; and that was one reason why it spread, and the use of the lot spread with it. It might mean demagoguery; but it also meant a fair field and no favour.

II

Hitherto I have been speaking in general terms about what I may call the political *thought* of the Greeks—the common stock of ideas current among the people at large which issued in their general practice. But I have

always drawn a distinction between political *thought* and political *theory*, meaning by the latter the speculation, the *theoria*, of philosophers and their schools. Political theory may often differ from political thought. It will not be so broad or so popular. It will smell of the study or lecture-room, rather than of the open air. The philosopher will want men to be in his own image, acting by reflective wisdom rather than by common sense and in the light of common conviction based on common experience; in a word, he will tend to be an intellectualist aristocrat, or even a pedantocrat. But here there is a great difference between Plato and Aristotle; between the Academy and the Lyceum, the Platonists of the Academy and the Peripatetics of Aristotle's Lyceum. I am myself a Peripatetic (so are most Englishmen), and my master is, and has always been, Aristotle rather than Plato. I love Plato (so did Aristotle, as witness the noble elegiac verses which he devoted to the memory of the man 'whom the bad have not even the right to praise'); I love Plato, but I follow Aristotle—perhaps because I am a Whig, 'the last of the Whigs', as I remember being once called (what a noble epitaph . . . if only it were true!)—perhaps because I am a Whig and because Aristotle (and *not* the Devil, as Dr. Johnson is reported to have held) was 'the first Whig'.

Plato was a pedantocrat who at the age of eighty (which happens to be now my own age) began to compromise with common sense and to mix democracy with his pedantocracy in the argument of his last, and to my thinking his wisest, dialogue, which is called the *Laws*. He had started from the intellectualism of Socrates, who had objected to the use of the lot because it made way for incompetence as readily as for competence. In the *Republic*, following in the steps and developing the views of his master, he had set the doctrine of specific function and specialised training over against the democratic promiscuity of the lot; and rejecting not only the lot, but also the more aristocratic method of *hairesis* or election, which might after all have given him some sort of a qualified *élite*, he had erected a philosophic sanhedrim, itself selected, and selecting others, on the basis of pure intellectualism. Election thus gave way to selection, and selection was conducted by examination: Plato would have had a mandarin society, with a deaf and silent people, unable to play with beans or to use a voting pebble, but managed and manipulated by a professoriate of examiners—all of them philosophers. (Think of it—all *philosophers*: it is a devastating thought.) It is, indeed, the business of any political society to produce a body of mandarins—an *élite*, a widely recruited *élite*—and having produced it to trust it: but it is also the duty, or rather the right, of such a

Elections in the Ancient World

society to give some sort of consent—in other words, to have something to do with picking the *élite* and something to say about what its members are to do. Plato in the *Republic* is so concerned with the business of producing an *élite* that he neglects to consider the need of any sort of consent. There are some noble words at the end of the *Republic*, addressed by the Interpreter to the souls of the dead who are about to begin a new incarnation in a new round of earthly life: 'No guardian spirit will cast lots for you', says the Interpreter, 'but you shall *choose* your own destiny. . . . The blame is his who *chooses*: Heaven is blameless.' What a pity that Plato did not remember these words—words often quoted afterwards by Christian champions of the freedom of the will—when he was building his political theory. The souls of the dead might choose their new life. The souls of the living members of the political society are left by Plato with *no* choice.

Forty years later, in the *Laws*, written, as I have said, at the end of his life, he begins to pay heed to consent and election, and even to the use of the lot. He is still preoccupied with his *élite*, but he mixes his notion of a selected *élite* with a notion of some sort of consent in a scheme for a mixed constitution. I cannot go into the details, though they are profoundly interesting and curiously anticipate some modern developments. Briefly, he admits a popular assembly, which elects the deliberative body, or council, and also the various executive magistrates. The method proposed for the election of the council is complicated: it is, on the one hand, a mixture of universal suffrage, where each man counts as one, with what may be called class-suffrage, where the electorate is divided into classes and the upper classes count for more than the lower: it is also, on the other hand, a mixture of the aristocratic method of election with the democratic method of the use of the lot. The method proposed for the election of the executive magistrates, the 37 guardians of the law (*nomophilakes*), who take the place of the guardians or *phulakes* of the *Republic*, is more simple; they are simply elected, and elected by a triple ballot, in three successive votes which winnow down the 300 original candidates to the final 37. A curious thing about these guardians of the law is that they hold office for 20 years: there is not much opportunity for election on that basis, but Plato dislikes the democratic idea of a short life and a merry one, so far at any rate as concerns responsible magistrates, and he prefers a long run at a quiet pace. Another thing, and a happy thing, about the guardians of the law is that they have a president, elected from their ranks, in a secret vote by a joint assembly of *all* the magistrates of the State; and a still happier thing is that this president—the head of the government, or prime

minister—must be, *not* the first Lord of the Treasury, as in our own financially minded country, but the Minister of Education (*epimelētes tēs paideias*). I have always admired that provision. If Mr. R. A. Butler is ever prime minister, as he well may be, I hope that he will once more hold the office of Minister of Education (as he did once during the war), in conjunction with that of prime minister.

I turn from Plato to Aristotle. We have no such succession or series of his writings as we have of Plato's, who wrote the *Republic* about 387 B.C. and finished the *Laws* about 347 B.C., so that there is a period of 40 years for the changing and maturing of his views. Aristotle's political writings—the *Politics* and the *Constitution of Athens*, with some political passages in the *Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*—were all crowded, I take it, into the period of some ten years or so (335–324 B.C.) during which he taught at the Lyceum; and they show a consistently Whig or (I may even say) 'Asquithian' trend. . . . I say 'Asquithian', by the way, because I have in my mind the scheme of public social services which Aristotle proposes in the Sixth Book of the *Politics*, a scheme which reminds me of the new scheme of social legislation which Asquith began (it was *he* again, by the way, and not Lloyd George, who was responsible for the scheme, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer)—the scheme which inaugurated the present welfare state. . . . But returning to the particular matter of election, which is my proper theme, I can only repeat what I had already said, that Aristotle believed in the right of the masses—to *plethos*, the people at large—to elect the magistrates and to call them to account, I must add, however, a qualification. He did not believe in unqualified universal manhood suffrage—one man one vote, and all men equal. He had something of J. S. Mill's fear of that absolute; but while Mill would have qualified universal suffrage by a regard to and weighting of the factor of education, Aristotle would have qualified it by a regard to and weighting of the factor of property. In a notable chapter of the Sixth Book of the *Politics* he discusses the relative claims of personality, or 'one man one vote', and of property, or 'the more stake a man has in the country the more the number of his votes'. He proposes a plan which recognises and does justice to both claims. Let the will of the majority prevail, he says, but let it be the will of a majority of persons who *are also the owners of a majority of property*. He proceeds to suggest a system which gives effect to this plan. The system might have worked in a small city-state: it could hardly work in a state of 30,000,000 electors, for it would involve an impossible mass of mathematical calculations. But the whole idea is not a folly: it is a Whig

attempt at a rational eirenicon. The pity is that politics are in a sense beyond, or above, reason. They include also sentiments, feelings, prejudices; and the egalitarian sentiment will always reject an eirenicon, however rational, which contravenes its feeling that 'a man's a man for a' that'. Sentimentalists, however, as well as rationalists, will accept another suggestion made by Aristotle in the same wise Sixth Book of the *Politics*. It is that those who are eligible for office should not be a narrower circle than those who elect to office. Do not, Aristotle says, have a broad circle of electors and a narrow circle of the eligible, for that will mean that the few who are eligible will start bidding against one another for the support of the electorate, and that will mean corruption, sedition, and ultimate revolution.

I have spent four-sixths, or even seven-eighths, of my time on the Greeks. The difficulty about the Romans is that they didn't *think*—at any rate originally—and the Greeks always steal the limelight, because they *would* think, and not only think, but also talk and write. I have been trying lately to collect passages from Latin and Greek authors on the development of social and political ideas from 300 B.C. to A.D. 300, and I have been astonished—no, I was not astonished, for it was really what I expected—to find how little I got from the Latin authors I consulted. If I did get anything—for instance, from Cicero—I found, or suspected, that he had got it from a Greek, generally a Greek whose name began with a P, Polybius or Panaetius or Posidonius. The only good fresh Latin stuff I could find was in the Roman lawyers, such as Gaius and Ulpian. I will mention what I found in them in a moment; but let me first hasten to admit that the Romans—being, as they essentially were, good engineers, both literally and metaphorically—literally, in building roads and aqueducts and *castra* and *coloniae*; metaphorically, in building viable and workable institutions—being, as I say, good engineers, engineered a whole system of elections. To describe it would be to run into constitutional antiquities of *comitia curiata*, *comitia centuriata*, *comitia tributa*, and that puzzling body, the *concilium plebis*; it would also be to flounder in a Serbonian bog of obscurity and the muddy slough of my own sad ignorance. I once knew something about it, when I took the Oxford School of *Literae Humaniores* in 1897: I have now forgotten it all. I only know that the Romans were great voters: they threw *tabellae* into an urn as they came by a gallery or *pons* out of the enclosures in which they were penned century by century: a majority of the votes in a century determined the vote of that century, and a majority of the centuries (it was all a system of *group-voting*)

determined the vote of the whole *comitia*. Formally, the people both voted *leges* (which the Athenian *demoi*, by the way, did not do) and elected magistrates; actually, as the Republic developed, the government fell into the hands of the Senate, which consisted of ex-magistrates and was thus, at most, *indirectly* recruited by popular election in the *comitia*. But the elections in the *comitia*, in the latter days of the Republic, were manipulated by corruption or managed by the leaders of armies: and when the Empire came they were automatically determined by the will of the *Princeps*. A quasi-democratic façade covered the rule of 'Tammanies' and 'bosses'; election in the ancient Roman world became a sham, interesting enough as a sham, but with no real political thought, no common conviction, and no general consent behind it. Yet the form persisted, if it persisted only as a sham; it entered into the theories and the formulas of the Roman lawyers; by them it was transmitted, as part of the corpus of Roman law, to the Middle Ages and the modern world; and thus we come to the paradox, the final paradox of our argument, that the sham system of voting and election current in later Rome meant more, far more, to the medieval and modern world, and transmitted a greater inheritance, than the genuine system current in Periclean and fourth-century Greece. Great is the power of shams, especially when they are adopted by the lawyers, who are adepts at dealing with them.

We must therefore look, as we end, at the theories which the Roman lawyers drew from the shams, or forms, of the Republic, as they were continued in and practised by the government of the Empire. Let us take their conception of law, or *lex*, and let us note Gaius' definition that *lex est quod populus jubet et constituit*—law is the command and ordinance of the people, the result of *their* vote, the consequence of *their* saying, in answer to the *rogatio* of the presiding officer, '*Uti rogas*', 'Be it as you ask'. *Ainsi soit-il*. This is the theory of the basis of law in the will and vote of the people which you find in St. Thomas Aquinas, and which St. Thomas transmitted to future generations. But even more striking is the conception of the origin and basis of authority—the authority of government—which you find expounded by Ulpian and adopted, again, by St. Thomas. Why has a prince authority? 'Because', says Ulpian, 'the people, by means of the *Lex Regia* which is enacted concerning his authority, confers upon him and into his hands all *its* authority and power.' St. Thomas adopts and glosses this: the people give, and, he adds, the people can take away, if its gift should be abused. This is the way in which you arrive at the theory of the Social Contract, of which Filmer says that it was 'hatched

Elections in the Ancient World

in the Schools and fostered by all succeeding papists for good divinity', but of which, going even further back, we may say that the original egg was laid by the Roman lawyers of the imperial age. It is the triumph of election in the ancient world, that the sham election of the Roman emperors, who, as we all know, never *were* elected, should have been, in the political field, the real classical inheritance bequeathed to the modern world. But I ought to add that St. Thomas, if he knew and drew on Ulpian, also knew and drew on Aristotle, whose *Politics* he knew in a Latin translation made by a Dominican archbishop. The eleventh chapter of the third book, with its idea that the people should elect the magistrates and *call them to account*, was an authority that could serve as a supplement to the dictum of Ulpian. So I end, after all, with Aristotle—but with an Aristotle hanging on to the coat-tails of Ulpian. Which is a curious picture! For Aristotle, after all, is greater than Ulpian.

THE PRESENCE OF THE SULTAN SALADIN IN THE ROMANCE LITERATURES

Cultural phenomena never exist except in connexion with the agents of human life that make them possible and endow them with their authentic value. Culture is not of itself a fertilising rain—nothing human can be 'of itself', an island of abstraction. Literary themes, then, are things that happen in and to someone's historical life. Their value is manifested to its full extent when the theme that interests us is seen as the expression, through an individual, of a particular people, who, in giving life to the literary theme, achieves its self-realisation in terms of a value structure. We have rather too frequently thought about comparative literature as if its motivating force were always some theme common to several literatures, and as if these literatures were limited to the historico-geographical space in which the migratory theme takes up residence and progressively 'evolves'. This over-abstract and anti-vital idea leads to another, the notion of the theme in its pure state, the *Urtema*, in many comparative studies.

The actual truth is that a writer chooses his theme, whether that theme be contemporary or remote in time. The theme, ancient or recent, is in its received form simply the possibility for a new creation, and the importance of the new creation lies in its function and power as a generator of values,

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

not in the formal skeleton that links it with something that is not it. The mere establishing of connective schemes is a scholars' game, nothing more. And I say this not to criticise or oppose anyone or anything. Rather, the present period requires that someone say it—this period in which it has become impossible to gather into one comprehensive embrace the ever more incoherent masses of knowledge about man. We have reached the absurd situation where it is not the unknown but the known that is a problem. How can one learn all that has been found out already about any bit of history? The *terrae incognitae* are not in the shadows of the past but in the libraries that tower around us. Wherefore my interest in looking for *ways of understanding*, rather than new or unpublished facts. It is high time we systematise (as best we can, according to our means) the legacy bequeathed to us by our hardworking, praiseworthy predecessors.

Life is always the expression of a somebody, and this somebody is not an abstract being. It is a concrete human reality—collective or individual—and always a variety. At the same time we are so busy these days repeating Aristotle's dictum that 'being is expressed in many ways', we must also emphasise the equally certain principle that man and his good life consist in an existence as a plurality and difference of expressions. What is important in literature, then, is not the common and *comparable* aspect but those features in each literature that differentiate it and set it in contrast against others. Let me recall for my purposes an idea of Joseph de Maistre's: 'The Constitution of 1795, like its predecessors, is made for Man. Now there is no such thing as man in the world. In my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.; thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be a Persian: but as for Man, I declare that I have never seen him' (*Considérations sur la France*, 1796).

Let us take this as our point of view and have a look at the figure of the Sultan Saladin as it is presented in the Romance literatures of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Spain, France, and Italy. Each one of these peoples—Spanish, French, Italian—made use of such news as reached them about the Sultan of Babylon in the same way that a painter makes use of the colours on his palette and the prefigurations waiting in his fantasy. Each people accentuated in this case the aspects and values most pleasing to them, and muted or rejected all that was incompatible with the functioning of their 'vital dwelling place'.¹ History is always the result of the

¹ For a further explanation of this idea, see my *La realidad histórica de España*, Mexico, 1954 (translated into English under the title *The Structure of Spanish History*, Princeton, 1954). The present paper was designed to offer a concrete application of the historical method expounded there.

play between the sought for and the rejected—in the last analysis, the play between what each concrete variety of man finds more or less comfortably possible and what he finds possible only with difficulty. By itself the literary matter that makes up the theme of Saladin is like the puppet when the show is over.

There is scarcely a new fact among those I am going to present here. All are to be found in a few well-known publications.² My special interest, rather, is to point out the disparity between the manifestations of Saladin in each of the three great Romance literatures, and, at the same time, the inner coherence that each of the manifestations presents. The forms of Saladin's person and life are not like a river spilling over the various countries of Europe; they have no substance that persists through or beneath their aspects. They are pure inventions without effective historical foundation, without any logic to bind them together. The source of the various structures is the inner process of each literature as it deals with the Saladin theme.

The political and military genius of Islam flashed for the last time in the figure of Saladin (1138–93), Sultan of Egypt, Caliph of Baghdad, and conqueror of the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187. After the victory of Hittin and the conquest of the Holy City, the crusaders went into decline. Richard I of England and Philip II of France did not succeed in regaining the lost ground. In the course of the thirteenth century the Holy Land once more became a Moslem dominion. Saladin (whose name in Arabic means 'prosperity, integrity of faith') succeeded in reviving and effectively unifying the Islamic Orient, to the sorrow of Christendom. His zeal for his faith led him to exterminate those Templars and Hospitalers who fell prisoners after Hittin, knights who must have represented for Saladin a perverted, Christian version of the bellico-religious virtues of Islam. He also had Renaud de Châtillon put to death for violating a truce, although he spared the life of King Guy de Luzignan, and permitted the Christian inhabitants of the city to leave freely.

Saladin's life is nobly marked by generous, chivalrous features: his soldiers once snatched a baby girl from the arms of her mother and were going to sell her as a slave; Saladin had the little captive returned to her mother, and, according to the chroniclers, the Sultan's tears mingled with

²The most important of the studies in question are: Gaston Paris, 'La Légende de Saladin', *Journal des Savants* (May–August, 1893); by the same author, 'La Parabole des trois anneaux', *Revue des Etudes Juives*, xi (1885); Mario Penna, *La parabola dei tre anelli e la tolleranza del medio evo*, Turin, 1952. These studies contain references to still others which need not be mentioned here.

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

those of the happy mother. The grandeur of the Soldan of Babylon (i.e., of Cairo) was praised by Dante and Boccaccio. In the first literary manifestations, to be sure, the portraits of Saladin are very hostile to him (thus, for example, in the *Carmen de Saladino*). Later, the direction of the approach changes, and Saladin looms as an exemplary figure. Each literature, each people, comes to see in him the prototype of the virtues which are most pleasing to it.

The idealisation of such a personage within Christian society was not simply a reflection of Saladin's grandeur, for his whole life spelled the ruin of the crusaders' mission and of Christian power along the routes of expansion toward the Orient. The anecdotes about the Sultan's humane behaviour were pretexts for literary creations whose *raison d'être* has to be looked for in the basic 'disposition' of life as well as the historical temper of certain European peoples. Specifically I refer to a certain critical attitude regarding ecclesiastical customs, and also to the idea that the spirit of God could manifest itself through beliefs that were not Christian. It is not enough to say that there were ideas and sentiments of tolerance in certain European countries during the so-called Middle Ages, because tolerance is a negative attitude with respect to what is tolerated, to what is felt as something that ought not to exist but whose existence, even so, we must allow and endure. In the case of Saladin more than this was involved: it takes more than greatness for a man to be converted into a prototype of great virtues. (Genghis-Khan did not filter into the wells of literary expression in Europe.)

Actually, the figure of Saladin provided a means of expression for pre-existing situations that people were interested in showing forth, and which gained prestige by being set in the frame of an illustrious personage, remote and exemplary. This figure was, after all, no less fabulous than that of Prester John of the Indies; for it was not established fact but hearsay and invention that were at work here. Above all, this intercultural activity was favoured by the harmony that had existed between Christians and Moslems since before the thirteenth century, the result of which was evident in the military orders, the holy war, and the codification of religious tolerance in the *Partidas* of Alphonse the Learned (cf. *The Structure of Spanish History*, Chap. vii). But it was not in Spain that the figure of Saladin made its first appearance. Rather, it was in Italy and France, and, to be sure, in forms that were never accepted by Castilian literature. In this connexion it is important to remember the forty-two years of the reign of Frederick II of Swabia (1208-50), the great emperor of Sicily and

Germany. Frederick had a Moslem's command of Arabic, and, if the occasion arose, he could embellish his discourse with quotations from the poets. His friendship with Saladin's son Al-Kamil, the Sultan of Egypt, made possible his peaceful occupation of Jerusalem in 1229, even if only for two days, thanks to the brief of excommunication issued against him by Pope Gregory IX. Gregory preferred to lose the Holy City for Christendom rather than yield in the contest of ambitions which had got him on such bad terms with Frederick. The violent criticisms of the papacy that certain French works put into Saladin's mouth may have been an echo of that incredible situation. What happened between Frederick and Sultan Al-Kamil (a struggle, after all, between men who respected and admired each other) can be understood if one bears in mind that that world was one huge chivalric *koiné*, within which it was possible, at least for knights, to cross over the religious barriers. E. Kantorowicz says: 'The norms of the chivalry of the nobility were traced out in the Orient before they were in Europe, as is evident from the epic of Firdusi and other testimonies.'³

For many contemporaries, beginning with the Pope, Frederick was an unbeliever. They even attributed to him the authorship of the non-existent *De tribus impostoribus*. It would be imprudent and anachronistic to apply nineteenth-century criteria to Frederick, as Renan and others have done. The reality was that Islam offered the opportunity for certain attitudes that we today would call deistic, but without the consequence that the Moslem, or certain rather Islamicised Christians, should therefore reject everything not demonstrable by reason or science. Ibn Hazm of Cordova wrote, in the middle of the eleventh century, that some people think 'there must undoubtedly be among all the religions one that is authentic, but it has not manifested itself evidently and clearly, and therefore God has imposed on no one the obligation to profess it'. This, after all, was what the Koran said: 'If your Lord had wished it, verily all the people in the world would have had the same belief'. In our own times, a man who finds religious beliefs inadmissible puts them aside and accepts in their place the dogmas of science or a political or social creed. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries this could not be done, since there was no place for souls to rest outside the realm of the traditional beliefs. It was thus possible to move about within this realm without ceasing to be a believer. Emperor Frederick longed to know what the nature of this world was as well as that of the other. To satisfy his curiosity he asked questions

³ *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite*, 1927, p. 174.

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

of both Christians and Moslems (and, I imagine, of Jews). These questionnaires have been preserved, as has the answer to one of them by a young sage of Ceuta who permits himself no little hauteur in his dealings with the emperor. The great Frederick would not have been interested in finding out about the system of justice in hell if he had not believed in the possibility and the existence of hell. His intellectualist position is formally analogous to the emotional situation of his famous contemporary, Ibn Arabi of Murcia: 'My heart can take on any form, for its name means "change" . . . The variety of its feelings is due to the variety of the Divine manifestations that appear to its inmost ground.'⁴ Or again, as he says: 'My heart can take on any form: it is a pasture for gazelles and a monastery for Christian monks. A temple for idols, and for the Kaaba of the pilgrims, and for the tables of the Torah, and for the book of the Koran. I follow the religion of love: whatever the direction of the camels of my love, my religion and my faith are there.'⁵

For those chosen souls, God had not fenced off his fields, and the gazelles of a faith infused with hope could chase from one to another of them, breathless with longing. Had anyone taken proper account of this vital situation—and of the position of each people within it—the theme of Saladin, the theme of the three rings, and others of the same sort would have become historically comprehensible. What ought to be done is to situate these themes not only in a time, but, above all, in the lives of those who evoked them and found in them meaning and solace. If the figure of Frederick had one foot in Islam and the other in Rome, Saladin might well have been seen as his double, with his Mohammedanism but one step from Christian spirituality. In this, as in many other cases, the most naïve reflections might now be the most fruitful. It must be remembered that never before had two sections of humanity confronted one another with such great and durable strength, a strength that was both spiritual and political: Christian Europe and the Islam of the fighting caliphs. Each of these forces was a part of the other's vital horizon, in a relationship that in no way resembled the earlier ones between Rome and Greece or between Rome and Germany. And this relationship was six hundred years old in the thirteenth century.

I do not know how the Moslems of the Orient regarded the figure of Frederick of Swabia, or what reflections that wizard, who got into Jerusalem without drawing his sword, may have found in their literature. We

⁴ *The Tarjumán Al-Ashwāq*, tr. R. A. Nicholson, London, 1911, p. 69.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

do know, on the other hand, how the Christians felt about Saladin and how they conceived him. The Italians saw in him a great lord no less liberal than Alexander: 'Who is not thankful in his heart for Alexander's royal benefits? Who does not still remember the good king of Castile, or Saladin . . . ?' (Dante, *Convivio*, iv, ii). The liberality of the generous lord made possible the magnificence, the great spectacle of life conceived as a work of art—in which Italy was the guide and master of uncouth Europe. Dante's praise of liberality is not that of a beggar, of a writer greedy for any surplus wealth that might come his way. Rather is he thinking of the regal and illustrious character of those exalted lords, whose line was to be continued by the Medici. Saladin was the only Moslem to be spared eternal punishment. Dante places him in limbo along with the heroes of Antiquity.

And I saw Saladin, alone, apart.

(*Inferno*, iv, 129)

The desire to christianise Saladin plays no part here, nor in any of the references to him in Italian literature, where the approach, in this regard, is secular and earthly. (A German, Wido von Bazoches, characterises Saladin as '*Princeps quidam, nisi foret extra fidelium gregem, egregius*'.⁶)

Later, Boccaccio was to elaborate, as we shall see, on the theme of magnificence and social splendour. First, however, other aspects must be observed. For the Italians, the Sultan of Babylon was sceptical, or, rather, indifferent in matters of religion: 'Little did he value its laws and commandments', Boccaccio says of him in the Dante commentary, for the mere pleasure of saying so; for Saladin was the zealous defender of Islamic orthodoxy. A person who in certain other peoples evoked the image of a Saladin on the brink of conversion, is seen in this case as cold and critical, devoid of emotional warmth. The virtues brought into relief are sagacity and astuteness, and such was the approach to his figure in *Le cento novelle antiche*, or the *Novellino*. 'Saladin was a most noble sultan, a lord illustrious and generous.' On one occasion he ordered that someone be made a present of 200 marks; his treasurer made a mistake and wrote 300; the Sultan then made him write 400 so that the pen would not be more generous than he was. But what follows in this narrative is even more meaningful. During a truce, Saladin noticed the Christians' manner of eating: the lords at tables and the poor on the ground. 'This he rebuked and censured sharply, for the friends of the Christians' Lord were eating in

⁶Johannes Hartmann, *Die Persönlichkeit des Sultans Saladin im Urteil der abendländischen Quellen*, 1933, p. 100.

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

a mean and base fashion.' Later the Christians came and observed the customs of the Saracens and found them eating on the ground. Saladin put up a splendid tent and spread out rugs which were covered with a multitude of crosses. The Christians trampled on the crosses and spat on them. Then the Sultan rebuked them for despising the Cross, and for loving God more with gestures and words than with works. The truce was broken and hostilities were resumed. At the heart of the little story is the deviously ingenious scheme and the clever way of setting a trap for the enemy.

On another occasion, Richard Cœur de Lion and Saladin are fighting. The English king fights dismounted, and his adversary offers him a horse so that such a noble man shall not go on foot. The king is suspicious and turns the horse over to a squire. The horse turns out to have been especially trained, and breaks away at full gallop for Saladin's camp. Although this anecdote is to be found in French chronicles, the important thing is the predominance of this kind of motive in Italy. In certain versions in the *Livre de la Terre-Sainte*, Saladin offers the horse without any malice; in others, with malice. Astuteness does not displace the same volume in France as in Italy; and above all, it has not the same function.

Italy presents a characteristic treatment, in this respect, of the well-known theme of the three rings—the symbol of the three religions—Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Judaism. A father bequeathes to his sons three rings, each one having an apparently precious stone. Two of the stones are false, although the difference between them and the true one is not to be detected at first glance. How is one to tell the difference between them? Those who have studied this story up to now have believed they could disregard the historical personality of those who treated the story and establish a chronological order for the various versions. Others have tried to explain the differences between one version and another on the basis of practical motives—of defence, among the Jews; of missionary proselytism, among certain Christians; of reaction against the Inquisitorial laws, in Italy; etc. The question, in my judgement, is at once simpler and rather more complex. One only has to notice the complete absence of the parable of the three rings in the literatures of the Iberian Peninsula to realise that we are faced in such problems with modes of human behaviour conditioned by the disposition of the several 'vital dwelling-places' in each European group, and not with narratives in the service of practical motives, or produced by the free and capricious play of fantasy.

There were a number of narratives or tales about the magic power latent in a precious stone and about the puzzle arising from the fact that of

three stones one possessed virtues absent from the others. Thus in the first story of the *Novellino* it is told how Prester John of the Indies sent Emperor Frederick II three gems of the greatest value. The Emperor accepted the gift without suspecting the marvellous properties of one of the stones. Prester John then tried to get them back. One of his lapidaries managed to get a look at them. One stone, he told Frederick, was worth a city; another, a province; the third, a whole empire. He squeezed it in his fist, became invisible, and returned to the court of his lord. The story's interest centres in the astuteness of the shrewd lapidary and in Emperor Frederick's lack of perspicacity, even though he was the 'epitome of the world in speech and manners, and a master of the subtleties of the art of giving wise answers'. A high degree of astuteness has always been one of the virtues most prized by the Italian, while the unwary and the dull-witted have frequently been the types he has chosen to represent human inferiority.

In other cases the stones symbolise the three religions, and no one can tell from their appearance which is the best, the authentically divine one. One version, collected by the Spanish Jew Salomón Aben Verga in *Shebet Yehuda*, is a work composed in the fifteenth century and containing (as is usual in Moslem and Jewish works of this kind) traditions of much earlier date. King Peter I of Aragon (1094-1104) asks a Jew which of the two religions is the true one, the Christian or the Jewish? The Jew answers with a parable: 'A neighbour of mine set forth on a journey about a month ago, and to console his two sons, he left each of them a precious stone. The two brothers came to see me and asked me to tell them about the nature of the stones and the difference between one and the other. "Who can know better than your father?" I answered them. "He is an expert lapidary. Ask him and he will tell you the truth." For giving this answer, they beat me and insulted me.' The king praised the cleverness of the Jew and grasped the meaning of his parable. He could grasp it thanks to a situation in which different beliefs intermingled harmoniously in the common life of the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula. (This was not a situation of mere tolerance.) In an appendix of *The Structure of Spanish History* I have quoted a passage from a fourteenth-century chronicle in which God appears as a vertex of justice where Christianity and Mohammedanism converge.

But a real situation is one thing, and taking one's distance from that situation and expressing the idea implicit in it is quite another. The Spaniards *lived* the reality of their history without producing a theoretical

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

expression of its significance. The Moslems could do this (Ibn Hazm and Ibn Arabi come to mind as examples), and also certain Hispano-Hebrews, such as the anonymous author of the last parable; and one way or another they always injected into their expression a note of personal feeling. The Italians saw in this theme a triumph for the subtlety of the mind and a justification of their tendency not to let themselves be carried away by excessive enthusiasm, that is, not to fight spontaneously and epically for the destruction or the defence of a belief. The Spaniards on the other hand, were delighted by battles—collective or individual—*pro Deo et Ecclesia*.

In story LXXIII of the *Novellino*, the Soldan (that is, Saladin) needs money. His counsellors tell him to have recourse to a certain ruse and thus trick a rich Jew out of his money. In this way a theological problem is posed, but in cold and calculating terms, as a battle of wits. Only in Italy is the question presented in this fashion. The Jew senses the danger at once: if he says that his own religion is the best, the Soldan will be offended and will punish him; if he says that the Moslem religion is the best, he will be asked why he is a Jew. Then the sagacious Hebrew tells the famous parable of the three sons and the three rings. 'Each one thought he owned the good one, and no one knew which it was except the father. The same I say to you about the religions, which are three. The Father which is in heaven must know which is the best; and among the sons, which are ourselves, each one believes that his is the good one.' The Soldan had nothing to say and let the Jew go in peace. The presence of Saladin in this case is a faint echo of the legend of the monarch who was tolerant and somewhat uncertain in matters pertaining to religion. It is not a question here of scepticism or of Renaissance spirit, cheap and false formulas that evade the historical reality. In Italy the religious problem was coldly and distantly regarded as an interesting curiosity. The impassioned deism of the Moslems and the Jews has been resolved into a formal scheme merely by the process of objectification, by being detached from the person. This is indeed the road to atheistic rationalism. But neither the author of the *Novellino* nor Boccaccio is an atheist or a sceptical analyst of the religious phenomenon. That is yet to come.

The three rings reappear in the *Venturoso Ciciliano*, by Bosone da Gubbio (beginning of the fourteenth century), in a spirit like that of the *Novellino*. But it is in the *Decameron* (I, 3) that the story acquires its maximum degree of literary relief. The matter is discussed once more by Saladin and a Jew (named Melchizedec in this case), so that Christian sensibilities will not be

affected by the final answer. According to Boccaccio, Saladin has recourse to the Jew because his treasury has been exhausted by the cost of his magnificence and his wars. The Sultan does not attempt to expropriate the Jew's wealth but rather to borrow from him: Melchizedec 'lent money at usurious rates in Alexandria'. But the conclusion is the same as in the other two Italian versions: 'Each people believes it must cling to its own heritage, to its true Law and the commandments thereof; but as in the case of the rings, it is an open question whose is really true.'

As an Italian of the upper class, Boccaccio was captivated by the spectacle of intellectual daring—which is not the same as being intellectually daring. This great Italian saw life as a contest between human desires on the one hand and the means found for resisting them on the other. Desires in conflict take up the entire reality of the figures of the *Decameron* (rather as if we knew nothing of a pair of wrestlers save what might be revealed about them in the course of a match). These personified impulses have no 'beyond' that transcends them, nor any kind of perspective leading to the troubled inwardness of their consciences. These figures are pure activity, directed toward the achievement of an immediate end over such obstacles as the art of Boccaccio can make us feel to be justified within the 'polemical zone'. One of the antagonists is usually defeated under circumstances that are sometimes very comical. This art is beautifully transparent but almost entirely lacking in feeling as it makes perceptible the powerful game of a greater agility of mind against a lesser one, or against pure stupidity. The organisation of spectacles and the admiration of intellectual subtlety have always been among the greatest sports for the Italians.

It is quite understandable that Boccaccio should, in a sharply drawn, very elegant sketch, give new life to the image of Guido Cavalcanti, Dante's '*amico primo*', and 'one of the world's best logicians and an excellent natural philosopher'. He had a merry disposition and was well-spoken. He knew better than anyone how to do the things expected of a gentleman. Besides, he was very rich and sought to pay highest honours where they were due. Betto Brunelleschi, the leader of a gay company of Florentine youths, tried but failed to bring Guido into his group. The logician was more interested in keeping to himself and engaging in speculation. 'Because he shared somewhat the opinions of the Epicureans, it was said among the common people that the object of his speculations was to see if he could find a proof that God did not exist.' Strolling one day, as was his custom, he came to the Church of San Giovanni, and he stopped behind the marble sarcophagi at the entrance. His friends saw him and

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

began to tease him: "Guido, you don't want to be one of us; but, tell us, when you have discovered that God does not exist, what will you do?" On seeing himself thus surrounded, Guido replied crisply: "Sirs, in your house you may say anything you please to me." That is, since you dwell with the dead, you may speak to me like dead men—like idiots and know-nothings. 'Thereupon he put his hand on one of the sarcophagi, which were very high, and nimbly vaulted over it to the other side, and, separating from them, went his way.' From then on the tricksters tricked regarded Guido as a subtle and intelligent gentleman.

Daring agility of mind, complexity and intricacy in discourse, elasticity and resilience in body are combined in this ideal figure of a man—a *summum* of Italian values. We do not know how Guido's audacious (averoistic)⁷ reflections turned out, nor whether the whole affair was merely a street rumour or something more. It is enough, in the present case, that Boccaccio has set up one of his characteristic conflicts, this one between an elegant recluse, a devotee of logical reflection, and a group of merry-makers fond of staging fine parties and spectacles 'whenever any joyful news of victory or anything else reached the city'. I should consider it quite meaningless to call this a manifestation of the Renaissance in the fourteenth century. This would be like speaking of *seicentismo* in the *Trecento*. I prefer to think that in Boccaccio's work we have revealed in very pure state the aims and impulses of the 'functional structure' (*vividura*) of Italian life. Seen in terms of this functional structure, the themes of the *Decameron*, among them the theme of Saladin, take on meaning. Problems considered under the cold light of reason (no vital integralism here), sharpness of wit, clever schemes and tricks, comedy, the ordering of social life into an aesthetically pleasing hierarchy—in one way or another, all this is found in the Italian versions of the parable of the rings and in the tale so characteristic of Boccaccio, *Saladin and Messer Torello di Pavia* (x, 9).

When he hears that a new crusade is being prepared, Saladin, 'most valiant lord, and at that time Soldan of Babylon', decides to go and have a close look at the enemy's preparations. He tells his people that he is going on a pilgrimage to Mecca, but actually he sets out for Italy, disguised as a merchant and accompanied by a reduced entourage of faithful friends. His object is to spy on the Christians. He meets Messer Torello, who ministers

⁷ See B. Nardi, 'L'averroismo del "primo amico" di Dante', in *Dante e la Cultura medievale*, 1949, p. 93. To question the survival of individual souls does not necessarily mean to deny God's existence.

to the strangers and gives them lodging, though he conceals for the moment the fact that he has taken them to his own house. He installs them in chambers 'most richly appointed; they were served an abundance of fine foods with great and beautiful ceremony'. Saladin is surprised to be treated as an emperor, for Messer Torello is a 'citizen and not a lord' (the Italians took pride, and quite rightly, in the fact that it was really their *bourgeoisie* who taught the monarchs of Europe how to live like kings). The appearance of the mistress of the house is given a spectacular treatment: 'Most beautiful and noble in body, and adorned with rich garments, between her small sons, who seemed two lambs, she came forth before them, and made them a pleasing greeting.' The Sultan-merchant receives gifts that fill him with wonder. The travellers depart. The Christians undertake their new crusade, and among them is Messer Torello, who has made a compact with his wife that in case he does not come back, she will wait for him one year, one month and one day after she has received the last news of him. Then she may marry again. Messer Torello falls prisoner. The Sultan recognises him and heaps splendours upon him. Such sudden glory makes him forget somewhat his affairs in Lombardy. In the meantime, the news has reached Messer Torello's house that he has died, and his wife prepares to marry again. When the prisoner learns of this, he is desperate. But Saladin and his magician are there to save the situation. They give him a narcotic, lay him on a sumptuous bed, bedeck him with jewels, and gird him on a sword set with precious stones. And that is not all. 'On each side of him they put two huge golden basins filled with gold coins; and many strings of pearls and rings and girdles, and other things, which it would take long to recount, [Saladin] caused to be put around him.' Just as in the earlier case of Guido Cavalcanti modern readers could see anticipations of the Renaissance spirit, here Messer Torello and his portentous bed will probably make some people think of the ornamental abundance of the so-called Baroque. It would be more correct, however—and I insist on this again—to say that both phenomena express moments of axiological tension within the functioning of the Italian *vividura*, in perfect and beautiful accord with the preferences and possibilities of that process.

The introduction of the magician makes it possible to mount a scene of *opera buffa*. The sumptuous couch, carrying the still sleeping Messer Torello, comes to rest in the Church of San Piero in Cieldoro, in Pavia. The sacristan is terrified when, the next morning, he discovers the unexpected catafalque. To his own panic is added, in a crescendo of comedy, that of the abbot and his friars, who flee in terror as they cry '*Domine ajutaci*'.

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

Amidst this uproar, Messer Torello awakens, very happy to find himself where he had asked Saladin to have him transported. Thus he once again praises Saladin's magnificent power. He calls the abbot, who is his uncle, by his name, only to increase the panic, for the uncle has thought his nephew dead. Yet the uncle ends up by recognising him in spite of his long beard and his Arabic garments. The tale ends with everybody happy.

From what I have pointed out it can be seen that the pleasing and meaningful element in these narratives is what Italian genius put into them—not the schematic and generic theme of Saladin. And the two aspects must not be regarded as on a level of equality, for they are heterogeneous. The latter is possibility, the former fulfilled reality. The themes that certain comparativists talk about are devoid of artistic and vital style.

When we get into the literature of France, a Saladin quite different from the Italian one emerges at once. First of all, in the French version of the parable of the three rings neither Saladin nor the Jew is involved, and this is a negative feature that ought to have been noticed but has not. The relationship between the Frenchman and his religious faith was not the same as the Italian's. The Frenchman felt himself the executor of a mission expressed in the eleventh century by the incisive phrase *Gesta Dei per Francos*. In this phrase the *gest*, the crusading, epic impulse, figured in the foreground. The activistic, practical Frenchman directed his great energy towards extremely precise goals. As early as about the year 1000 a French king arrogated to himself the divine power to cure scrofula, as well as the right to pass this miraculous virtue on to his descendants. Religion provided a support for royal and feudal power in France somewhat as the devotion to the monarchy provides a foundation for political organisation in England today. The French were not interested in static thought about the uncertain validity of the three religions, nor in charting subtle lines of argument that would lead to inconclusive positions. This problem, fruitful in other ways, interested Jews and Italians, or the Mallorcan (not Castilian) Raymond Lully.

When a Frenchman takes up the question of the three rings, he thinks that one must be the true one. Thus proceeded the Dominican Etienne de Bourbon, in the first half of the thirteenth century, in a *Tractatus de diversis materiis praedicabilibus*. He says right off in the preface that 'actions speak louder than words', according to a phrase which he appropriates from St. Gregory, for Christ '*primo docuit factis quam verbis*'. The parable is this:

A certain rich man owned a ring, and set in it was a precious stone endowed with the power to heal all sicknesses. The wife of this man bore him a legitimate daughter, and later, *corrupta a lenonibus*, she had others that passed for legitimate daughters of her husband. He knew this, and before his death, he drew up a will declaring that he bequeathed the ring to his legitimate daughter, and that his inheritance would go to the owner of the ring. The other women, when they found this out, had similar rings made for themselves. When the will was opened before the judge, each one showed her ring and claimed to be the legitimate daughter. The judge, a wise man, tested the virtue of each of the rings. When he found none at all in the other rings, he adjudged legitimate the ring that had demonstrated its virtue, and declared the others illegitimate.

The question concerning the three religions, a concrete, historical question known to everyone, has disappeared. In its place has appeared the abstract question of one truth as opposed to multiple error. In the seventeenth century Corneille took as his model Guillén de Castro's *Cid*. 'The milk I sucked as a babe is still white upon my lips, yet this shall not keep me from mixing it with the red of your blood.' So goes the rich metaphor of the Spanish, even when thinned down into prose. For this Corneille says: 'Courage is not measured by the number of one's years'. On the one hand, the integration of abstract concept and concrete felt experience; on the other, striking conceptual clarity. In the French text of the story of the rings, the sentiments, passions, and modes of human conduct (suspicion, envy, astuteness) have disappeared. The parable has become a case at law in which certain illegitimate daughters impugn a will made in favour of the legitimate daughter. A test of legitimacy is made, and the judge renders his opinion. Of the marvellous there is present only the indispensable minimum to give the judge's opinion the appearance of legality.

The other French versions have the same unity of tendency which, after their own fashion, the Italian ones displayed. Adolf Tobler published, in 1884, a short poem of the thirteenth century entitled *Li dis dou vrai aniel*. It is quite significant, to begin with, that we have the word *vrai* in the title of a parable that had been conceived amidst vacillations and uncertainties of an Oriental character, foreign to France. In this *fabliau* a father has three sons, the two older ones wicked, the youngest one virtuous. The father owns a ring with the well-known virtue. Seeing the perversity of two of his sons, he orders from a jeweller two rings externally the same as his own. He then calls each of the sons to him separately, and gives the older ones the rings with the false stones. To the youngest he gives the good one, explaining to him what he has done with the other two. When

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

the father dies, each of the brothers says that his is the legitimate ring. But after all rings are put to the test, the youngest son proves to be right. The others mistreat him and spoil his ring—they drive him out of his own land (Palestine). In view of this, the author of the *fabliau* exhorts the Christians to go and redeem the Holy Land.

The poet's objective, that is, the crusade, led him to reduce the numerous rings of the version analysed before (the legitimate daughter and her half-sisters). Nevertheless, the scheme is the same: absence of ambiguity, epic and activist intention. In the *fabliau*, though, there is an echo of the Moslem belief that the variety of religions is a consequence of the divine will. Still, the accent is on the goodness of one religion as opposed to the illegitimacy of the other two.

The absence of Saladin in the French versions is also significant: his presence in the Italian stories was linked with the form of the *dénouement*, where the question which of the three religions is the true one is left undecided. The image, valid for certain Christians, of a Saladin who was vacillating and ambivalent with respect to religious belief provided a basis for the irresolute attitude toward the three religions—an attitude which I would call expectant, deistic, rather than sceptical. The sceptic, when he really is a sceptic, leaves no room in his thinking for the question of the existence of God. Guido Cavalcanti seemed to be moving in this direction. But the Jewish and Italian versions of the parable expressed a different sort of preoccupation. And since this preoccupation did not exist among the French who treated the theme of the rings, it was perfectly natural that they should make no mention of the Soldan of Babylon.

When we situate the Saladin theme within the context of its vital connexions and against the historical horizon to which it belonged, we can give real meaning to what has hitherto been nothing but amusing anecdote. In the Italian versions of the parable of the rings, Saladin provided a basic organising element; in the French versions, he had no function. Therefore he does not appear in them. From the social and literary point of view, in France God was like a constitutional monarch, secure and imperturbable, but compatible with the free play of reason, of a kind of reasoning that has had, in France, ample room in which to extend itself before crossing the border-line of atheism. Religious and secular interests have gone hand in hand for centuries without damaging each other. Cluny and Cîteaux were agents of French imperialism in the West just as the Templars and Hospitalers were in the Holy Land. And even in the twentieth century a Charles de Foucauld has succeeded in harmonising a

moving Christian asceticism (more rigorous than the Trappist life he left behind) with political and scientific activities that were a great help in the imperial expansion of his fatherland over the deserts of Africa. *Gesta Dei per Francos*.

France knew the legend of a Saladin disposed to adopt the Christian faith: '*Catholica fidei leges et dogmata Christi/Legit et audivit Saladinus*' (so reads a poem of c. 1215, quoted by Gaston Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 294). The bad part of it was that, notwithstanding his desire to let himself be bound by 'the Catholic chains', he refrained from doing so after seeing the corruption of the Church, her '*Luxuriam, fraudem, invidiam, scelus atque rapinam*', etc., etc. Without these priests, cries the poet, 'the empire of Christ would grow and spread far and wide'. The work of the Crusades came to nought not through the fault of Saladin but because of ecclesiastical wickedness. It was known in France that the Christians, freed by the Sultan when he took Jerusalem, were robbed and mistreated when they got back to Christian lands. The idea of a possible *entente cordiale* with the enemy was to be given substance later, when Frederick II entered Jerusalem by using his wits rather than his arms. The stubborn ambition of Gregory IX nullified this victory, and the Emperor left Palestine, pursued by a mob that insulted him and literally threw mud at him and his knights. A poem of the fourteenth century has Saladin say these words (in jest or in seriousness): 'You adore a man [the pope] who is like me, or like anybody else' (Gaston Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 195).

In spite of everything, whenever the comparison of the three religions came up in France, Christianity would succeed in showing its superiority. In a *Chronique d'Outremer* (thirteenth century), it is told that 'Salehadins', on the point of death, did not know which religion to choose—although this did not keep him from giving the Christians the best part of the riches he had conquered. In a compilation of Latin works of the same period, Saladin is shown as listening to a discussion, just before he dies, between Jews, Saracens, and Christians; at the end he decides in favour of the Christian religion: 'I choose it because I judge it better' (Gaston Paris, p. 298). I find support here for my idea that the conclusion favourable to Christianity in Etienne de Bourbon's version of the parable of the three rings is to be explained not only by the fact that the author is a Dominican: it was the only conclusion acceptable to a Frenchman, Dominican or not.

In certain poems of the fourteenth century (Gaston Paris, p. 429) Saladin comes to France not to spy on the preparations for war but to observe 'the nobility and attitude of the Christians'. He brings with him

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

his uncle Jean de Pontieu because the French have given the Sultan a French family tree in their epic zeal to attract the East to the West—as in an ideal crusade, so to speak. In his entourage there is also the figure of Huon de Tabaric, who has dubbed him a knight. When he gets to Saint-Omer, Saladin saves, through single combat, an unjustly accused daughter of the house of the Counts of Pontieu. We are very far indeed from the merchant of the *Decameron*, not because of the difference between epic poetry and fiction, but because the vital situations and ways of facing the world peculiar to the Italians and the French, respectively, resulted in, or were expressed by, the different literary genres cultivated by the two peoples in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

To the French Saladin's epico-knightly activities must be added his triumphal adventures in love, unknown to the literatures of Italy and Spain. While he is being feted by King Philip II, the queen takes a fancy to the Sultan. Later, in Palestine, this love affair is continued. The queen says she wishes to go and see Saladin to convert him—one more echo of the motif of religious ambiguity. The king accedes to her request, though he has the troubled lady accompanied by André de Chauvigny, a hero of the third crusade. The object of the interview, it turns out, is not precisely religious, as Chauvigny quickly realises when he observes Saladin's conduct with the beautiful visitor. The queen does not want to return to Acre, and states her reasons firmly and clearly, with neither malice nor reticence: '*Je suis venue pour besongnier avoec Saladin . . . si ne me partiray d'icy tant que ma volenté aury acomplie, deusse je perdre vostre compaignie, de laquelle je suis trop mal contempte*' (Gaston Paris, p. 434). It makes no difference to the argument that the poet-chronicler has confused the virtuous wife of Philip II of France with Louis VII's feather-brained Eleanor of Aquitaine. The point is that Saladin is used as an ingredient in such a situation that unfolds thus: The queen's guardian goes away with his entourage, but returns later, alone, on horseback. Saladin and the queen are talking peacefully in the palace when Chauvigny stops outside beneath their window. He calls to the queen to come down and tell him what message he should take to the king to avoid being punished for his negligence. The queen comes close to the horse, Chauvigny hoists her up on to it violently, and carries her off at a gallop 'as a butcher carries a ewe in front of him'. The scene recalls Gaiferos and Melisenda, in the *Romanero*, with the difference that this Melisenda is riding much against her will.

Let us not bother with the sources and authenticity of the anecdote. Rather must we underline the natural tone, unmarked by humour, in

which the explosion of an erotic transport is expressed. The queen calmly and calculatingly plans her adulterous diversion with the Sultan. With the same natural directness Jean de Meun later describes the sexual act in the last verses of the *Roman de la Rose*. French life has been a tension between the polarities of reflection and hedonism, between 'le bon sens' and 'la bonne chère'. Between the poles, an ideal of 'mesure', of 'bon goût', of compromise between violence and restraint. 'Tout est perdu fors l'honneur'.

Without going into details that would change nothing of what I have said, I find it beyond doubt that the French Saladin is more French than Saladin. The pictures and situations in which he appears give him his vital tonality: epic and combative impetus (in one case the great Moslem prepares to attack England); clear and decided judgment in matters of religion; triumph over woman as a knight and as a male. Just as happens in the other two literatures, a certain ideal image of man together with movement along a line of preferences toward the realisation of certain values has performed the treatment of the literary figure. It is more urgent to keep this in mind than it is to establish connexions of an abstract type external to the authentic literary reality, external, that is, to a value-expression in a certain form and of a particular way of life, of a *vividura*.

If we now probe into the grave Castile of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, we shall see that there too the 'matter' of Saladin gave rise to works linked vitally to certain assumptions, assumptions which I have tried to lay bare in my book concerning *The Structure of Spanish History*. Things Islamic were known and talked of more in Spain than in any country in Europe, but, in spite of this, literary reflections of Saladin there are at a minimum, and do not correspond to those in the other Romance literatures. It is thus once again evident that the reality of the history of a people becomes visible and understandable only by determining the tension between what that people has done and what it has not done. The story-parable of the rings circulated in the ghettos of Spain, for Salomon Aben Verga speaks of it in the fifteenth century and fixes its origin in the court of Peter I of Aragon, 400 years earlier. Contrary to every expectation in such a case, the story has left no traces in the literature of Spain—just as no traces were left by the science, philosophy, and mysticism of the Moors and Jews in the period during which, abstractly thinking, correspondences of expression between the various castes of the Peninsula should have been most widespread. In certain areas of life, interpenetrations had indeed taken place—such, for instance (to recall a random example), as

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

the participation by Jews, as godfathers, in the baptism of Christian children, and the participation of Christians in analogous capacity in similar Jewish ceremonies (circumcision, etc.). The Jews organised supplications *ad petendam pluviam*, taking up where the Christians left off. Moors took part in the collection of tithes and first-fruits for the Church. Etc., etc. But in spite of all this, that which happened in everyday life was not expressed consciously, in objectified, *thought-out* form. The structure of each life—of a person or of a collectivity—is like a screen or filter which lets some things pass through and keeps back others. The English-speaking peoples do not speak casually of the fact, for instance, that babies suck. Spaniards and French do.

Saladin did not come to Spain to spy on the Christian forces, or to undertake adventures of chivalry, because tales like those of the *Novellino* and poems like those of Chrétien de Troyes did not flourish in the Spanish fantasy. It was unthinkable for a Castilian even to set up the question, in writing, of the relative value of the three religions that enclosed his existence. If he had been capable of standing aside and reflecting about the world in which he moved, the Castilian would have written on theology and philosophy, which he did not do in the period when the Saladin theme was commanding attention. The Boccaccio who was interested in Guido Cavalcanti's theological doubts was a compatriot of Thomas Aquinas. It was not a Castilian but the Mallorcan Raymond Lully who wrote the book of *The Gentile and the Three Sages*—first in Arabic and then in Catalan. For reasons which I have explained at length elsewhere, it was possible for a Catalanian to be attracted by the example of the Sufi mystics. For the same reason, Lully could leave open, without cutting it off dogmatically, the question as to which of the three religions was the true one. Lully aspired to attract the Moslems by loving and persuasive preaching, and in this task he lost his life. But even today, this gentle discourse (extremely rare) of Raymond Lully is excluded from the Spanish edition of his literary works.

The Castilian regarded Saladin as an example of moral consciousness that would serve as the basis for the fashioning of serenely heroic personalities, for a heroism in outward actions and in the restraint of forbidden appetites. The troubled Saladin, the Saladin surrounded with all kinds of splendour, the Saladin given to sensual pleasures or to magic—this Saladin traced no course in the Spain of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In this case the Spanish version of an international theme serves to measure the immense distance separating Spain from the rest of Europe.

But before we come to the really literary texts, it will be useful to look at *La gran conquista de Ultramar*, a thirteenth-century work (left out of account by the Saladin scholars) based on French texts, which are sometimes translated very freely. This chronicle relates that when the Moslems entered Jerusalem in October of 1187, they 'tore down a great crucifix and a cross that were high up in the temple'. They dragged the cross about and broke it up into splinters in the midst of great mockeries. 'But', comments the chronicler, 'that was not ordered by Saladin.' The Sultan went into the temple and 'gave thanks to *our Lord God*, because He had given him power and dominion in His house' (p. 574). That is, Saladin's God and the God of the Christian chronicler are one and the same, a fact which is in accord with what Alphonse the Learned wrote about synagogues as places where God is also worshipped. A chronicle of the fourteenth century (as I have pointed out elsewhere) admits that it is just, under certain circumstances, for God to give the victory to the Moors and not to the Christians. This is the situation tinged with deistic sentiment, to which I referred above, the effect of which, in this case, is to allow Saladin to appear as behaving justly towards the Christians and their religion. For example, on a certain occasion several clerics come to convert Saladin, and his counsellors order him, in the name of Mohammed, to behead the Christians. The Sultan replies: 'I desire to go against that commandment of our law.' He lets the clerics go in peace, after offering them 'gold and silver and precious cloths', which they *do not accept*, for they have come to win Saladin's soul, not his wealth (p. 626). These are the grave notes caught by the Castilians, or added on their account.

Contemporary with Boccaccio is Don Juan Manuel, St. Ferdinand's grandson and author of the collection of tales entitled *Libro del conde Lucanor*. The principal interest of these narratives lies neither in the happenings therein recounted nor in the spectacular or decorative element. The author's attention is concentrated chiefly on the moral consciousness of his characters, and he projects his narrative from this starting point. Don Juan Manuel does not describe the duel between two clever disputants, as Boccaccio does. He is concerned, rather, to make the just and the noble prevail, and to combat falsehood: 'I shall speak in this book', he says, 'of the things that I understand can be of profit to men for the salvation of their souls as well as for the improvement of their bodies and the upholding of their honour and their estate.' Saladin's appearance, therefore, will now be in terms of moral conduct, without reference to his religious

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

vacillations or his knightly adventures. He will be simply the giver and receiver of wise counsels.

A Count of Provence goes to the Holy Land as a crusader and is taken prisoner by the Sultan, who makes him the object of great honours, and consults him as to how he should proceed in all his acts. The Countess, meantime, does not know what to do about choosing a husband for their daughter, sought by the 'sons of kings and other great men'. A message is sent to the Count asking his opinion. The Count consults Saladin who, since he does not know the suitors, limits himself to this unadorned expression of opinion: 'My advice is that you marry your daughter to a man (*con omne*).' The Count writes for details concerning the several suitors. The one that stands out among them is the son of a nobleman, not 'of very great power', but seeming to be 'the best man and the one of greatest attainments'. Saladin prefers this candidate, because a man is 'more to be esteemed for his works than for his wealth or the nobility of his lineage'. The man chosen in this way by the family to marry the Count's daughter believes at first that they are joking with him. They explain to him, however, that he has been chosen 'because he is a man'. He then asks to be given all the Count's revenues, and in great secrecy he arms a large number of galleys. The marriage is celebrated, but not consummated, and the husband leaves his bride to go and perform a 'manly deed' (*jecho de omne*) before taking possession of his wife and county. He departs for Armenia, learning the language and the customs of that country. He is told that Saladin is very fond of hunting, so he goes to see him with good birds and fine dogs, leaving one of the galleys in each of the ports. As soon as he comes into the Sultan's presence, he is very well received, 'but he does not kiss his hand'—that is, he does not promise loyalty to the Sultan. He wins Saladin's confidence and they go out hunting. The Count's son-in-law has arranged things in such a way that one day he and Saladin find themselves alone near one of the young man's galleys, and he takes Saladin prisoner. So that he would be able to do this with all propriety, he had not sworn the loyalty to Saladin that a knight owes to his lord. Under such circumstances, Saladin has to ransom himself by freeing the Count of Provence, and he gives thanks to God for having given the Count such good advice. 'Then the Sultan gave the Count and his son-in-law many very rich gifts.'

In another instance, Saladin is also vanquished, but in a purely moral way, and not by a man but by the wife of one of his knights, a woman he had fallen in love with. As a condition that must be met before she will

give herself to the Sultan, the woman requires his promise to do whatever she demands of him. He agrees, and she requires him to answer the question, 'What is the best thing that a man can have within himself, which thing is the mother and chief of all excellences?' Saladin cannot find the answer, nor can any of his counsellors. He then crosses the sea and goes to the court of the pope, 'where all the Christians gather together', and he still cannot find the answer. He goes to the house of the king of France, he asks all the kings, and the result is always the same. He finally gets a satisfactory answer from an old man, who 'because of his great age could not see and could not leave his house', but who 'was full with wisdom'. The sought-for answer is this: 'shame (*vergüenza*), for through shame man suffers death, which is the gravest thing that can be, and because of shame man desists from doing all the things that do not seem right to him, no matter how great his desire to do them'.

Saladin grasps the mystery concealed in the question and its answer, and renounces his carnal love for the wife of his knight; rather, from then on, does he love 'with an ideal and true love, which the good and loyal lord must have for all his people'.

The shame (*vergüenza*) spoken of here has an active meaning; it is not merely the repression of an immoral impulse: 'Shame makes a man brave, forthright, loyal, of good custom and demeanour; it makes him do all the good things that he does.'⁸ This meaning of *vergüenza* is characteristically Spanish. Although the word is Latin, there are Arabic overtones in it that I have pointed out elsewhere.

The Spanish Saladin does not correspond to the Saladins of the other Romance literatures. His grandeur has been seen from an eminence that dominates him and subordinates him to principles of moral sublimity, the Spanish idea of the 'essential man', as the fifteenth-century phrase had it. This ideal man is not affected by the presence of any power external to the person: the 'man in himself' (*omne en sí*), in the words of Don Juan Manuel, is a human quality which does not depend on wealth or nobility of caste. Out of this mould Lope de Vega was to fashion the figure of his Peribáñez, Calderón the figure of the Mayor of Zalamea, Unamuno the figure of his *Nada menos que todo un hombre* (Nothing less than a man). From this absolute, monolithic, dominating position the Spaniard has kept at a distance the world of nearby things; or else, he has made them his own, he has brought them into the functioning of his own life. This is

⁸... la vergüenza hace a omne ser esforzado e franco e leal e de buenas costumbres e de buenas maneras e facer todos los bienes que face.'

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

what the Count's son-in-law and the lady Saladin was wooing did with the person and the behaviour of the Soldan. Here the great Sultan of Babylon turns like a satellite around stars greater than himself.

Don Juan Manuel's stories contain a host of Oriental reminiscences. The household of this great lord, this Infante of Castile, was full of Jews, whose advice was followed in the bringing up of the Infante's children. I do not know the sources of the Saladin who lives in Armenia, and the Castilian tone and meaning of the narrative would in any case not be changed by such knowledge. There are echoes of Saladin the traveller, of Saladin the lover, of the low esteem in which pontifical Rome was held—matters which in other forms and for other purposes are to be found in non-Spanish versions. In the Spanish ones, the theme is the imperial and imperious unfolding of a personal will, the subordination of the good things of this world to the grandeur of one's own conscience.

The point of what I have said here should be clear enough. Saladin as a literary theme is inseparable from the historical lives of the peoples who have expressed themselves through that theme. By inverting the usual perspectives of comparative literature, I believe that I have reclothed the phenomena with their authentic form—the form of each people's life, in a moment of artistic tension. The finest artistic achievements here have been Boccaccio's and Don Juan Manuel's, for giving unity of structure and style to a shapeless mass of anecdote. Each of them from his own position conceived Saladin as a literary figure who realises himself through contrast with another figure—Melchizedec, Messer Torello, the Count of Provence's son-in-law, the knight's wife. The character's deeds are thus referred to his person, and not the other way round, as is the case with the actions in the French works, in which events are more important than Saladin's personality. (No great French writer was attracted by the Saladin theme.) The French narratives, at that historical moment, represented the epic genre in decay. The character tale foreshadowed, on the other hand, novelistic description, with greater vital profundity to be found in Don Juan Manuel than in Boccaccio. In Boccaccio's Saladin stories, the characters have no inwardness, of which there are suggestions in Don Juan Manuel's stories.

Literary work of high quality is always the result of the authentic possibilities latent in the historical life of a people, and of the unpredictable art of persons who have known how to utilise such possibilities. The inner disposition of a literary creation is not separable from the inner form underlying the language and the history in and within which it exists.

THE LAST FUEGIANS

The spread of Western and Christian civilisation all over the world, during the last four hundred years, has been marked, on all continents, by the disappearance of large numbers of technically less advanced peoples, or by their numerical regression, which in turn was accompanied by the decadence and crumbling of their cultural inheritance. But such feats of extinction are not the prerogative of the white man of modern civilisation. Every point on the globe, at all times, has witnessed struggles for life, where victory went to the stronger. The extinction of Neanderthal man, some thirty thousand years ago, was probably due to the appearance of Cro-Magnon and Chancelade man, who entered Europe at that time and had attained a more advanced technical civilisation than their predecessors. In historic times, we know of several cases in which peoples were driven back and annihilated by neighbours whose civilisation was more advanced and who were endowed with a greater expansive force. The Negritos of South-east Asia had been ousted from a part of their original territory by the Malaysians and Chinese long before the arrival of the Europeans. Several Melanesian tribes were exterminated in the

The Last Fuegians

course of the ancient Polynesian migrations. These examples could be multiplied. They are in fact so numerous that it has become customary to consider them almost as manifestations of a biological necessity, against which human will remains impotent.

Certain tribes, like the Onas of the Tierra del Fuego, the Bushmen of South Africa, the Tasmanians, were simply exterminated on the spot or driven out of their traditional hunting grounds. The few survivors regrouped themselves on some uninhabitable fringes of their former territory, to which they were ill adapted. Within a few years they disappeared from the population map. These pages of history are not glorious for our civilisation. But they do not provide an adequate explanation for all the instances where primitive tribes have disappeared from the earth.

Not in all cases can we speak of extermination. Retarded populations have rarely if ever been subjected to economic exploitation, for the simple reason that their nomadic way of life and their rudimentary techniques could not be adapted to regular work which was alien to their traditions. It remains true, nevertheless, that in almost all cases groups of nomadic hunters have disappeared after coming in contact with the whites. Their state of health deteriorated rapidly and epidemics broke out. Within a few decades the demographic stability of the group was upset. Soon there would be nothing left but a few survivors. A certain number of them would be attracted by the great urban centres, with their proletarian masses, into which they merged. Others would die on their home grounds. This history repeats itself again and again, with striking exactness, among peoples who are quite different in all other respects. Pathology does not seem to provide a sufficient explanation, and the majority of authors seek the cause in a certain feeling of discouragement or impotence which would seize inferior peoples in the presence of new forces upsetting their concepts of the world, forces which they can neither make their own nor resist. Thus we speak, in certain cases, of the senescence of a race or of a civilisation. Such explanations, however, seem terribly verbal. How are we to define the senescence of a race or civilisation? And—apart from suicide and birth control, equally unheard of among the populations in question—in what ways could discouragement jeopardise the demographic equilibrium of a human group? All this needs a great deal more precision. As far as we know, no one as yet has undertaken a comprehensive study of the causes of the disappearance of retarded peoples after coming in contact with the white race.

This phenomenon of extinction is ununderstandable at first sight. In cases

where no extermination has taken place, where the indigenous population has not been driven back by brute force, and where there is no conflict between vital interests, one could imagine the possibility of a stable and peaceful co-existence between men who have not surpassed the level of Stone Age civilisation and colonisers of the twentieth century. Reality however is different. The process may be variable, but the result is the same, in almost all cases: extinction, plain and simple, biological as well as cultural; disappearance of individuals; disappearance in so far as the race is concerned; disappearance in so far as its civilisation is concerned.

The rhythm of extinction of the most primitive peoples grows faster with every one of the world cataclysms by means of which the white man's power asserts itself ever more imperiously on islands and continents. The indigenous population of Australia which, it seems, numbered two or three hundred thousand at the end of the eighteenth century has dwindled to some ten thousand survivors. The Pygmies too are getting fewer and fewer, despite the protection afforded by their equatorial forests. Several Eskimo groups have vanished since the end of last century.

The last Veddas of Ceylon, who still live in caves, are on the verge of extinction. On the American continent the picture is particularly gloomy. Several indigenous groups have vanished completely—apart from those who had been exterminated by the conquerors—and at the extreme southern tip we are witnessing at this moment the final extinction of the last Paleo-Amerindians, generally known under the name of Fuegians. By the end of 1953, they had been reduced to twenty-seven Yahgans and sixty-one Alakalups. The study of their disappearance will soon be a problem for historians or archeologists to cope with.

In some cases of this kind, nothing can be done any more. In others, there is still time, and the urgency with which the conditions of their extinction are being studied does not stem merely from the curiosity of the specialist. This study can be applied practically. Some of the survivors of these groups, left at present to miserable extinction on various points on our continents, could be saved. If it is too late for them, the lesson learned from their tragic experience could be applied to the study of the difficult situation in which many of the world's minority groups find themselves in view of the expansion of new and more dynamic groups. These facts concern basic and elementary phenomena, and they are all the more precious for that. It is not absurd to imagine that the situation of the old European countryside, under the invasion of our twentieth-century civilisation, shows some analogies with that of certain

The Last Fuegians

primitive tribes, submerged by pioneers who created new needs and destroyed the old traditions. These analogies may be remote; certain traits, however, are identical, the most obvious of these being the rapid disintegration of the old systems of values.

This work of synthesis and of applying facts observed in one set of circumstances to different realities is only a remote possibility. The scope of the present article is restricted to an exposition and interpretation of the documents which the two French ethnographic missions to austral Chile (1946-8 and 1951-3) were able to assemble on the last phase of the extinction of the Fuegians on the archipelagoes of western Patagonia.

I. The Alakalups of the Magellan Archipelago

Before going into facts and figures, we must give some other details about the Alakalups: Leaving aside for the moment such matters as the extension of their habitat and their way of life, we should stress above all that we are dealing here with living beings—a detail which, bent over facts and figures, we are liable to forget. Real beings: which means that today, in some desolate and desperate corner of the world, the sixty-one last Alakalup Indians of the archipelagoes are sleeping around a fire. The wind howls around their huts tempestuously, almost all the year round. Inside the huts, men and dogs are huddled together—two, three, or four families per sordid hut. There are sick persons among them, one or more in each hut. In 1952 the death rate had reached almost one per month. Someone certainly has died some weeks ago, and someone else is bound to die some weeks hence. They know it. They know, and they say it, that they all must die and that after them the stormy archipelagoes will be deserted once more. But they do not know why.

These few Indians who eke out a miserable living, mostly hovering around the Chilean military station of Puerto Eden, on the large and practically unexplored island of Wellington, are the remainder of a tribe which, some time ago, was very important and led a nomadic life of hunting and fishing over the whole stretch of the western Patagonian archipelagoes.¹ They represent one of the most retarded human civilisations. When they occupied the region, several thousand years ago, they brought with them a civilisation of bone and chipped stone which already at that time was rather worn out. The level of their technique never rose above that of the European Reindeer age and in several respects remained

¹The western Patagonian archipelagoes extend over 12 degrees of latitude, from Chiloé to Cape Horn. They are today practically uninhabited.

markedly below that level. After their arrival, and probably owing to the geographical conditions which were particularly unfavourable, their technical culture continued to go down. When, four centuries ago, the first European navigators crossed the archipelagoes, the Fuegians, whom they met there, seemed to them the most frightful savages they had ever seen.

They were completely naked and appallingly dirty. Body and face were greased with walrus oil which, when rancid, gave off a dreadful odour, and they were smeared all over with red and white clay. The only kind of clothing they knew was a sort of seal-skin or otter cape which, occasionally, they would throw over their shoulders. They hunted the seal with clubs, bone harpoons and spears; they also knew bows and arrows. Besides seal, and occasionally deer, they ate the eggs of water birds and shell fish which the women would gather in their strawbaskets, plunging naked as deep as three or four metres below the surface of the sea in any temperature. They kept fire, either on the ground of their huts or, if they were travelling, on little clay platforms which were guarded in the centre of their canoes. If the fire died, they were able to rekindle it by striking pyrites. They cut stones, rather roughly, worked bones and wood into tools and weapons; but their most common tool was a knife made of simple mussel shell.

About their psychology, their social and religious life, we know practically nothing. The navigators of past centuries were neither psychologists nor sociologists and they did not seek other impressions, beyond the stupefaction or indignation aroused by such savagery. For a long time we knew nothing of the Fuegians except their dirtiness, the clumsiness of their technical achievements, and a cannibalism which perhaps is not altogether legendary; since more than one excavation has yielded cracked human skulls thrown together with kitchen refuse.

In 1946 the first French ethnographical mission to austral Chile, composed of two members, arrived with its equipment at Puerto Eden, in the heart of the western Patagonian archipelagoes. A semi-stable Alakalup encampment had been established at that time near the military station which consisted of two non-commissioned officers in charge of providing the Indians with food and medical care. Most of the Indian families had abandoned nomadic life and contented themselves with catching shell fish around the bay. Each of them had a canoe, which they had cut with axes out of tree trunks. The traditional tools and weapons, with the exception of the bone harpoon, had yielded their place to imported axes and knives. Life went on in almost complete idleness, in the expectation of the distributions

The Last Fuegians

of the military station and of gifts brought by passing ships. The centre of this life was the hut which had remained unchanged through the ages: with its casing of pegs, its form of an oval or round cupola, its dimensions which never surpassed 1 metre 80 for the height at the centre and 3 metres for the longest diameter; but the ancient covering of seal skins had been largely replaced by old pieces of canvas or drag-net. The adults all wore European-type clothes, while the children continued to play naked, most of the time, in mud and wind. They had no longer any feasts or ceremonies. It seemed as if any form of creed had disappeared. Only the traditional language was still spoken. It is in this language, which the white man, or *cristiano* as he is called by the Indian, does not know, that some scraps of the past are preserved inside those huts, around a fire—some remnants of the creeds which, a century ago, were held by those free nomads of the sea.

The two members of the mission settled down in the encampment. They passed twenty-two months in a tent, sharing the life of the Indians, and in the course of that time they began to assimilate the first elements of the Alakalup language. All of the Indians were subjected to a complete medical and anthropological examination. At the same time, and parallel to the ethnographical work, the mission carried on a demographic investigation which included not only the living but also the dead in so far as they were still present in the memories of the survivors. The second mission to the same region lasted for two years, from 1951 to 1953. Its main purpose was to solve the problem of Man's appearance on the extreme tip of the American continent during the early post-glacial period, i.e., ten to twelve thousand years ago. This mission had the opportunity for a stop-over at the Alakalups and, without undertaking any new research, they could complete, for the period 1948–53, the research on demographic evolution that had been initiated by the first mission.

II. Contacts with the White Race

We do not know with precision, or even approximately, to how much the original Fuegian population may have amounted some two or three hundred years ago. Almost surely to several thousand. This population seems to have remained numerically rather stable until about the middle of the last century, when it began suddenly to drop, for reasons which are as yet unknown but which evidently have something to do with the fact that the whites were now visiting the archipelagoes in much greater numbers. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Alakalup Indians

numbered no more than two or three thousand; about fifteen years ago, when the Chilean government, alarmed by this rapid rate of disappearance, enacted a law for the protection of the archipelago Indians, they were about 500; when the first French expedition arrived in 1946, they were 150; at the moment of its departure two years later, they were 105. In September 1953 they were no more than 61.

The history of the contacts with the whites does not teach us much as to the cause of this phenomenal rate of extinction.² From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the navigators around the archipelago of Magellan met the Alakalups on their voyages. The names of Ladrillero (1557-59), of the English pirate Francis Drake, of Sarmiento de Gamboa, later of Byron, Bougainville, Fitz Roy, are connected with this little-known history. Whether peaceful or not, those contacts were brief. Undoubtedly they did not exercise any deep influence on the life of the Alakalups except for the introduction of the use of iron in the form of nails, fragments of old barrel hoops made into some kind of adze, or sometimes knives and hatchets. The introduction of a new means of acting on matter meant an improvement and did not contain in itself the germ of decay. It had no influence whatever on the Indians' beliefs and social structure nor did it affect in any way their vital interests. It is doubtful whether the spread of certain European diseases, in particular, of venereal diseases, amounted to much. It does not seem so, but our ignorance on this point is rather complete.

A new chapter in the history of relations between the Alakalups and the whites begins with the end of the nineteenth century. At that time the Alakalups made more lasting contacts with the fur hunters and fishers from the great island of Chiloé, north of their territory, and with the recent European immigrants to Punta Arenas in the Tierra del Fuego. In most cases, hunting expeditions would last from three to six months. The schooners would disperse over the archipelagoes, and small groups of men, each one disposing of a shallop, were stationed near the seals' breeding grounds, with the order to kill and skin the new-born and the fur seals, at the time of parturition. Their hunting encampment was refurnished from time to time, and at the end of the season the hunters would be re-embarked with their cargo of thousands of hides which were scraped, salted and packed.

²The details of this history may be found in 'Evolution démographique des Indiens Alakaluf' by J. Empeaire, *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, Nouvelle série, tome xxxix, 1950, pp. 187-218. Cf. also J. Empeaire, *Les Nomades de la mer* (publication imminent).

The Last Fuegians

Despite their aversion against the people from Chiloé, the Alakalups settled near their encampments. Their confidence was won by some gifts, and eventually they furnished skilled manual labour at a very low price. In exchange for their labour of preparing the hides, a job for which they had a traditional competence, they received foodstuffs from Chiloé and sometimes wine and liquor. The Alakalups also furnished the people from Chiloé with their otter- or racoon-skin capes, and received in exchange second-hand clothing or blankets of a much lower quality and value.

At that time most of the Indians disposed of knives and hatchets, but other objects soon began to rouse their envy: canvas sails, rifles, shallops. Frequently they would depart in the thick of the night, carrying with them as much as they could of their hosts' equipment. If the Indian canoe was caught, the operation generally ended in a savage massacre. On the other hand, the people from Chiloé showed a lively interest in the Alakalup women. Women and young girls were often kidnapped by the fur hunters, sometimes to be returned later on, sometimes to be carried off to Chiloé. Young boys, who would provide skilled and almost gratuitous manual labour, likewise were carried off, sometimes by persuasion, sometimes by force.

During that same period shipping between the Atlantic and the Pacific became much more intensive. Most of the ships followed the coastal waters and canals, which were more secure and less fatiguing than the open ocean. Shipwrecks were common. Hydrographic missions were sent to explore the safest passages. The natural ports where the ships would anchor were in most cases bays used by the Alakalups. Short but repeated contacts took place. The nakedness and misery of the Alakalups aroused both curiosity and pity. Foodstuffs, clothing, tobacco, and metal tools were given to them.

The whites penetrated ever deeper into the new and unexplored territories on the archipelagoes. Grounds suitable for cattle breeding were discovered on the peninsula of Brunswick, on the island of Riesco, and on the territories which border the gulf of Ultima Esperanza. These were the ancient hunting grounds of the Alakalups. They abandoned those regions, yielding to the attraction of the urban centres or transplanting themselves to smaller settlements.

The period between 1880 and 1930, with the twofold influence of the seal hunters from Chiloé and of the white coloniser, marks the beginning of the Alakalups' decline. But we are unable to determine clearly the reasons. Extermination did not take place anywhere, nor were the Indians

driven back by force. They reduced their area of their own accord, following their main game, the seal, which had disappeared from the colonised regions. The last large breeding grounds are to be found on those almost inaccessible islets which border the Pacific. But the decline of the seal did not mean a real danger to the Fuegian population. Though less abundant than formerly it remained still sufficient. This, nevertheless, is the time in which the numerical regression of the Alakalup Indians was first noted. Entire zones of the archipelagoes in which they formerly were found were now deserted. Almost unnoticed by the newcomers, the Indians entered the road of extinction. Was it due to alcoholism, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, or to phenomena of a different order? We know nothing about it. All that could be done was to register the fact.

Around 1940 the Chilean government began to worry about this situation, and, on the initiative of President Don Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a law was enacted for the protection of the Indians of the archipelagoes. Under this law, the last Fuegian survivors—there were still a few hundred of them—became the official charges of the State. Puerto Eden, a magnificent bay of the island of Wellington, which had been destined as an airport for hydroplanes, became—at least on the records of the government—a hospital, first-aid station, distribution centre for provisions, etc. The station belonged to the Air Force. Its administration was entrusted to aviators.

The first years of this era of protection, the result of a generous initiative, were marked by a scandal which came into the open around 1950. The outpost was responsible for the distribution of foodstuffs to Indians who, attracted by this windfall, came in large numbers to set up their huts in the vicinity of the station. It was also responsible, in principle, for giving elementary medical aid and for inducing the Indians to settle down and gradually to adopt a more civilised way of life. A sergeant of the technicians' corps was entrusted with the command of the station. His incompetence, his harshness, and the excessive interest he showed in fur dealing utterly ruined the experiment. Medical assistance amounted to zero. The Indians seemed satisfied with exchanging their various hides for foodstuffs, and continued to disappear at an ever more alarming rate.

This scandal is over now. The guilty lost their positions and were transferred, and the outpost has been entrusted to two voluntary workers of the Chilean Army, who, in principle, ought to be changed every six months. The two young men who received us in 1953 in their wooden chalets, lost in complete solitude and ill-prepared for this unpredicted type

The Last Fuegians

of work—the one was a radiotelegraphist, the other a meteorologist—did their best to solve the innumerable difficulties they were faced with. It is obvious that they could not get very far where even doctors, educators, psychologists, anthropologists would probably have failed.

Their main job was the distribution of food. They did not possess the necessary knowledge to do more, and in fact they did not even try to improve housing conditions and raise the standards of living, nor to draw the Indians into occupations commensurate with their possibilities, and to force them out of the idleness to which the relative abundance of these years has accustomed them.

The picture of the contacts with the whites would remain incomplete without mentioning however briefly the activities of the Salesian missionaries of Punta Arenas. The memory of the ancient missionaries who, at the beginning of the seventeenth century and later during the second half of the eighteenth, visited the northern parts of the Alakalup territory, certainly has vanished long since. The mission established in 1887 south of the Straits has not left any deep trace either. That mission was founded mainly to act on the Onas, but the Alakalups too were received there, sometimes in groups of several dozens. The mission disappeared around 1906. After that time no serious effort was made, on the part of the missionaries, in favour of the archipelago Indians. Occasionally a Salesian Father from Punta Arenas, animated by the desire to do something for those disinherited souls and taking advantage of the transportation offered by a vessel of the Chilean Navy, tries to baptise some child or to marry some couple. Their lack of understanding is total and their influence amounts to zero. It is quite possible, on the other hand, that these scraps of religious teaching coming from peoples so obviously superior to the Alakalups, have contributed somehow to the disintegration of the ancient creeds. In this sphere, even more than in others, we are reduced to vague hypotheses.

III. *Demographic Research*

The explanations advanced by most ethnologists—physical and moral decay due to an abuse of alcohol and tobacco, to venereal diseases, to the recent introduction of clothing and blankets which, always humid, induce colds and pulmonary affections; and due also to a sort of discouragement which afflicts the groups—these explanations may be partially or totally correct, but they need to be verified. The disappearance of a group is not an abstract phenomenon. It translates, very concretely, into the disappearance

of each one of its members and into the fact that he is not being replaced. The first task incumbent on the investigator of the extinction of a people is an investigation of the life, the death, the reproduction of each family group and of the individuals that compose it.

First of all, we should define the word 'disappearance'. From the point of view of the individual there exists only one kind of disappearance, namely through death. But from the point of view of the group, the permanent removal of an individual has the same effect as his death, because he will not contribute in any way to any of the activities of the community, in particular, he will not contribute anything to its renovation. In the following tables, which are drawn up from the point of view of the Alakalups as a group, we have therefore added the number of those who have left the group to the number of dead.

Demographic research was conducted by interrogating the surviving members of the group, who always have a very keen memory of the dead and vanished, even if their connexion with them had apparently been very loose. The facts we gathered—except for the last period, 1948-53—were checked up to five times, and they were not adopted until all doubts had been eliminated. A table of filiations and deaths thus was put together for each family group of which at least one survivor had remained. This picture is incomplete because it includes only those groups which still have a surviving member. Other groups have disappeared completely, and it seemed preferable to leave them out of our calculations in order to avoid possible errors. After assembling all the available facts, one would estimate that the number of family groups living some sixty years ago must have been about twice the number (17) of those marked on the table.

In this investigation we counted only straight biological filiation, as the Alakalups know and understand it, leaving any social system of parentage out of the picture. The point of departure for each family group thus is a woman and her children. Masculine filiation has been left aside. Figs. 2 and 3 show two examples of genealogical tables, and Fig. 1 presents, synthetically, the over-all results. The investigation embraces four generations, the last being that of the present-day children, and covers a period of 60 to 80 years.³

The evolution of the feminine Alakalup population speaks for itself: in

³This time span may seem too narrowly calculated, because in general we allow thirty years per generation; but two facts should be kept in mind: first, that the fourth generation is still very young and second, that the Alakalups reach the age of reproduction very early and age very fast.

The Last Fuegians

1946 it still consisted of 48 persons of whom 27 were adults, 8 adolescents, and 13 children. In 1948 it comprised only 43, of whom 25 were adults, 5 adolescents, and 13 children. We note already a decrease of 10 per cent in the span of two years. Five years later, in 1953, the balance is still more catastrophic. Of the 17 family groups covered by the investigation, 5 did not have a single living woman on Alakalup territory. The others, together, had 24 women—a decrease of 50 per cent as compared to the figure of 1946. Two of these women were aged, four young women, who had been married several times, had remained childless, five women had children who died at an early age (two children who survived are of mixed blood), five women had a large offspring, but three of them did not live beyond the age of 40, and many of the children died, either accidentally or due to unknown diseases; and finally there were eight children or adolescents below the age of 18. The survival of the group thus depends entirely on the two or three adult women and the eight children or adolescents, several of whom will certainly leave the archipelagoes or die before reaching adulthood.

What are the most obvious reasons for this extinction?

Violent deaths: Under this heading we should assemble deaths by drowning or due to accidents on the rocks during hunting or fishing excursions, and cases of murder. All these cases are extremely numerous. They may account for the extinction of a family. In group 2, e.g., a woman named Kostora had seven children, all living. The oldest one was killed by a white man, the six others, ranging from 1 to 15 years, were drowned near the Isla Solitario, when their canoe capsized in a squall.

During the whole span of four generations we counted 41 drownings and 24 murders. The drownings and accidents affected all age groups and both sexes. The males are hit at a higher rate, apparently on account of their more adventurous type of life, although the whole family leads a nomadic life, in canoes, and fishing is the exclusive prerogative of the women, who often carry along their young children. 6 women and 7 girls, 15 men and 13 boys drowned during the period under consideration. It should be noted that for five of the men the accident was the result of a brawl, after excessive drinking.

The total number of drownings represents 12 per cent of the total number of deaths (335) while the number of drownings after excessive drinking represents 3.3 per cent of the number of deaths of adult persons, 6.8 per cent of the number of deaths of adult men, and only 1.5 per cent of the total number of deaths.

One might think that the number of drownings or fatal accidents on the rocks should not have been raised substantially by the presence of some whites in the archipelagoes (except for the five cases of drowning due to intoxication) and that this factor of mortality is directly linked to the climatic conditions and the way of life of the Indians. The five particular cases do not change the total percentage very much (12 per cent instead of 10 per cent of the deaths). This factor of extinction thus may be considered as constant.

The number of murders is more startling: 24 murders, in the span of a half century and for a total of 335 deaths, is enormous, considering that we are dealing in each case with individual murder, not with a state of war or open hostility. It accounts for 7 per cent of the total number of deaths, 13.5 per cent of the number of deaths of adult persons, 19 per cent of the number of deaths of adult men.

It is difficult to appraise exactly the influence of the white man's presence on these massacres. Most of them were committed by Indians. In most cases an old revenge for some theft was involved, and the offended party often holds back for a very long time before finding a suitable occasion for avenging himself. Often he does not even think any more about the old complaint; but when the slightest dispute arises, or when his enemy suddenly finds himself in some difficult situation, the Alakalup remembers his old grudge and satisfies it by murder. At other times, some domestic scene is involved, which may come up on account of any smallishness, the loss of an object, for example. The discussion becomes poisonous and degenerates into blows. The husband eventually beats his wife to death, although he may not have had the slightest intention of doing so.

The Alakalups are often polygamous. The women are not polyandrous though they have considerable freedom in this sphere. A woman often changes husbands several times during her life. Occasionally she may spend one or several nights with another Indian, a man from Chiloé or a white man, without meeting any objection on the part of her regular husband. Scenes of jealousy occur rarely, though they do occur. A husband has no particular liking for his rival: he kills him. If a man fails to convince a woman to go with him, he kills her, or her husband. Any sort of combination is possible; but we did not find a single case in which the woman did the killing.

Murders committed by people from Chiloé or by whites had always the same two motivations: theft and love. An Indian has stolen a shallop,

The Last Fuegians

a rifle, or some tool: he will be killed, together with his whole family, when the occasion arises. It also seems that at the beginning of this century the whites visiting the archipelagoes used the Indians as targets for their shooting, just for fun.

It is difficult to assess the influence of these murders on the rate of extinction of the Alakalups. 19 per cent of the number of deaths of adult men are accounted for in this way; but more than half of the cases in question involved reasons intrinsic to the group life and it does not seem that they increased due to the presence of the whites. Another part is due to the seal hunters from Chiloé, whose way of life is very similar to that of the Indians, and they fall more or less in the same category. The few cases where murder takes the form of extermination are so isolated that they cannot be considered as a real factor in the disappearance of the group.

One might think that the changed living conditions and the disappearance of group traditions strengthened the impulse to murder among the populations of the archipelagoes. This may be correct in so far as the inner life of the group is concerned; but if we take into account the ancient feuds with the southern neighbours, the Yahgans, or with the Tehuelches of the pampas; if we take into account the fact of cannibalism which is corroborated both by the tales of the ancient navigators and by recent excavations, we may come to the conclusion that the proportion of violent deaths among the Alakalups has not risen during their phase of decline. Perhaps it has even gone down, owing to the lessened demographic density and to the rupture of most contacts with neighbouring tribes.

Departures with no returns: Their number is relevant: 51 per 396 births or per 335 individuals eliminated from the group. This means, 15 per cent of the causes of disappearance. This figure calls for our particular attention because it is generally overlooked as a reason for the decrease of the Fuegian population and because it is entirely due to the presence of the whites. These 15 per cent represent a loss which is much more catastrophic than one might think at first, and this for two reasons: Infant and child mortality is high among the Alakalups, and if the number of emigrants is considered not in proportion to the total number of eliminated persons but in proportion to the number of children who reach the age of adolescence, the percentage is more than twice as high. It reaches 34 per cent. This means that, of 100 persons who escaped fatal illness, drowning, or other accident during their childhood, 34 will leave the traditional group to try to adapt themselves to the ways of life proposed

by the newcomers. This proportion is very high indeed, but since these departures always take place rather sporadically and as individual whim may suggest, they have never attracted the attention of the statistician. This impoverishment of the race, during the last three or four generations, divides up as follows: 24 females, of whom 2 were children, and 27 males, of whom 5 were children. Departures were most numerous during the heydays of seal hunting. They have decreased since about 1930.

But there is something even worse: Quantitatively the loss is heavy. Qualitatively it is even heavier. In the vast majority of cases, the departing ones were young boys and men carried off by the captains of schooners or fishing parties from Chiloé in search for enduring and cheap labour; or they were young girls and women kidnapped on the same vessels or by the same fishers. Young men and women were chosen for their strength, their pleasing ways, or their greater intelligence. They represent an élite, from the physiological as well as from the psychological point of view. Their departure bereft the community of its best elements. Even though the word 'kidnapping' has been used in this connexion, it is a fact that curiosity, the attraction of otherwise inaccessible wealth, the seduction of men belonging to a superior race, all played an important role in these departures.

We have counted these emigrants, somewhat arbitrarily, under the heading of those really vanished, because they are definitely lost for the language, the culture, and even the race of the Alakalups. They will never return to the home waters, and their children, if any, will merge with the lower classes of Chiloé, of Punta Arenas or of Natales, which consist mostly of people from Chiloé. Large numbers of these individuals will die, either of tuberculosis against which they are not immunised, or of various other diseases contracted in the cities. Others live and reproduce. Eventually they are assimilated and adopt easily the way of life of their hosts who are, like the Indians, essentially a sea-going people. If there had been sufficient time, it would have been interesting to follow the vicissitudes of each one of those Indians, after adaptation to the new way of life.

Deaths due to disease: Almost all of the 180 persons who, as Fig. 1 indicates, died of some illness during the last three or four generations, died without receiving even a minimum of medical care or undergoing medical examination. Any hypothesis as to the causes of this mortality would therefore be sheer fancy. In general the Indians are quite unable to explain the nature of their suffering. The memories they may have of illnesses in

The Last Fuegians

their families are even more unreliable and, moreover, they amount to almost nothing. Therefore the scope of our inquiry is restricted to the cases observed by Dr. Robin, during the first mission to the archipelagoes and to the results of the complete medical and anthropological examination to which he subjected all Indians then living.

Of the 99 persons settled at Puerto Eden and vicinity, the following died during the 22 months the mission spent there: four children, two of whom showed symptoms of heredosyphilis at birth, died at the age of three. Another one died of broncho-pneumonia, and the fourth died while the mission was absent for a few days. As he had apparently been quite healthy, it is likely that he too was the victim of some pulmonary affection. A fifth child, it should be noted, died immediately after birth. Five adults died of illnesses during the same period. Two elderly women (60 and 55 years old respectively) and a man and a woman in their thirties died of hemiplegic ictus. In the case of the two younger ones, this was certainly of syphilitic origin. A fourth woman died without medical observation.

The causes of the 33 deaths which occurred between February, 1948, and January, 1953, could not be determined medically. Four drownings and one assassination took place which do not concern us here, and some children died immediately after birth; but the memory of our informers fails to record the exact number. As far as the remaining deaths resulting from diseases are concerned, the age distribution is as follows: eight children between 7 and 15 years of age; seven young men and women between 20 and 24; seven men and women between 30 and 45; six men and women above 45 years of age. The balance is frightful.

The small number of deaths which occurred under medical control would prevent an over-all determination of the causes, had it not been complemented by medical observation covering about 80 living persons. A rough summary of the results of these observations, taking into account only those relevant to the problem of mortality, may reveal certain facts:

Though he is of small stature, the Alakalup Indian has a highly developed musculature, is very resistant to fatigue and to cold, and shows a physical strength which is above average. Both men and women age very fast and their strength gives way rather abruptly. Their constitutional physical strength is almost always associated with acquired frailty.

Pulmonary diseases: Medical examination revealed a perfectly normal functioning of the pleuro-pulmonary apparatus in almost all cases. From time

to time, however, and especially during the winter, epidemics break out in the encampment which are of a particular violence. All Indians are severely affected; they refuse nourishment at the first sign of fatigue; they fail to gather wood for heating; they neglect their children, and soon decline into a status of physiological debility and moral depression. Crowded in their icy huts, they will fall prey to prompt and certain contagion.

Are we faced here with a form of European grippe? This is not impossible, though difficult to ascertain. In all cases the disease is epidemic, and when the diseased succumbs, it is in consequence of a pneumonia or pleurisy. After the epidemic of the winter of 1946 all Indians of the camp, adults, children, and aged, were affected. The two members of the mission alone were healthy enough to treat, warm, and nourish the sick. Even if it were of European origin, the epidemic has been known for a long time in austral Patagonia. It seems it is this same disease that Müsters describes in an account referring to the year 1870.⁴ Müsters, an officer of the British Navy with a liking for adventure, had arranged for a long sojourn among the nomadic Tehuelche Indians in the pampas stretching north of the Straits of Magellan. There he witnessed the outbreak of an epidemic which was in every respect like those which periodically hit the Alakalups. Several children died. If it is the same disease, it was possibly introduced somewhat later into the archipelagoes which are better protected against outside contacts than the pampas, and the losses it caused among the Alakalups are probably of a more recent date. If, on the contrary, these epidemics occurred at earlier times, they must have wreaked less havoc in the small communities of that time, spread out all along the archipelagoes, than they did later in the permanent settlement of Puerto Eden.

Public opinion in Chile tends to ascribe the disappearance of the Fuegian population to pulmonary tuberculosis the spread of which was helped along by the abuse of tobacco and alcohol, and to epidemics of measles which, it seems, took a high toll around the beginning of this century in the missions of Dawson and Ushuaia. There are no precise medical records as far as the measles are concerned, but it is likely that this disease really caused the disappearance of a relevant number of Yahgan Indians. The Alakalups were less numerous than the Yaghans in the missions of the Fuegian islands, and even if a certain number of them were stricken by measles, this disease—of which no further epidemics are recorded for the archipelagoes—must be considered merely as an accident causing the

⁴G.Ch. Müsters, *At Home with the Patagonians: A Year's Wandering Over Untrodden Ground from the Straits of Magellan to the Rio Negro*. London, 1871.

The Last Fuegians

death of some tens of individuals at a time when there still were about a thousand of them, not as a lasting cause of their disappearance.

Nor does it seem that tuberculosis was an important factor in demographic evolution. The Chileans have been impressed by the fact that most of the Alakalups who came to the urban centres contracted tuberculosis and died rapidly. But from this we should not jump to the conclusion that all Alakalups are tuberculous. On the contrary, only 8 of the 25 adult men who were examined, and 5 of 28 women had a positive reaction to tuberculin. The cutireaction of children was negative in all cases. Moreover, in all the cases mentioned, the only Indians who had a positive cutireaction were those who had lived or were living continuously with the seal hunters from Chiloé or the whites. Tuberculosis remains practically unknown among the Alakalups who live in the archipelagoes. It was even more so, obviously, half a century ago.

Syphilis: Syphilis, on the contrary, must be responsible for a great number of deaths. Given the total lack of earlier observations, we must limit ourselves, also in this case, to the examinations made between 1946 and 1948. These, however, reveal a great deal. During that period Dr. Robin diagnosed and treated a certain number of cases, in all stages of development, among the Alakalups as well as among the seal hunters from Chiloé who were living near the Indian encampment. We know enough about sexual relations between *loberos* and Indians and within the Indian group itself, to be quite sure that if there is only one clear case of contagious syphilitic lesion, the disease will find its way through the whole population of the archipelagoes.

A great number of syphilitic cases were observed, scarred as well as active: chancres, rashes, mucous plaques, cutaneous ulcerations, symptoms of a heredosyphilitic character in newborn babies, nervous disorders and tabes among old people, hemiplegic ictus inducing the sudden death of persons in their prime and apparently quite resistant. Primary sores were visible in four cases, a primary active tumour in one case. Secondary lesion was observed in one case, in the form of mucous plaques, and one tertiary case, with multiple gummata.

Newborn babies showed heredosyphilitic symptoms which led to their death within a few months after birth, despite regular treatment. A host of other disturbances and accidents which affected at least one fourth of the population, must be attributed to hereditary syphilis: testicular atrophy, cutaneous lesions, blindness, nervous disorders, etc. It is very likely that

of the 33 deaths which occurred between 1948 and 1953, several must be ascribed to syphilis. The high rate of infant mortality, the death of adolescent boys and girls, the disappearance of a high percentage of young adults could have no other reason.

Whatever may be the part played by venereal diseases in the physiological degeneration of the Alakalup population, it is impossible to venture a figure, with any degree of certitude, as to the percentage of deaths for which they are responsible. What is sure is that, even if that percentage is not very high for the adults, a large number of the deaths of small children and doubtlessly almost all cases of sterility must be ascribed to this disease. Venereal disease, then, would be at the root of the evil: it would explain the lack of reproduction of the population, and hence its disappearance.

IV. *The Evolution of the Death Rate from Generation to Generation*

If we take up the figures given in Fig. 1 under the headings 'deaths from diseases' and try to break them up according to generations, the result is surprising. It may perhaps be summarised as follows: For the oldest generation reached by this inquiry, i.e., the generation of the great-grandparents of today's children, infant mortality is 0 per cent; for the generation of their grandparents, 16 per cent; for the generation of their parents, 38.5 per cent; for that of today's children, 56.4 per cent. Obviously this table cannot be accepted at its face value, for the simple reason that the small children who died forty, fifty, sixty, or more years ago have left no traces in the memory of the present population. To a certain extent the results of Fig. 1 must be modified and the over-all percentage of children who died at a low age must be increased. The fact remains, however, that this first generation is represented on the genealogical tables by families with four, five, six, up to nine children, *plus* those who must be assumed *a priori* to have died at an early age. It seems that the family groups of former times were both more prolific and more resistant than the families of today.

For the last two generations, comprising the children of today and their parents, almost none of them having passed the age of 40, the records are exact and almost certainly complete. They reveal a steep and catastrophic demographic decline: 38 per cent of the children of the preceding generation died of diseases; 56.4 per cent, of the present generation.

This relative variation of 18 per cent is nothing compared to the demographic decline it really represents. 184 children were born to the preceding

The Last Fuegians

generation, as compared to only 49 born to the present one. Parents are hit by sterility, and of the few children they bring into the world a much higher proportion than formerly prove not viable. Of the seventeen family groups recorded at the beginning of this investigation, one disappeared a generation ago because its members emigrated. During the present generation, eight groups have disappeared or are in the process of extinction. The members of three of these groups have emigrated, the members of three others died young or are childless; the seventh group had four children born of three different women, but all four of them died; and in the eighth group the only child that was born died, while another young woman is sterile. Even supposing that some births will still occur during the coming years, this will not change the picture.

Of the 22 children still living in the Alakalup group we may suppose—conditions remaining equal—that 34 per cent will emigrate while the others will either drown, be killed, or die for unknown reasons, and only one or two will live beyond the age of fifty. At that time the Alakalup group will have disappeared long since, and the last survivors will have joined groups of people from Chiloé or will have been carried off as manual labourers into some remote corner of Patagonia.

V. Causes and Remedies

If we now make a balance sheet of the causes which brought about the disappearance of the Alakalups and which were introduced by the arrival of the whites, we find certain secondary factors (tobacco, alcohol, clothing, pulmonary diseases) and two factors of primary importance: syphilis and emigration.

Tobacco and alcohol were far more common among the Indians of the archipelagoes in the days of the seal hunters than they are at the present moment, when the difficulty of procuring them reduces their influence to practically zero. Around the beginning of the century drinking parties of Indians and seal hunters were frequent, as attested by oral and written accounts; but we should not forget that the Indians could not get hold of liquor or wine except when they happened to be near a white settlement or an encampment of hunters from Chiloé. Once they left this environment, they had no choice but to resume their habitual diet, and no one has taken account of these phases of sobriety. If alcoholic beverages, or, to an even lesser degree, tobacco, have had a certain part in the dislocation of the Alakalup community, this is due not so much to physical damages which they could entail as to the seduction they exercised on the Indians, pushing

them to accept jobs which were contrary to their customs and interests, or even to emigrate in the hope of procuring this pleasure to themselves as promptly as possible.

As we have seen, tuberculosis played practically no role at all. But the damage attributed to imported clothing and blankets is probably not merely imaginary. In a country where it rains 280 days every year and where the wind blows practically all year round, a man is better off with a protective layer of grease on his bare skin and occasionally a fur cape on his shoulders than with clothes which are always humid or wet. These clothes must be responsible for a part of the pulmonary affections.

These factors, however, are of little importance if compared with syphilis and emigration. These two factors act in quite distinct spheres: the one in the medical, the other in the psychological sphere. Through them the Alakalups have come to know at the same time the two ways along which a population may disappear from the map of living peoples: by extinction, or by fusion with invading groups. Extinction is in wait for the individuals who have remained on the traditional territory, while the emigrants—to the extent that they survive—will fuse with the poorest classes of the invading population. These two sets of factors act independently, but their effects are cumulative and hasten the complete disappearance of the race.

If there is an interaction, it is difficult to assess its importance. Are the Alakalups driven to emigration because their archipelagoes are disease-ridden and mortiferous? Probably. But are they more susceptible to the diseases of the whites because their group is more disorganised and more exposed to any kind of influence? Also this is probable, although it is impossible to say anything positive on these two points.

The stages of the Alakalups' disappearance can be retraced as follows: Around 1900, we have a steep increase in the contacts with whites and people from Chiloé, most of whom are seal hunters and, we can imagine, do not represent the cream of their civilisations. These contacts entail quite a series of changes in the traditional life of the archipelago Indians. The vital interests of the group expand. Hunting and fishing cease to be the Indians' exclusive preoccupation. More tools—though known already since over a century ago—are acquired by a greater number of persons, soon by all the members of the group. As long as it is only a matter of tools, this represents an improvement of the technical aspect of life. The other gifts offered by the seal hunters in exchange for Indian labour entail more important consequences. Gradually the Indians grasp the meaning

The Last Fuegians

of labour paid for in clothing, foodstuffs and alcohol. At the same time new tastes are developed, for such clothes and such drinks, which end by being more damaging than useful to the individuals as well as to the group. Although our documentation is inadequate, it is likely that the introduction of syphilis and the first erosion of creeds date back to this same period. The whites make fun of the Indians' way of life; the Indians become aware of the inefficiency of some of their practices in comparison with the more successful methods of the whites; and scraps of teachings arriving from the far-off missions of Ushuaia and Dawson do their part in undermining the ancient customs. Even among the Fuegians, the contact between two systems of truths and of values weakens the older and less coherent system, and creates a sort of scepticism. Rites and ceremonies which were the joy and the strength of the group lose their importance and vanish. At present the ancient creeds have not been abandoned altogether, but an Alakalup would be ashamed to mention them in public, and they are not spoken of except in the secrecy of the huts.

The Alakalup society begins to disintegrate. Men are seduced by a way of life which they deem superior to their own; women are seduced by men; the people from Chiloé are close enough, on the one hand, while their wealth and power, on the other, links them to the new superior beings come into these waters. Men and women embark voluntarily in the schooners which carry them to Chiloé whence they will never return.

The attraction is stronger yet considering that life in the encampment is not what it used to be: no more feasts, no more chants, no more dancing—or only rarely so. The interest of the group turns away from the things which formerly were its very life, and gravitates to the seal hunters and their goods, which are so desirable. Many children die. The adults are afflicted by unknown diseases. Gradually a kind of discouragement and resignation seizes the Alakalups. The old people, who have known life in the archipelagoes in its plenitude, resist the new attractions better than the young generation.

Owing to economic reasons of various kinds, the number of seal hunters decreased after some twenty or thirty years, and now they have all but disappeared from the archipelagoes. In the wake of their departure, alcohol became scarcer, the number of murders decreased, even kidnappings and emigrations declined. But one evil was replaced by another. There were now more ships visiting the archipelagoes. A regular line was set up between Valparaiso and Punta Arenas, and also other foreign

lines passed through the canals. Passengers and crews, moved to pity by the unhappy Indians, naked in wind and rain, pleased themselves in handing out no matter what, usable objects as well as useless ones. The Indians began to get accustomed to having everything for the asking. Hunting and fishing, the vital activities of the group, thus passed to a second place, being less rewarding and much more toilsome than the waiting for passenger boats.

The law of protection was the finishing stroke. Theoretically, the Indians should have been stabilised around Puerto Eden and led, step by step, towards a more civilised way of life. The first point of this programme was easily realised. The distributions of foodstuffs sufficed to draw the Indians to Puerto Eden, but, owing to the difficulty of control, this was as far as the experiment ever got. It took place, moreover, at a moment when the Alakalups were already in full decline; nothing was achieved but a hastening of this process. Nothing was changed in the way their huts were constructed; only they were now still filthier than before. The seal-skins, which had become more rare, were replaced by old pieces of canvas, less comfortable. Hygienic conditions became even more deplorable. No human labour would substitute for the clean-up job which wind, rain, and constant dislocations formerly did inside the huts. Now the Indians huddle on straw litters, on the sheer ground, which is never cleaned at all, in shocking promiscuity. In a single hut, whose longest diameter does not exceed three metres, sometimes two or three families live together with their dogs, which means, about ten persons or more with some fifteen dogs. It is easy to imagine the effects of venereal and other diseases under such conditions. Men as well as women live in almost complete inactivity, and their resistance to disease has gone down. No ceremonies of any kind take place. Contacts with the supranatural serve no longer any purpose. The white man provides and answers for everything. He distributes ready-made objects which the Indian suspects cost no labour at all. The people crowding together in their huts finally die while waiting for the next food distribution. Few children are born, many of whom die at an early age; the others await the first opportunity to have themselves adopted or kidnapped. Nothing remains for the group but death and disease. If any hope is left it is turned altogether towards the outside world.

The example of the Alakalups shows that, even without any struggle for the possession of a territory or of the means of production, a human

The Last Fuegians

group can find itself, on the biological as well as on the cultural level, in a position where it cannot resist the contact with another group. On the archipelagoes this contact was weak and sporadic, yet sufficient to introduce into the community pathological germs unknown up to that point, against which no immunisation had been acquired; to awaken new desires which the traditional life could not satisfy; and to convey the idea of new values, more coherent and powerful than the ancient ones, which they destroyed without replacing them.

The facts gathered for a single population do not permit an extension of the problem to other peoples who have disappeared or are on the verge of disappearance. They give but hints as to the direction in which other research might be undertaken. It is always relatively easy to assemble a medical documentation, because it is objective and does not require knowledge of the individuals, their behaviour, their language, and their customs. It is almost always possible to put together demographic information, establishing the number of deaths and their causes, the number of births, of departures of men, women, and children, and contingent conditions. The interest of such information grows in the exact measure in which the researcher is able to record the social implications and psychological resonances of the figures registered in his tables.

Only further research, undertaken in other parts of the world, will tell us what is the role of the pathological and psychological factors in the extinction of other minority groups facing forms of higher evolved civilisations. It is possible that if the pathological factors do not play everywhere the devastating role they had in the case of the Alakalups, the psychological factors, on the other hand, are more or less constant: disintegration of customs and creeds in the face of more efficacious customs and creeds which rapidly undermine the respect for the traditions of the group; the desire to mix with the newcomers in order to enjoy both their material wealth and the prestige that accrues to them; corresponding enfeeblement of the structures on which the force and the cohesion of the group formerly rested; emigration of the younger and more enterprising members of the group; impoverishment and disappearance of the others.

Demographic investigation by itself is not enough. To know the sickness is but the first step for a physician. He tries to cure the sickness. The human sciences are trying more and more to apply in practice the results of their research.

On the medical plane it is relatively easy to find solutions for the kind

of problem we have been discussing in this paper. Many methods have been tried all over the world; it is useless to insist.

It is not enough to increase the chances for an individual to live. We must also propose to him a kind of life that makes sense to him. Obviously the kind of organised beggary around Puerto Eden did not constitute an acceptable 'way of life'. Welfare, in the form of gratuitous distributions, does not provide a definite solution. Something else has to be found, and it is at this point that the difficulties arise. The choice of a solution implies in reality a very precise conception of the relative values of civilisations. Does any civilisation or culture, no matter what its stage of development, possess an intrinsic value, and is it the duty of a government to protect its existence as such? Or should the so-called inferior civilisations be 'integrated' into the economic prosperity and the spiritual life of the nation on which they depend? Is it a question of merely trying to save individuals without encumbering the movement of the colonising nation? Few governments have given a neat answer to these questions, and theories have been stretched to fit practical necessities.⁵

These questions no doubt exceed the scope of this essay. It is one thing

⁵For the Fuegians of the Patagonian archipelagoes, three solutions have been tried by the Chilean government, with various degrees of success. The system of reservations, which had been tried with a certain measure of success in other places, was applied to the Yahgan group in the south. When the islands bordering the west coast of the Tierra del Fuego were invaded by white settlers, the Yahgans, whose numerical decline was similar to that of the Alakalups, were assigned a reservation of 10,000 hectares on the great island of Navarino. The government put at their disposal a certain number of sheep, cattle, and horses, in charge of a man of their race who was intelligent and had a good command of Spanish. Against all expectations, the Yahgans adapted themselves rather well to their new condition of small cattle raisers. In their new habitat, at Puerto Mejillones, they built ranches of wood planks and corrugated iron of the type usually met with in that region, and traded the ridiculously small products of their breeding and fishing for provisions, tools and clothing. After falling to twenty-seven, the Yahgan population seemed to have reached a stable equilibrium, which was helped along by numerous mixed marriages. At the time they received their reservation, they had lost practically all of their civilisation, with the exception of the language, and from then on they lived their lives just like any other group of small cattle breeders on the west coast of the Tierra del Fuego.

For the Alakalups other experiments were tried, in connexion or without connexion with the protective law. They all failed. A mission which was established in 1887 on the island of Dawson by the Salesian missionaries of Punta Arenas failed and dispersed around 1906 after the outbreak of a murderous epidemic. It seems this mission has left no positive trace among the Alakalups whom it had sheltered only temporarily and all of whom returned to nomadic life in their canoes.

Much later, at the time when the protective law was enacted, another attempt was made which seemed to be based on a sound idea. A young Alakalup, still in his teens and particularly intelligent, was sent to Santiago to an Airforce Training Centre. The idea was to give him a good education, to 'civilise' him, then to send him back to his group, to make of him the chief of the community, and thus to lead the Indians step by step, and under the guidance of one of their own men, to change their way of life. Young Lautaro Wellington adjusted

The Last Fuegians

to determine the causes of a people's disappearance and the extent of its inevitability; it is quite another thing to find remedies.

It seems, at any rate, that there is no way of stopping the process of disintegration which we have analysed in these pages. Sooner or later all the peoples of the earth will have to face our great modern civilisations. It is hard to imagine how a less advanced population could resist the temptations of a greater dynamism and efficiency. Depending on the nature and the coherence of the civilisation which has to be faced, and depending on the conditions in which this contact takes place, disintegration or assimilation or disappearance will come about sooner or later. It is only a question of time.

In various places reservations have been established, somewhat like zoos, where, theoretically, our retarded brothers could continue to live their traditional lives, protected against contacts with the white man. Theoretically: in practice the reservations for the indigenous populations on the best hypothesis slow up the process of disintegration; they do not stop it. More than one example could be cited where ancestral customs have no other function but to serve as baits for tourists and journalists.

The primitive civilisations are doomed. If attempts are made to save

remarkably well to his new situation. He passed his tests and left school with a degree and an instruction equivalent to those of a non-commissioned officer of the French army. He returned to Puerto Eden, with the official order to govern the little Alakalup group. This experiment turned into a catastrophe. For several weeks, Lautaro ordered the hapless Indians, who were bewildered but admiring, to execute the most senseless manoeuvres with shovel and axe; whereupon he disappeared from Puerto Eden eloping in an Indian canoe with a young Indian woman. The official civiliser, who incidentally was married to a nurse at Santiago, had taken up the life of the nomads of the sea. The Indians who had been half-settled at Puerto Eden lost no time joining him in his new habitat. A new life took shape, in collaboration with hunters from Chiloé. The little Indian community took to fur dealing; and had it not been for an over-consumption of wine and liquor, some kind of satisfactory economic equilibrium might have been reached. Around Lautaro the Indians found a type of life much like that of the *loberos* and not too different from that of their ancestors. The government wisely closed its eyes to Lautaro's defection and let the experiment take its course. It ended in a catastrophe. At the beginning of 1953 Lautaro and a whole group of Indians drowned themselves. The other Indians gradually returned to Puerto Eden.

From time to time the government tries to send young Alakalup Indians for their military service to Santiago or elsewhere. In general, these young men are enthusiastic at the moment of their departure, but then pass a whole year in contact with other young Chileans without learning anything at all, hardly a few words of Spanish. As soon as they come back to Puerto Eden, they take up their former ways in huts and canoes, without any difficulty, and without the slightest attempt to change in any way the habits of the group.

The idea of civilising the Alakalups, by settling them in the neighbourhood of a military station or by educating some individual among them and counting on the strength of his example and authority to act on the others—this idea has failed completely. Given the lack of competent personnel—educators, psychologists, or anthropologists—these experiments were doomed to inevitable failure. Other solutions have been proposed spontaneously by the Indians themselves, with a varying measure of success, i.e., those of emigration and partial

them, this is not a question of nostalgia for the past, that passion for history which is so characteristic of our contemporaries who love to play the role of archivists of humanity; nor is it a manifestation of that somewhat morbid taste for the extraordinary, the picturesque, and the sensational, which turns with equal pleasure towards the big crime, the dangerous voyage, or an unknown people. This is another matter. For the destruction of the equilibrium of human groups means the destruction of a whole system of values worked out in the course of thousands of years, of an entire universe of the mind—esthetic, affective and religious; which, in most cases, is not replaced by anything at all. It means, finally, the destruction of what is most human in human beings. It is not enough to distribute food and to care for the body. If we want to achieve anything more valuable we must give a new sense and a new coherence to those despoiled communities—even in those cases where nothing has remained of their ancient universe. The task calls for a programme as well as for men.

As far as the population of the archipelagoes is concerned, there is not much that could be saved. Some specialists may find that this little human group does not deserve any particular attention, considering that miserable masses are dying all over the world. This point of view can be sustained.

assimilation. But due to the bad medical conditions under which the majority of emigrations took place, these often ended catastrophically. The few Indians who live in the suburbs of Punta Arenas or Natales, have been more or less assimilated by the poorest classes of those suburbs. Misery, tuberculosis and alcoholism are their lot, and even if one or the other survived, we cannot justly speak of a success of this experiment. The Indians, in these cases, have but swelled the ranks of those for whom a solution has to be found in all countries. They have lost themselves in a multitude, and their problem does not present itself any longer in a particular form: but it has not been solved for all that.

There is another kind of half-emigration which, it seems, has yielded better results and which might provide a definite solution for the sixty or so Indians who have resisted decimation. Several families, or in other cases also isolated individuals, have joined the woodsmen and hunters from Chiloé who live—not in very large numbers—in the archipelagoes. These men, as we have seen, have a way of life rather akin to that of the nomadic Indians, but they command better tools and equipment. They originally came from Chiloé, some 700 km north of Puerto Eden, and they seem to belong to the same human family as the Fuegians. The two groups show great physical resemblance, but the people from Chiloé, who were colonised by the Spanish four centuries ago and who have been in contact with old civilisations for much longer, have reached a much higher level of evolution. This assimilation through intermediaries, a process somewhat similar to the one chosen by Lautaro Wellington, might be the best alternative. It seems at any rate the only one which might offer to the Alakalups of our days the possibility of enduring and asserting themselves and finding some vital equilibrium.

Unfortunately the people from Chiloé who live on the archipelagoes often are the scum of their society—those who did not succeed on the native island and are seeking adventure elsewhere. Their influence is much more often damaging than useful to the Indians. Propagators of venereal diseases, of alcoholism, thefts, sometimes capital crimes, they are educators of doubtful value, and there is an ordinance which bars them in principle from Puerto Eden and from any contact with the Alakalups. It is impossible, however, to enforce any kind of control, and no one pays any attention to the ordinance.

The Last Fuegians

On the other hand, an experiment could be tried here under particularly simplified conditions. This argument weighs in favour of the Alakalups, those last of the Paleo-Amerindians.

Group	Total of births	Persons Actually Living				Deaths from Diseases	Deaths from Murders	Deaths from Drownings	Deaths from De-partures	Deaths from Deaths
		0-3	3-12	12-18	18-35	35-50	50			
1	42			1	2			1	3	8
2	24		1			1		10	4	1
3	31	1	1	2	2	1		1	3	1
4	31	1	1	1	1	1		3	4	2
5	20	1	1	2	1	1		3	1	3
6	13							2	1	2
7	14				1			2	1	1
8	17		3	1				3	8	1
9	24		1	2	2			1	5	3
10	48			2	3	2		3	11	8
11	39	2	1		3	1		6	7	4
12	15							2	1	1
13	15							1	1	1
14	12				2			1	4	2
15	30		2	1	4	1		1	6	1
16	15			1	1	1		1	4	3
17	6							2	1	1
	396	4	11	10	22	9	5	41	89	39

FIG. 1. Over-all results of the demographic investigation. The figures in Column 1 represent the ordinal numbers of the families covered by this Research.




FIG. 2. Family group No. 2. The black circles indicate the dead, the blank circles the living, and those with a diameter indicate the Alakalups living outside their group (extract from the *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, Nouvelle série, Tome XXXIX, 1950, pp. 187-218).

I. Descendants of ALAOELSKAYROEWA

Died very old. Buried at English Narrows.

KOSTORA—Died October 1947 at Bahia Eden, at the age of 65.

KTCAHAK—60 years old. Narrowly escaped drowning several times.

AKEKERMOS—Died by drowning during a quarrel among Indians, after excessive drinking (shipwreck).

TESYEKEYWET—killed by a white. Buried near Baker Canal.

X (name unknown)—drowned at the age of 10-12 while gathering shells on steep rocks.

II. Descendants of KOSTORA

MESEYEN—Killed by white.

ATARMOEROKS

TAKSE

AYWONEYEKANAY

KASA

TATOERTOROS

ATESKOWAYERA

children aged 1-15, all drowned near the Isla Solitario, when their canoe capsized in a squall.

III. Descendants of TESYEKEYWET

YERKAWKS—Died at around 30 years of age, on January 1, 1947, at Bahia Eden.

MATCAWES—Kidnapped and taken to Chiloé at the age of 15. Worked

The Last Fuegians

at Chonchi, where he married a native woman. Has not been seen at home for several years.

TCYATOEWA—Died at the age of 15 (approximately) in the Falles canal, after his canoe capsized in a squall. Was able to reach a steep rocky island, where he died of cold and hunger.

TESKYEN—Kidnapped at the age of 12 by woodsmen. Died at Punta Arenas some years later.

WAKTERSELOES—Died between two and three years of age. Buried at Eyre Fiord.

X—Died a few months after birth. Buried at English Narrows.

IV. Descendants of YERKAWS

X—Drowned, a few months after his birth, at Bahia Eden.

X—Died soon after birth.

KASO—Kidnapped by men from Chiloé at the age of 10 or 12. Was never heard of again.

TESKARSENTOERA—10 years old; died after 1948.

KERAY—6 years old.

TCALA—2 years old. Kidnapped recently (1950) to Punta Arenas.




FIG. 3. Family group No. 10. Black circles indicate the dead, blank circles the living, and circles with diameter indicate the Alakalups living outside their group (extract from *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, Nouvelle série, Tome XXXIX, 1950, pp. 187-218).

I. Descendants of KYETAPAKSOEKWON

MANUEL—17 years of age. In military service at Santiago since the beginning of 1948.

WORKWA—18 years of age. A boy born of a mixed marriage, died at the age of 3, in February 1947. Buried at Bahia Eden. Married to an Indian man. Without descendance. Died after 1948.

STAKSO—13 years of age.

ATKASAP—11 years of age. Died after 1948.

ASAMALO—8 years of age.

YENSENTARA—6 years of age. Died after 1948.

KNOKWOALAS—Drowned at Bahia Eden, after excessive drinking.

MATA—died at 10 or 12 years of age. Buried at Puerto Molyneux.

KSERKYEYEN—Died at an early age. Buried at Puerto Pico.

TEREKSTAT—Died at an early age. Buried at Puerto Grapler.

MAYAHENAY—Died at an early age. Buried at Canal Aceite.

II. Collateral kin of KYETAPAKSOEKWON

ATCANA—Drowned after excessive drinking.

ATCOEPESKAR—Died after falling on the rocks. Aged about 20 to 25 years.

KYEWAYTCALOES—50 years of age. Died after 1948.

SELAWASYETE—Died of old age. Buried at Brazo Norte.

SEYEKTAWANA—Died of old age. Buried at Messier Canal.

ASEYENEKTE—Died of old age. Buried at San Pedro.

KAMELOKLAY—Died at age of 17-18 years. Immersed^a at Puerto Grapler.

III. Collateral kin of KALALAWA

KEYERMAEKSEPATALO—Died young, without children.

NAYWAK—Had one child, who died soon after birth. Immersed at Puerto Bueno.

MANAKAWRIAS—Died at age of 20-25 years.

KALALAWA—Had 9 children. Died of old age. Immersed.

MAKOALESLAY—Died of old age.

YAKAWYAS—Died of old age.

KARER—Died adult.

YETELKTETCEFTCASLAY—Died adult.

^aForm of water burial, common among the Alakalups.

The Last Fuegians

IV. *Descendants of SEYEKTA WANA*

ATALAKYENAYEWE—40 years of age. Married. Offspring.

JOSE—35 years of age. Married. Offspring.

TCASKYEP—25 years of age. Married. Without offspring.

MALOTCE—Died young. Killed by an Indian. Buried at Brazo Morte.

KOLAKTESEYA—Died about the age of 14. Killed by an Indian.

OFSAKOERA—Died about the age of 3-4. Buried at Puerto Molyneux.

TCARSA—22 years of age. Married several times. Childless. One of the wives of Lautaro Wellington.

V. *Descendants of ASEYENEKTE*

PEDRO—50 years of age.

KNOKWOALAS—60 years of age. Lived for many years around Punta Arenas. Died after 1948.

SAYEKTE—Died in her youth. Buried in a grotto at Puerto Grapler. Had one child who died at birth.

KOSWAKER—Died of old age, in 1946. Had two daughters who died soon after birth

2 girls and 2 boys, who died soon after birth.

THE DECLINE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD

The Economic Evolution of the Hellenistic States¹

The problem to which this article tries to supply an answer, in any case for the time being, is the following: was the political collapse of the Greek world the result of a slow internal disintegration or of the destructive action of the Roman conquest?

In other words: did the Graeco-Macedonian states, constituted after the conquest of Asia by Alexander, die 'their own splendid deaths' or were they 'assassinated'² by Rome?

This question is less academic than it appears. Within the measure in which we consider ourselves heirs of the Greeks we may well ask ourselves why, in so short a space of time after the Hellenistic apotheosis, they were so easily subjugated. Moreover, many historians maintain that Antiquity was acquainted with capitalism; so it is interesting to examine the reasons

¹This article summarises conclusions which will be more amply expounded in a further book. I have recalled some of the problems posed by the decline of Hellenism in a lecture on the destiny of the Roman world delivered last March at the Institut de Science Economique Appliquée under the presidency of M. André Piganiol.

²These expressions are used by André Piganiol; see *L'Empire Chrétien* (Paris 1947, p. 422).

The Decline of the Ancient World

for which the economy of the Eastern Mediterranean revealed itself incapable of assuring the resistance of the Hellenistic States and cities against foreign assault.

There can be no question here of bringing forward new elements and facts to throw light on this problem. Historians have put together an important documentation from which to draw.³

Naturally many points remain obscure, vast tracts are still unexplored, but in the last thirty years a great amount of work has been accomplished which can serve as a new starting-point for the discussions already opened up by the historians themselves. Our present aim is the following: to determine whether modern economic analysis permits us, on the basis of already established facts, to clear the way for a coherent and correct interpretation of the period which extends from the death of Alexander (323 B.C.) to the conquest of Egypt by Rome (31 B.C.). In what measure, so to speak, can the economist formulate a diagnosis based on the conceptions and theories with which he is familiar? His attempt can bear fruit only if he works out a *schema* which brings to light the *laws* of expansion and of contraction of Hellenistic economy.

This is obviously a difficult problem. Firstly because of the working habits of historians who do not make use of the same conceptions or the same instruments of thought as economists, and who attribute a quite different meaning to words in the economic and sociological vocabulary. Moreover, their 'restorations' of the past are influenced by political or cultural rather than economic or social interests. (In exactly what measure does the Hellenistic period constitute a *typical* phase of economic history?) We must in all justice recognise that this divorce between historic and economic science is equally imputable to the economists themselves and that the historians are not altogether mistaken in showing a certain measure of distrust concerning the methods favoured by the best-known theorists on modern economy. The latter in fact reason in abstract terms: for example, they use expressions such as 'marginal rates of substitution', 'liquidity preference', etc., which have reference to a simplified economy of an ideal nature, whilst the historian must start from reality and take his stand on facts of which he can furnish a detailed explanatory narrative. Moreover, economists like 'short-term' arguments, which means that they put aside certain 'data' of prime interest to the historian,

³ For the bibliography as a whole and the various sources, the most recent and best informed work is that of H. Bengtson: *Griechische Geschichte* in the collection *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft* by Ivan von Müller and Walter Otto (Munich 1950), pp. 341 *et seq.*

such as the population, technical progress, the stock of capital, the country's needs. It should not, however, be concluded that the refusal to analyse 'data' is general among economists; certain theories on evolution do exist as for example those of Marx or of Schumpeter, but Marx and Schumpeter are not merely theoretical economists, they are at least equally sociologists and historians. We are accordingly willing to admit that if a reconciliation is to come about between historians and economists it will take place on the plane of the concept of 'evolution', and from this viewpoint we shall ask ourselves in what precise measure the most recent results of erudition are contributing material for the elaboration of a theory accounting for the progress of Hellenistic economy as it may have been affected by some change in one or several of these 'data' or may itself in turn have modified them.

We have arrived at the following provisional conclusions. In the first place we have recognised that, from the economic point of view, the Hellenistic period belonged to a historical phase of humanity characterised by the *preponderance of agrarian production* over industrial production or commerce. The fundamental economic unit on which we had thus to fix our attention was the *domain*, for it represented the form taken by the modes of production and appropriation characteristic of an economy founded on agriculture. And since we had to deal with this economy based on landed property we were bound to ask ourselves whether variations supervening either in population, capital, technical methods, or general needs would be capable of affecting the composition and the structure of those domains, and if changes of composition and structure would not in their turn act on the fundamental 'data'. It happens that at the epoch with which we are concerned the form assumed by the domain was quite peculiar and in no way resembled either that of the preceding or of the following period: it was in fact determined by an anterior 'processus' or chain of events affording plain evidence of the part played by the fundamental 'data'.

On the other hand the domain was not merely a centre of production, it was also a *centre of exchange*.⁴ The great domain of that epoch is inconceivable unless it could sell its produce on the market, either regional or

⁴This point has been well brought out by Mr. Rostovtzeff in a series of works (e.g., *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1910; *A Large Estate in Egypt in the Third Century B.C.* (Madison, 1922), reprinted in his monumental work published in 1941: *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, Oxford, 3 vols. Cf. also the remarkable account by F. Heichelheim: *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums* (Leyden, 1938), I, 596 *et seq.*, and, generally, chapter VII (pp. 420 *et seq.*).

The Decline of the Ancient World

international. The authorities and the bureaucracy in general always favoured this direction and treated the domains both as commercial and productive units. It follows accordingly that the bulk and the fluctuations of commerce and of industrial production were always essentially dependent on formal changes in the rural domain.

How are we to imagine the domain as the *motive power of the Hellenistic epoch*? Although specialised cultivation developed in proportion to the international division of work, the domain remained a manifold producer but its *poly-production was organised*. A staff directed by a steward took care that the crops cultivated corresponded in *quantity and quality* with the rules laid down by a central and national authority. This central authority worked out a joint plan whose aim was not only to bring about a maximum increase in production but in addition to favour the types of cultivation whose crops would find a ready sale on the market and so procure a large profit. It was accordingly the business of the holder of the domain to subordinate his plan of production to the exigencies of a policy aiming at producing the largest possible revenue for the Hellenistic king. The domain organised and controlled by 'royal' economy implies, obviously, the existence of a bureaucracy capable of enforcing the orders of the central authority, a kind of minister of finance (*dioiketes*) of the monarch.⁵ In this lies the fundamental originality of the agrarian *régime* of the Hellenistic epoch. The problem which presents itself is to know how this type of organised and controlled domain (favouring large-scale agriculture and the expansion of agricultural land) came about and if it spread throughout the States of the Mediterranean basin. Before answering these questions it is well to stress the fact that it is impossible for us to recognise in the economy of that period an economy of the capitalist type since the latter implies the *subordination* of the agricultural and commercial branches to industry. On the other hand, the phases of crisis and contraction in Hellenistic economy taken as a whole are characterised not by the familiar phenomena of over-production on a general scale but on the contrary by insufficiency of production and exchange.

It is accordingly impossible for us to follow the greater part of modern authors when they interpret the destinies of Hellenism in terms borrowed from the economic history of our times. Without doubt the Mediterranean world, between the third and the first century B.C., was the theatre

⁵ This holds good especially for the Egypt of the third century. One finds, however, analogous forms of organisations, if less developed, in South Russia, in Iran, at Carthage and in Sicily. Cf. Heichelheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 612 *et seq.*

of extremely violent social conflicts, but we refuse to see in these class-wars the reflection of the conflicts between the 'middle-classes' and the 'proletariat'. The middle-classes and the proletariat are tied to a specific economic system whose fluctuations and inconsistencies are of a radically different type from those which define a system of economy based on exchange and characteristic of the domain. Many scholars who adhere to a 'capitalist' conception of ancient classical history (e.g., Meyer, Kahrstedt) do not hesitate to maintain that Hellenism has been 'assassinated' by Rome. This is one more reason to be suspicious of this 'modernisation' of Hellenistic economy. We find it difficult to admit that the brutal methods of conquest of an economically *backward* State (as Rome still was at the beginning of the second century) could have so easily overthrown a civilisation founded on a powerfully armoured capitalism.⁶ Another staunch defender of a strictly modern interpretation, Mr. Rostovtzeff, is more consistent with himself when he invokes as essential factor of the collapse of Hellenism a long process of internal disintegration.⁷

If any interpretation of Hellenistic economy based on 'capitalist' terms appears to us in the light of a 'ready-made' solution, what other solution can we offer in exchange? We confess at once that, considering the character of our sources of information, their dispersion, their insufficiency and frequently their complete absence, it is difficult to establish a scheme of evolution capable of giving entire satisfaction. We are compelled, in face of the silence of documents, to deal with many capital points by simple inference. But our documents are not so insufficient as not to indicate a fundamental tendency or 'trend' (as the Anglo-Saxons call it) of which many events are symptomatic. Only in so far as we are able to measure the dynamic force inherent in this 'trend' shall we be in a position to give a precise meaning to the contradictions to which Rostovtzeff has, with every justification, drawn attention: the ethnic antagonism between Greeks and natives, redoubled by political antagonism (the statute for the Greeks in the towns contained privileges not extended to the peasants in the country) and by economic opposition (relative liberty

⁶ The most determined supporter of a 'capitalist' conception of Greek economy is E. Meyer; cf. *Blüte und Niedergang des Hellenismus in Asien* (1925). See also on the same lines, F. Munzer: 'Die politische Vernichtung des Griechentums' (*Das Erbe der Alten* [1925], II, 95); H. Berve, *Griechische Geschichte* (1933), II, 393 *et seq.*, and above all, U. Kahrstedt, 'Die Grundlagen und Voraussetzungen der römischen Revolution' (*Neue Wege zur Antike* (1927), IV, 94 *et seq.*).

⁷ Cf. the works already cited and, in addition, 'The Hellenistic World and Its Economic Development' (*American Historical Review* 41, 1936, pp. 231 *et seq.*).

The Decline of the Ancient World

of townsfolk and oppressive control of workers on the soil).⁸ This 'antinomia' between the conquering Greeks and the conquered populations was naturally accompanied by a most unequal distribution of revenues and, as regards the entire Mediterranean economy, by a *chronic insufficiency* of purchasing power generating a limitation and narrowing of the international market and causing an invariable obstacle to any *unlimited expansion*. The observations of the scholar himself, based essentially on the papyrological sources of Lagid Egypt, are accurate and can also be applied, in a lesser extent, to other Hellenistic States (Asia of the Seleucids, Pergamon, Macedonia). On the other hand the City-States (Athens, Sparta) experienced class-conflicts of an almost identical nature. Kahrstedt has even ventured to speak of a 'proletarian international' responsible for the agitations of the second and first centuries.⁹ Although the term employed by Kahrstedt is manifestly anachronistic, the facts which it describes are perfectly accurate. But the scholars who have established this state of permanent internal warfare have not been able to give a satisfactory explanation of it, obsessed as they were by the history of the twentieth century. Rostovtzeff had been struck, on the eve of the Russian Revolution of 1917, by the opposition between town and country; Kahrstedt, Berve, and German scholars in general, by the troubles and revolutionary crises in Germany after 1919. Nor have other scholars who have adopted intermediary attitudes (W. W. Tarn, F. Heichelheim) furnished convincing solutions for lack, not of information (Heichelheim in particular furnishes us with new facts about prices and revenues), but of a method capable of explaining a dynamic succession of phenomena.¹⁰

Must it then be said that, though we recognise the accuracy of Rostovtzeff's statements and the precision of his information, we refuse recognition in our scheme to any disturbing action coming from outside, whether from Iran as Altheim suggests,¹¹ or from Rome herself, according to Willamovitz, Ed. Meyer or F. Munzer? By no means. The proper sense of our interpretation is precisely that it refuses an explanation based on simple factors of internal disintegration or external attack. Its aim is, on

⁸Rostovtzeff: *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World II*, 913.

⁹In *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1926, p. 97; 1928, p. 484.

¹⁰Cf. W. W. Tarn: *La Civilisation hellénistique*, Paris, 1936; Heichelheim, *op. cit.*, I, 1 et seq. The method (and consequently the presentation) of Heichelheim, inspired by the sociological works of A. Spiethoff and Oppenheimer, seems open to question.

¹¹F. Altheim: *Alexandre et l'Asie*, Paris, 1954.

the contrary, to point out how the *internal dynamism of the exchange economy of the domain in its Hellenistic phase rendered possible and practically inevitable a double pressure coming at the same time from East and West.*

It will be remembered that at the beginning of this article we stressed the characteristic fixed *direction* taken by the exchange economy of the domain in the period between 323 B.C. and 31 B.C. There appeared on the scene for the first time a type of domain whose essential aim was to co-operate in increasing the production of a State. Egypt in particular constituted a privileged laboratory for this kind of experiment. It was under the impulse of the economic counsellors of Ptolemy Philadelphus (285-246) that the constitution of *model economic units* took place which were highly progressive in their methods and which proposed not only to reclaim the lands hitherto uncultivated but also to introduce new crops, to improve cattle-breeding, to establish modern methods of cultivation (the first attempts at triennial rotation of crops date from this epoch), to perfect 'domestic' industry, etc. All this in order that the produce of Egypt should compete victoriously with that of other States on the Mediterranean market and increase the Sovereign's stock of precious metal. We are admirably informed about all these experiments by the correspondence of Zeno, steward of Appolonios, minister of finance of Ptolemy II Philadelphus.¹² Thanks to this correspondence we can follow the development and the progress realised on the domain of the district of Philadelphia which the Sovereign had granted to his minister. The methods of production were based on native manual labour, and the peasants were practically serfs who disposed of land *which they were not free to cultivate as they thought best* but only in strict conformity with the instructions of the steward. The latter supplied them with seeds, implements and cattle in return for a *quota* of their harvest (between 20 and 30 per cent) which was fixed and *previsionally* calculated. In other words, the harvest was estimated *ex ante* and the dues fixed in accordance. The steward did not confine himself to the use of already existing manual labour; he also called in *paid workers*, either permanent or temporary. The produce of the domain was later centralised in storehouses and its disposal realised by special sellers who enjoyed an actual monopoly. 'The right to sell a particular product, for instance, oil, wine, salt, cheese, bread . . . was granted to

¹²Cf. Rostovtzeff: 'A large Estate', etc., pp. 43 *et seq.*, for a careful analysis of the existing papyrological sources of which he gives a complete extract (Index IV, 205).

The Decline of the Ancient World

special concessionaires who had the exclusive right to sell these products to the population of a certain district.¹³

An attempt has been made to see in these new methods of agrarian production a form of State capitalism, mercantilism or some such thing. In effect, however, it was at first merely a question of allowing the Ptolemies a policy of presence and intervention in the Mediterranean area, but it was also important to favour the installation of the Greeks whom Alexander's conquest had dispersed to the four corners of the East. To solve the social problems propounded by this *diaspora* was a categorical imperative for the Hellenistic sovereigns who could establish lasting power only if founded on a Graeco-Macedonian *élite* provided with adequate wealth. If it is necessary at all costs to define this new type of economic organisation which allowed a complete general staff of Greeks to display their spirit of initiative and organising capacity, it is by the word 'colonialism', the least disfiguring term for the reality of that period. The constitution of 'conceded' domains or estates (*doreai*) was the most evolved and dynamic expression of the new style of economy which characterises the *Landwirtschaftswirtschaft* system in its Hellenistic phase. Naturally the establishment of an important mass of soldier-peasants on land concessions of small dimension (*kleroukie*), together with urbanisation (particularly in the satrapies of the Seleucid East), had their part in the colonial policy systematically pursued by the Hellenistic sovereigns. But it is necessary to insist on the originality, at that epoch, of the system of granting estates with a precarious tenure and of which the methods of production formed part of a general plan.

How widespread was this type of domain, in what sense can we say that it constituted the motive power of the evolution of the domain economy of exchange during the three centuries which separate the conquest of Alexander from the battle of Actium? These questions we shall now try to answer.

To begin with, we insist on the fact that it is possible, when considering Hellenistic economy as a whole, to trace a phase of expansion followed by a phase of contraction. What duration can be assigned to these two phases? Is it possible to be quite certain that the chronological framework coincides strictly with the logical unfolding of our schema?

There are two series of clues at our disposal. The first are of a political order and have, moreover, been widely commented upon; the second are

¹³ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

of an economic order and concern prices and revenues as they are disclosed to us by the Delos inscriptions and the cuneiform texts of Uruk.¹⁴

First it would be well to say a few words concerning the clues of a political order. After a period of effervescence and military anarchy, during which two principles were opposed in incessant warfare—the principle of unity (maintenance of the integrity of Alexander's Empire) and the principle of division (attempt to constitute kingdoms and independent States—a state of relative equilibrium is finally reached. This equilibrium is quite unstable, and each new State aims at defending its integrity by defensive measures, that is, by wars. Thus from 323 to 301 (date on which at the battle of Ipsos the principle of unity represented by Antigonos Monophthalmos suffered shipwreck), and from 301 to 281 (battle of Corupedion lost by Lysimachus of Thrace, which put an end to the wars of succession) we find a permanent state of war. From 281 to 215 (the latter date marking the first intervention of Rome in the affairs of the East) we have an epoch during which each of the large States has to wage costly wars, just to defend its existence. This is a period of relative stability cut up by local but practically incessant conflicts. An example is afforded by the four first Syrian wars between the Lagid rulers and the Seleucids (276–271, 260–253, 246–241, 218–216), the 'Chremonidian' war (276–261), and the war against Sparta (222) waged by the followers of Antigonos of Macedon, etc. . . . We are not called upon to interpret these events in detail, nor are we, unfortunately, in a position to do so. We shall merely point out that on the plane of economic evolution, which is ours, they bear witness to the difficult genesis of the new 'royal' economy, a form of organisation corresponding with the domain exchange economy. It is not only the existence of a mercenary army which explains the interminable duration of the conflicts, but also the difficulties consequent on Greek expansion in the East. This new 'colonisation' merely perpetuated the contradictions of the economy of the *polis* and 'resolved' them by

¹⁴On the political history of the Hellenistic period there are numerous works; together with that of Bengtson quoted above, to be consulted are volumes VII and VIII of the 'Cambridge Ancient History', published under the direction of S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock and M. D. Charlesworth (with important bibliographies) and P. Jouguet: *L'Impérialisme Macédonien et l'hellénisation de l'Orient*. (Coll: 'L'Évolution de l'Humanité', vol. XV, Paris, 1926.)

On the history of prices the chief work is by F. Heichelheim: *Wirtschaftliche Schwankungen der Zeit von Alexander bis Augustus* (1930), whose conclusions are summarised in the *Wirtschaftsgeschichte, des Altertums*, I, 420 et seq. Valuable information can also be obtained from the articles by G. Glotz in the *Journal des Savants*, 1913, pp. 16 et seq.; from the *Revue des Etudes grecques* for 1916, pp. 281 et seq.; 1918, 207 et seq. (on prices at Delos); from the *Bulletin de la Société Archéologique alexandrine* (1930), pp. 80 et seq. (on the price of papyrus). Cf. also H. Michell: *Economics of Ancient Greece*, 1937.

The Decline of the Ancient World

military conquests. From the moment that the towns of continental Greece, because of foreign competition, could no longer dispose of their manufactured goods and suffered accordingly from chronic unemployment and over-population, aggravated by the poverty of their soil in raw materials as well as alimentary products and by their ineradicable particularism, the only possible road to safety was unification and expansion. Philip's Macedonian state, and the universal monarchy of Alexander mark the intermediary stages of the process leading to the 'royal' type of economy of which the Pseudo-Aristotle speaks in his *Economics*,¹⁵ and establish beyond recall the decadence of the City-States of the Athenian or Spartan style. Similarly the dislocation of Alexander's empire marks the doom of a formula no longer corresponding with the real development necessary to assure the permanence of a monarchy of a universal type.¹⁶ The hour was favourable to States of large dimensions and traditional form, familiar from early times to the East, to India and to China, but in the end, as will be seen, more vulnerable, more fragile than even the Empires of the Pharaohs or the Babylonian State of Hammourabi. From 215 to 31, the history of the Hellenistic Orient is intermixed with that of the Roman conquest.¹⁷ Does this mean that, as regards the Graeco-Macedonian States, this period represents a phase of continuous and irremediable decadence? By no means, and it is precisely because histories have noted the presence of incontestable symptoms of renewal at certain epochs that Heichelheim has ventured to accept only partially what he considers the too radical thesis of Rostovtzeff.¹⁸ He notes, for example, that between 190 and 135, the Hellenistic States experienced not only a political renaissance but also an economic renewal. We repeat that we do not consider the two points of view to be incompatible, but before entering into the heart of the subject it is well to review the movement of prices and revenues.

It is not possible to enter into details. Only the important pulsations can be briefly registered. From about 320 to 280, there were sharp and irregular fluctuations of prices and revenues, both upwards and downwards. From 280 to 250 more stable movements supervened with a

¹⁵ Cf. the commentary given by Rostovtzeff in his *Economic Social History*, I, 440 *et seq.*

¹⁶ On this point we are in entire agreement with the conclusions drawn by W. Wülken in his *Alexandre le Grand* (Paris 1929), *passim*.

¹⁷ On the Roman conquest, its causes and its consequences, cf. the admirable account by A. Piganiol: *La Conquête Romaine* (Coll. 'Peuples et Civilisation'), Paris, 1927, to be completed by *l'Histoire de Rome* by the same author (Coll. 'Clio', No 3, Paris, 1939), pp. 110 *et seq.* Lastly: Giannelli-Mazzarino: *Trattato di Storia Romana*, II (1954).

¹⁸ Heichelheim: *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, I, 452.

tendency to weakening. From 250 to 200-190 the accounts of the priests of the temple of Delos display a rising phase sufficiently durable to enable prices to return to the level of the beginning of the third century. The revenues (and particularly the salaries) did not follow this rise and reveal a sufficient rigidity to permit us to speak of a deterioration in the standard of living of the working classes. This tendency was maintained as far as 170-160, the date at which there are signs of a new rising phase to continue up to the year 80. From Sulla to Caesar, a new fall and stabilisation.¹⁹ It is thus clear that the rhythm animating Hellenistic economy was decomposing in alternate phases of *inflation* and *deflation* depending not so much on variations in the money stock as on the vicissitudes common to the exchange economy of the domain and, in a more general manner, to the destinies of the various Hellenistic States.

We have considered it useful to furnish the above indications as they make it possible for us to determine the crucial points of our schema. We shall put aside the *intermediary* period, 320-280, during which a new economic and political order was organised. This phase of violent agitations and disordered rivalries leading towards 'royal economy' is accurately reflected in the anarchy of prices and their erratic variations (within a few months oil, as standard unit, fluctuated between 54, 31, 18, 45, and 54 drachmas, flour passed from $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 drachmas, etc.). From the year 280 we should like to distinguish a *specific* Hellenistic cycle which falls into three phases: a phase of expansion, going from 280 to 240; a halt which marks the turning point, from 240 to 200, and introduces the phase of contraction, which in turn gives way to a new type of organisation of domain exchange economy, of which Rome, Sicily, and Pergamos were the promoters, an agricultural economy founded on slave labour. Having defined the chronological limits of our schema it now remains to analyse its internal mechanism.

In the first place we must insist on an essential point: the type of new organisation represented by the organised domain *does not seem to have spread* beyond the frontiers of Egypt. We are certainly much less well-informed concerning the economic life of Macedonia and of Seleucid Asia, but the small evidence at our disposal does indicate a radical transformation of existing economic conditions by a concerted development of production. This is especially true of Macedonia which up to the reigns

¹⁹Heichelheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 440-57; *ibid.*, p. 605; Rostovtzeff, *Economic and Social History*, II, 1185.

The Decline of the Ancient World

of Philip V and of Perseus seems to have preserved an archaic agrarian structure. As regards Seleucid Asia, the texts at our disposal (the inscription of Mnesimachos, for example) suggest that the domains were cultivated in the traditional manner without concerted planning. What was the cause of this lack of dynamism? It is very difficult to say. We are inclined to think that the resistance of the great landed proprietors was successful in opposing what they considered an inadmissible intrusion of the central power. This may have been true in the case of the great lords (dynasts) and the clergy of Syria and Seleucid Babylonia. But we must be on our guard against definite conclusions on the subject. What is in any case certain is that the new political economy of the Lagians did not succeed in securing them an absolute economic preponderance analogous to that of England at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. Egypt was not able to acquire an advance sufficient to allow her an undisputed control of the seas except for a relatively brief period. On the other hand, the appearance on the scene of the organised domain did not resolve one fundamental contradiction in ancient economy: the opposition between a particularist land economy of limited range and a commercial economy of international character.²⁰ In no case did the land proprietors become landlords endowed with an economist mentality and actuated by strictly economic objectives, and so no profound change took place in the spirit which had previously dominated the domain exchange economy. From this contradiction resulted the necessarily unequal distribution of the revenues. One of the essential laws of domain economy in general is the tendency to the increasing concentration of landed property. It does not appear that the Egyptian *doreai* made any serious change in the consequences deriving from this law in the sense that the purchasing power of the peasant was not improved, far from it.

We can now explain in a certain measure why the phase of expansion induced by the directed policy of the Hellenistic sovereigns had a relatively short duration. The reason is that it was not able to exert a lasting pressure on the fundamental data: population, capital stock, technical progress, needs. Its general effect was undoubtedly favourable, but slight and of short duration. The population perhaps increased in numbers, but very slightly, and possibly owing to immigration. The stock of capital registered an increase only of agricultural goods due to the introduction of more rational methods of production, to specialisation in crops, and to the

²⁰ Well brought out by E. Will in *Annales d'Histoire Sociale* (March, 1954).

reclaiming of waste lands; but industrial production and the rhythm of industrial investments made no progress worth mentioning. Certain vital sectors of industry (e.g., textiles) remained strictly dependent on rural economy and a large portion of the production of goods for current consumption continued to be guaranteed by the efforts of 'domestic' economy, that is to say, by the *workshop* of the estate. As regards ceramics, a *complementary* industry of agriculture, it was a long way from having attained, as Rostovtzeff claims, the stage of 'mass production'.²¹ Some 'manufactories' doubtless did exist in Rhodes and Alexandria producing water-jars and amphoras, but the main necessities were assured, as in the classic epoch, by the workshops (*ergasteria*). The same can be said about mining production whose character underwent no modification after the fifth-century exploitation of the Athenian mines of Laurion. On the whole, therefore, a state of stagnation must be registered at least as regards industrial production. In the same way, it must be admitted that the rate of technical progress during this period remained somewhat low. Neither the introduction in the textile industry of a perfected vertical loom, nor the new method of moulding in pottery work, nor the improvement in the draining system of the mines due to the introduction of the pump of Archimedes, caused any noticeable disturbance in the rhythm of industrial activity. It goes without saying, moreover, that the existence of slavery put a considerable check on the movement, but its importance ought not to be exaggerated. By reason of the fact that the slave trade had assumed an international character (Delos was the great centre of this market)²² technical progress could only be very slow and many inventions (the Hellenistic epoch was extraordinarily rich in inventions)²³ were condemned to remain dead letter. No illusions should be further entertained concerning the expansion of the market. Certainly by reason of increased specialisation resulting from the existence of a concerted plan of agricultural production and of 'model' estates, exchanges were intensified and the unification of money (a kind of monetary bimetallist system existed in which the Ptolomaic stater played somewhat the role of the dollar today,

²¹ Mass production implies that the early stage of individual handicraft has given way to the factory, a fact which the defenders of 'capitalism' seem not to have always grasped (e.g., F. Oertel in R. von Pohlmann: *Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt* (third edition, Munich, 1925). Nor is it possible for me to agree with the too 'archaic' conclusions of J. Bassebrook, above all concerning classic Greece. (Cf. *Staat und Handel in alten Griechenland*, Tübingen, 1928.)

²² On the commerce in slaves, cf. the well documented article by W. L. Westermann in the *Real Enzyklopedie* of Pauly-Wissow-Kroll: 'Sklaverei' (supplement VI).

²³ Cf. Tarn: *La civilisation hellénistique*, pp. 273 et seq.

The Decline of the Ancient World

even if only relatively) still further accentuated this intensification. But it is necessary to insist on the fact that if the level of the exchanges increased, *their structure remained identical*. The goods forming the object of an international commerce were partly luxury goods intended for rich clients (pan-Hellenic ceramics) and partly agricultural produce (wine, oil, grain) together with certain raw materials (wood and metals).²⁴ This international exchange trade had as essential aim the alleviation of the lack of foodstuffs (for example, wheat), from which certain Mediterranean States were suffering (especially the Greek towns) and which threatened to cause food scarcity and want unless regular supplies could be maintained. The fact must be stressed that because of insufficient purchasing power goods of current consumption did not constitute a decisive factor of maritime commerce. This explains the under-developed character of the commercial technique. A striking feature, for example, is the absence of great permanent companies similar to the societies which constituted themselves as far back as the thirteenth century in medieval Italy. Rhodes was certainly an important clearing-house and an essential place of transit—in which role it was later substituted by Delos—but the truth remains that the international market was never able (because of the extreme inequality of revenues) to develop to a point sufficient to *assure the economic preponderance of the merchants, to incite them to modify their methods of production and to destroy the artisan framework of industry*. The market remained almost stationary because too 'narrow', and accordingly *wealth founded on land always ended by getting the better of wealth founded on movable assets*. The rate of interest moreover remained relatively high (between 8 and 12 per cent) which must have considerably restricted the merchants. The transfers of property which in the fourth and third centuries favoured the newly rich were not sufficiently extensive to modify in a definite manner the existing social relations, except naturally to aggravate the situation of the middle and poorer classes (especially in continental Greece). Nor is it astonishing that credit and banking, though their operations developed, still preserved an archaic character. The bankers were above all money-changers; they carried out conveyances of property and accorded credits (in a limited number). But nothing existed in any way comparable to what was to be, for example, the market of Antwerp in the sixteenth century, or of Amsterdam in the seventeenth. If the letter of credit existed, the bill of exchange of the type used by medieval Italian merchants was

²⁴It is to be noted that the evidence of prices at our disposal concerns chiefly wheat, wine and oil.

unknown, so that there could be no question of a short-term money market. And as there were no joint-stock companies, there was no financial long-term market either.²⁵

It is accordingly clear why the phase of expansion brought about by the new royal economy could not last and why the turning point which led first to stagnation, then to contraction, manifested itself rapidly. Since Mediterranean economy was unable to free itself from the constraints of the archaic framework of its agriculture, it was precisely in the rural districts that the most evident symptoms of contraction first appeared. Rostovtzeff has given a remarkable description of the first consequences of this backward tendency: depopulation (especially in continental Greece), silent strikes of the peasants, fleeing to the temples to escape from the ever-increasing pressure of the contributions exacted from them by the royal functionaries, the retrogression of crops (the land once more remains uncultivated), and finally inflation.²⁶ In fact from the day on which 'interventionism' and control of agricultural production proved incapable of developing the forces of production, that is to say, of taking efficacious action on fundamental data, the pressure of the bureaucracy and of the army was bound to reveal itself day by day more unbearable, so that the 'financing' of these parasitic organisms inherent in every evolved State could be effected only by aggravating the burdens on the native peasants and by depreciating money. It was under the reigns of Ptolemy III Euergetes and of Ptolemy IV Philopator in Egypt, of Seleucus II in Asia Minor, of Demetrius II in Macedonia, that the backward tendency manifested itself. From 220 onwards and in spite of some temporary remissions, the decadence was irremediable. It is therefore not surprising to note how violent the racial and social conflicts became. The natives, both Egyptians and Persians, not only resisted all attempts at Hellenisation but actually rebelled both passively and actively against the Greeks. The desertion of the lands (*anachoresis*) and strikes followed by military insurrections (after the battle of Raphia in 217) multiplied in number. The Iranian satrapies (Bactria, Parthia) regained their independence.²⁷ In Greece, Sparta, under the reigns

²⁵ With the exception of the *partes*, societies of tax-gatherers, who, however, played no essential role until the second century. Cf. the important text of Polybius referred to by A. Piganiol in his *Conquête Romaine*.

²⁶ Cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *Economic and Social History*, II, 841 *et seq.*, 870 *et seq.*, 955 *et seq.* Perhaps he does not insist enough on the decisive and specific role played by inflation in a fundamentally agrarian economy. It not only accelerates the concentration of property and the unequal distribution of the revenues, but it also increases hoarding; hence the plethora of purely monetary 'capital'.

²⁷ Cf. the excellent development of the subject by F. Altheim: *Alexandre et l'Asie*, pp. 194 *et seq.*

The Decline of the Ancient World

of Agis (241) and of Cleomenes (227), instituted a laboratory for the most 'advanced' social experiments (liberation of slaves, abolition of debts, division of the land). These reforms could not be realised in a durable manner because of the crushing of Sparta by Antigonos Doson, and although they were resumed in the following century by Nabis they finally became dead letter, constituting, however, the *fundamental revindications* of the peasantry throughout the entire Classic Antiquity. The liberation movements, favoured either by the Macedonian kings themselves (Perseus) or by adventurers such as Andrisus in Macedonia, by Aristonicus of Pergamon, by Saumacus in the kingdom of the Bosphorus, were all at the same time *nationalist* (animated by the spirit of revenge of the original inhabitants of the land towards the Greek and Roman conquerors) and radical (not 'communist' as has been erroneously maintained).²⁸ In fact, the solution of the agrarian problem and the attenuation of the irreducible class conflicts could not come from such measures as dividing up lands or abolishing debts because of the congenital inferiority and the *regressive* character of the small landowner. The levelling policy of the Stoics, the ideal communism of the 'City of the Sun' had no influence whatever on the *data* of the problem.²⁹ The contradiction could not be resolved except by an *economic revolution* which would considerably develop the volume of production, and it has already been shown for what reasons this revolution had proved to be impossible. The 'cumulative' process of dilapidation of the agrarian economy, rendered still more manifest by the inflation which exposed so glaringly the unequal division of revenues, was able to develop without any obstacle. This does not mean that the Hellenistic sovereigns were insensible to the misfortunes of their subjects, but even their decrees of 'amnesty' were insufficient to turn the tide. Equally unsuccessful was a new 'lowering of debts' as enacted by Solon, and tried by Perseus in Macedonia, or an attempt to liberate the serfs, like that of Antiochus III in Asia Minor. It is possible, as Heichelheim sustains, that these several measures were evidence of a revival of Hellenism and that they favoured a partial improvement in conditions, but it is well

²⁸ Cf. once again the masterly development of the subject by Rostovtzeff in his *Economic and Social History*, II, 756. Although violently anti-Marxist, Rostovtzeff definitely seems to me the historian of classic antiquity who comes nearest to Marx by the importance he attaches to the class conflicts and by the care with which he seeks out the strictly social and political origin of racial opposition. Symptomatic also seems the small importance he attaches on the whole to monetary phenomena; cf. also the works of Kahrstedt, Meyer, Tarn, mentioned above.

²⁹ On the role of the stoa, cf. R. von Pöhlmann, *op. cit.*, and H. Bengtson, *op. cit.*

to remember that a period of depression of long duration is not exempt from spasmodic phases of prosperity of brief duration.

In what measure can Rome be held responsible for the collapse of Hellenism and the 'barbarisation' of the Greek world? For a considerable time (up to the end of the Republic) the brutal methods of conquest of the Romans considerably aggravated an already critical situation. It is quite certain that the enslavement of entire populations, the destruction of towns and of their artistic treasures, the enormous reparations, the activities of the tax-gatherers and the considerable 'exportation' of capital resulting from them, all helped to *accelerate* an internal process which had already begun to manifest its regressive effects long before the arrival of the Romans. Later, however, the *unification of the Mediterranean market* realised by Rome was a decisive factor of the ensuing recovery, and introduced another great historic cycle of expansion and contraction of a different type. The great domains were again transformed and became the origin of a new economic style, although the last centuries of the ancient world do not differ essentially from the centuries which preceded them.

In conclusion it is interesting to note that the fall of the Hellenistic monarchies strangely prefigures the fall of the Roman Empire. In the second and first centuries there had been, as it were, a 'dress rehearsal' of what was to take place on a greater scale in the second, fourth and fifth centuries A.D. If we are to reject the theory of the unilateral responsibility of Rome (who actually did no more than prolong the life of a moribund system) it is safe to suppose that on an international scale the contradictions which the Hellenistic governing classes had to face created unsurmountable difficulties. It would have been necessary to re-absorb the sequelae or morbid conditions arising from an archaic structure which had managed to maintain itself, notwithstanding a certain number of modifications in agrarian economy, which absorption was unthinkable. Rome was destined to face the same difficulties on an even greater scale resulting in a still more terrible failure. F. Altheim insists that '*the intervention of the other*' (i.e., the invader) constitutes a crucial factor of evolution 'in so far as it stops it, curbs it or stimulates it'.³⁰ We are of the opinion that it is merely the epilogue of a drama whose introduction and problem are purely internal.

³⁰ Altheim: *Alexandre et l'Asie*, p. 406.

FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY

Man can be 'good and evil' in his actions, reasonable and unreasonable—not to say, insane: this is his liberty. Hence his responsibility, which is born of this liberty. There can be no liberty without responsibility.

The question: is Man rational in his actions? cannot be answered by a simple 'yes': that some of his actions are rational is proved by the very fact of our existence; that not all of these actions are rational is proved by our present situation. On the other hand, if we do not perish, this is no proof of Man's rationality. Nor is it proved by the evolution of all creation, which undoubtedly moves from low to high. But it is not difficult to see that of all living beings Man alone is capable of acting rationally. Where Man's reason does not reach, there rules the law of selection. This latter prevails, likewise, wherever Man acts irrationally. Out of a senseless 'urge to be'—as Schopenhauer calls it—that being asserts himself who enjoys some kind of primacy, who is superior in no matter what sphere—whether by his force, velocity, protective colouring, or any other way, it does not matter, except in the individual case.

The problem 'liberty-responsibility' would be easy to solve if Man

la

were an isolated individual, born of himself. But Man, and beyond him everything in the universe, is part of a coherent whole, of an ultimate unreachable unity. Therefore he is a communal being (*Gemeinschaftswesen*), i.e., he is in relation with his fellow men and with whatever else exists in the universe. His freedom of action therefore has a certain influence on his surroundings and his fellow beings. Where he acts in his own interests, he violates the sphere of interests of his fellow men. It is against this background that his responsibility becomes visible. No matter how small the action in question, he cannot find his responsibility within himself. He must feel responsible also for the world surrounding him. If we consider now that Man lacks a system of order which would give him a clear perspective; if we recognise that he is not always able to calculate the consequences of his actions; that, moreover, he is not always willing to calculate them because he recoils from thinking—we will understand that he faces the world in a state of fear. This fear is the mother of cowardice. But cowardice will seek authority: something that will relieve the coward of his responsibility. The search for authority has moved men closer together, and thus created society. Man enters society, willing or unwilling, in order to give up his liberty, either partially or wholly, in favour of something bigger.

But if we remember that cowardice can engender only submersion, we will understand that the act of joining a community calls for courage; even more than that: that this act has been completed with the purpose of overcoming cowardice, of relieving man of his sense of loneliness.

Society, as the sum of many individuals, is viable only if it possesses an order, and if this order is observed. This requires an authority, power—unless subordination is voluntary, rational, and unconditional, thus enabling the order to hold society together. Such subordination would be possible only if Man were really Man, or in other words, if Man were rational. But Man lives in a world in which nothing can be rational except himself. With this exception, a being can assert himself in this world only if he is superior to the thing he needs. The most powerful wins. This recognition is an heirloom of our mind and instinctively penetrates everything around us. It is the lowest limit of a metaphysical force which passes reason, rationality, and eventually leads to imagination (fantasy), penetrating the universe in infinite forms of evolution. The practical efficacy of this force is bound to the individual; it cannot be transferred. It is not difficult to see that Man is not ready to be rational but that he strives to gain power. The stage of life thus is dominated by two scenes: the struggle for power among societies,

Freedom and Authority

and the struggle for power within each society. Reason matters little and is exercised only when it is enforced by authority. Reason leads Man to recognise that the demolition of power would mean chaos; it does not induce him to understand that this power would not be needed at all if he renounced his struggle to gain it.

There is no form of society of any importance where authority does not rest on power. The various forms of society differ from one another only in that they claim more or less of the individual's freedom. In the political sphere we call a system democratic if it leaves to man a part of his liberty. A system that restricts individual freedom more severely is called a dictatorship. The democracies as well as the dictatorships of our age have historical precedents. All such forms have been overcome in the past, for the urge towards liberty is probably as strong in Man as is his cowardice. Any power which rests on an order restricting the liberty of the individual must count with the eventuality of rebellion—especially when the dominated have overcome their cowardice or have nothing to lose. It would therefore be rational to prefer forms of power which would restrict individual freedom as little as possible. It should also be kept in mind that a dislocation of power will be less noticeable in a 'democracy' than in a 'dictatorship'.

What has been said up to this point applies to the kind of authority which cannot claim investiture from any higher source. Just as society arises from the recognition that two are stronger than one, thus power rests on the recognition that order must be preserved unless chaos is to break out. But it should not be forgotten that society cannot adequately protect one member against the ambitions of another. In so far as the stronger member keeps within the limits of reason and does not overrate his forces, the scales will be kept balanced in a steady upward and downward movement.

But there is another kind of authority which should be called 'natural authority'. This authority is not based on power in the above mentioned sense. It has always existed and will continue to exist, as long as there is personality. It does not coerce; it is recognised; not because people believe in it but because it persuades people. This authority rests on a clear, unequivocal, understandable relationship with the environment. The security with which its bearer moves unperturbed through any difficulty inspires confidence. Reason manifested in this way is like an island in a stormy sea. Liberty here is associated with responsibility. There is no bargaining, there is only action; there are only true measures, measures eternally valid. Thousands are remembered here, who have no power, but

to whom nevertheless we owe our escape from chaos. They are those who now and again bear light into the darkness, who come and go unnoticed. If once in a while they emerge from the narrow sphere of their action, they are admired, considered as men of grace; but their example is hardly ever followed. God, for them, is duty, not business.

The assumption that these men do not exist would be erroneous. They live amongst us. Their number may be small compared with that of the market-cryers; and, besides they are often disavowed. Many a feat of love has sprung from this source; even though this source may be disavowed. Without them Man would forget how to be 'good'.

Freedom and authority are genuine only where responsibility comes into being.

Life can exist only where it can destroy. The limit of necessary destruction is drawn by Reason and Responsibility. Here it becomes clear that the living being capable of developing reason must be protected, at any price, against destruction. More than that, this living being must be helped and encouraged if we want to get beyond a phase of evolution which has been dominated not by reason but by irresponsible power. Unless we agree to become reasonable, any reference to culture is a hoax. Then we must prevent Man from invading the spheres around him; for there lies the gravest danger of our destruction.

Man is not an individual born of himself. Heidegger says: 'Wherever man directs his eye, his ear, and all his mind, he does not achieve an uncovering by his own strength, but everywhere he finds himself transported into what has already been uncovered'. This is true. Man does not begin where the first man began. The only question is: Does he really open his eyes, ears, heart, and mind? He can receive the uncovered only where there is a will and a force. He can receive a part, and change its meaning. He can reject the whole, close himself completely. This is his freedom. But the consequences of his action, in other words, his lack of responsibility, he does not bear alone; the world around him must bear it too, more or less—perhaps even without him. In this irresponsibility Man does not act alone: already those who put him into this world and failed to inculcate in him a feeling of responsibility were irresponsible. The first thing man is taught is obedience: submission to an authority. Therefore he flees from responsibility also later on, and takes refuge behind authority. By supporting it he gives power to this authority, and always finds a scapegoat if it fails, if it acts irresponsibly against him who supports it.

Man is a free individual, but he is rooted in the world around him, and

Freedom and Authority

his action is connected with its action. Therefore he is responsible not only for himself but also for his environment. To safeguard this responsibility is the first condition for being human.

But where do we act responsibly? Only where we watch and calculate the consequences of our action, and on this basis do what is rational.

It is not enough to believe in an authority. Our faith opens to this authority the way to arbitrariness, to the irresponsible abuse of power. Though the sphere of action of a powerful individual may be limited by time, such time-limits are wide enough to permit such an individual to carry us to the verge of chaos. And the channels leading to power, are they not clogged with dubious personalities?

The remedy consists in creating responsible men. That is the ground on which true liberty and true authority can grow. All the rest are palliatives; there is no other cure. If Jaspers notes that man does not know how to use his liberty, this is an effect of our system of education. Men are educated to obey; on the basis of this education they evade responsibility. But how could there be liberty without responsibility?

Jakob Grimm says of authority: 'It is an heirloom which parents for countless years have carried with them and transmitted to us, which we in our turn preserve as a legacy for our descendants. . . . But if its origin be sought, it recedes ever further into the past; beyond discovery and shrouded in mystery, it remains concealed in darkness.'

Does he not try to insinuate the light of a soft sunshine into a scene which in reality is stormy?

The authority of one's parents, is it always founded on faith in one's parents? The parental orders, 'Thou shalt, thou shalt not . . .', are they not paralleled by analogous orders of larger organisations?

What would happen if a child rejected the authority of his parents? First of all, the child will not be able to do so, unless he wants to deprive himself of his biological foundations as well. But when he is in a position to do so, he will soon rid himself of their authority. Or perhaps, he will not have the necessary courage. Among those who have that courage we must count all those who leave their native land to seek their fortunes abroad. But when they are again importuned by authority, they may go as far as breaking even the last bond, and the seeker of freedom becomes a harried and persecuted individual. This may be the extreme opposite of the situation described by Jakob Grimm; but it occurs no less frequently than the situation arising from faith in authority.

Rarely is Man subject to genuine authority. Whenever he escapes one

form of domination, he succumbs to another. He must obey, obey, obey. He obeys wherever he lacks the courage to oppose. In many cases he is unable to oppose because he lacks the vision necessary to find rational solutions for the problems besetting him.

We have mentioned those who left their native land. Many of them found their way into the 'New World'. Though there they may have lived freer lives, they could not prevent the rise of power in the place of genuine authority—not even there. They could not prevent individuals from grasping positions of power. Perhaps the day is not so remote in which 'old' world and 'new' will hardly be distinguishable from each other. Or has that day already come?

Since time immemorial we are in a situation where there exists only obedience or power. Where we are inferior to power, we obey. Where we have the possibility of exercising power ourselves, we do so. Those who reject power and break out, seek to exercise their own power. They do not understand that the thing against which they try to defend themselves with all their might cannot be broken this way. Even the flight into 'collectivity' does not bring freedom, nor genuine authority. It merely transfers power from one hand to another. As long as the individual, educated to obey, seeks power in order to break through this obedience, freedom will remain a doubtful thing: because the stronger will decide over it. The possession of power is not a thing eternal, but one bearer of power will take the place of another. There will be severe masters and mild masters, or, in political terms, dictators and democrats.

When Man will have been made responsible for the liberty of his fellow men, then the birth of genuine authority will be an accomplished fact.

It was our intention to try to lift whatever may have remained of the veil covering the problem of genuine freedom and genuine authority. This attempt had to be continued also in those regions where the excellent analysis of Karl Jaspers¹ left both concepts still suspended in the transcendental. The last step had to be attempted which would lead both concepts from faith to rational understanding. Also in this, Man's responsibility must be made manifest. Both can be done. Only one thing is required: the will that it be done. This is the same Will that pervades the universe, as an all-embracing force, since the first beginning of time; which determined the course of creation, at least where we speak of 'life'. But the universe also harbours a contrasting potential development: if we lack this will

¹Karl Jaspers, 'Freedom and Authority', *Diogenes* 1, pp. 25-42.

Freedom and Authority

'that it be done', it must be said with Nietzsche: 'God is dead'; for it is this will that creates God—this breath that pervades the All like a mighty hurricane, not grasped by us, yet sensed somehow, since the beginning of time. We mean the way we must go, on which to progress, step by step, from the graspable to the ungraspable transcendent: for it is only this progress which will cause to exist that which determines the sense of our existence: God.

The stronger this will, the more light in the darkness around us; and Man will be able to discover where faith was superstition.

If we wanted to say: genuine freedom and genuine authority are not possible, we would miss the essence of truth. Both lie before us, uncovered. Let us bring them into existence.

Obviously this cannot be done the way a radio can be switched from one station to another. Many steps in this direction have been taken ahead of us. The traces have been blurred and covered by subsequent travellers. Let us seek out those traces and enlarge them into a passable road.

It will not be possible for us to complete the road that leads away from all untruth; but the portion we are able to construct is worth while by itself.

N

C

In
aut
ava
sail
eve
con
dist
C
bo
he
sam
ind
the
pen
In
tion

¹Jean
Bell
²Les

NEW CHINA AND THE CHINESE LANGUAGE

In 851, four and a half centuries before Marco Polo, the anonymous author of a famous report on China and India¹ (*Akhbar as-Sin wal-Hind*), availing himself of the information brought back by Arab merchants and sailors, gave so careful and meticulous a description of China that specialists even today find few inaccuracies. Yet the same subject is treated by most contemporary scholars with a light-hearted casualness that is confusing and disturbing.

One such scholar, who passes for an expert because of half a dozen bad books he has written on the Orient, does not even take the trouble, when he writes about the 'Chinese élite' to consult studies which deal with the same topic rather well. Another merely refuses to admit the existence of individuals who do not appeal to him. But all this does not mean that in the last five or six years no serious books have been written that help us to penetrate the Middle Kingdom.

Instead of dwelling on a China that is extinct, let us start our examination with a picture of the China of the future (*La Chine Future*)² given us

¹Jean Sauvaget. *Relation de la Chine et de l'Inde* (critical edition and French translation): Les Belles Lettres, 1948.

²Les Editions de Minuit, 1952.

New China and the Chinese Language

in a short attractive monograph by Pierre Naville, a man who has followed the Chinese Revolution at close hand for more than twenty years. Here we have personal, sweeping points of view, frequently enriched by quotations in which Maspero balances Hegel. Although there is a generous dash of audacity the study as a whole is judicious. For M. Naville sees the essential truth, that is, that China can now 'turn a new face to the heavens without denying her ancestors'. One China is dead, the China that foreign dynasties (first Mongol, then Manchu) surrendered to white men's greed; the China of unjust treaties and *extra-territoriality* (a horrible, unpronounceable word which symbolises, by an amusing whim of justice, something that should never have existed). But if the new-born China is even slightly disposed to, she will know how to renew her ties with the true Chinas—the China of the Song, the T'ang, the Han, the Chou, and even the Yin (not to speak of the Hsia, the myth of whose dynasty presupposes the existence of a culture which could be called 'Chinese', according to Herrlee Glessner Creel's *Studies in Early Chinese Culture*³).

In this destruction of so many economic and social values, will the leaders of the revolution have the wisdom to preserve one of the ideas and one of the richest arts that man has created? I am not the only one to raise this question. All those who have any feeling at all for China are equally concerned. For example, Arthur F. Wright declares at the end of a volume of essays, *Studies in Chinese Thought*⁴, that if the Communists have their way, the influence of ancient Chinese literature and other cultural traditions will be reduced to practically nothing. I should like, then, to examine as well as I can the question as to whether or not China will accept her heritage after inventory has been taken. This, according to Arthur Wright, 'is one of the most important questions of our days' (p. 301).

In 1932, long before Mao Tse-tung came to power, the League of Nations sent a mission to China with the purpose of studying the public education system and, if necessary, reorganising it. They found the country divided into factions, some for, some against the characters. In fact, there were a number of liberals who believed that the large masses of people, including illiterates, could not be educated so long as they had to master the script. Some suggested that only a limited number of characters be taught, which would serve as a kind of intellectual vital minimum. Many of the scholars who were familiar with the Japanese systems of notation

³First Series, Baltimore, 1937.

⁴The University of Chicago Press, 1953.

proposed a syllabic, or in any case phonetic, scheme which would adapt the *kana* to China. M. Naville, using Japanese as his model,⁵ suggests a mongrel system with a mixture of traditional characters and phonetic transcriptions. And he should like this new writing to denote a new language as well, a kind of 'basic Chinese' built on the tongue spoken in the North. Since he believes that China is 'the only country in the world where the popular revolution calls for changes in the language' he feels that a new 'instrument' must be forged with the 'aid' of the people. And what difference does it make if this new language, this 'basic Chinese', breaks with 'a literary past that the masses never enjoyed'?⁶

Others made the even more radical proposal of romanising the Chinese language at once. This meant neglecting the problem created by the great variety of dialects involved. When one knows that characters which in Peking are pronounced somewhat as follows: *tsao k'i yue lao je tch'u*, are read by a Cantonese more or less as *tso hi yut lok yat tch'eut*; and in Shanghai become 'tsao 'ki gneuh loh gneh ts'eh' one can see that an indiscriminate romanising of spoken Chinese would create languages as different from each other in their sounds as Italian from Spanish, Catalan from Rumanian, or French from Portuguese. As for the interdialectal romanisation that so many scholars dream of, I should like to know how they propose to romanise *uniformly* dialects that are so dissimilar! By destroying the lingual unity which depends entirely on ideograms, romanisation would jeopardise political unity at a moment when the revolution, an essentially centralising force, needs all of its strength and rigour to keep China in a single bloc.

So long as the Chinese do not speak a common language the romanisation of the popular vernacular, as well as its phonetic transcription (even if it is modelled on the Japanese *kana*), will be impossible. If Communist China did want to adopt one of our alphabets she would have to take the drastic step of deciding which of the many languages was to be the legal currency. It could not be anything but *kuo yu*, a kind of *koinè* that has been forming little by little. Limiting ourselves to purely common-sense arguments, we must agree that, in any case, it would not be possible to romanise safely before every Chinese without exception had assimilated the common language. Even if we suppose that the Ministry of Public Education could guarantee schooling for all the children, with enough

⁵'As the Japanese already do in part.'

⁶*La Chine future*, pp. 34-5.

⁷I have borrowed this illustration from Father Lamasse's *Sin Kouo Wen*.

New China and the Chinese Language

instructors capable of teaching them *kuo yu*, there are still the adults to contend with. So that the advocates of a romanised Chinese (assuming that they still exist and can prevail) would not be able to carry through their plan in less than fifty years or so.

What does the Communist Party think of all this? At the beginning of the civil war, about 1935, they supported romanisation; obviously, the *agit-prop* specialists had noticed that the enforced transcription of Annamite into *quoc ngu* was a help in proselytising peasants. And was it not more convenient to teach the few workers only the signs of an alphabet? A number of manuals of romanised Chinese were sent to me about that time. And a Russian Sinologist, V. N. Alexeief, devoted an entire book to the gospel of the period, *Kitaiskaya ieroglificheskaya pis'mennost' i ee latinisatsia* (The Ideogrammatic Writing of the Chinese and Its Romanisation). He demonstrated that one could perfectly well romanise the spoken language, the *pei hua* (that goes without saying), arguing that the original monosyllabism of Chinese was not the obstacle many people thought it to be. In fact, Vendryès had written that 'monosyllabism was sometimes considered a characteristic of English', which, as we know, does not have to be written in Chinese characters. In short, the Marxists were in favour of romanisation before they came to power. But it was interesting to note that the very same Alexeief was assigned the preparation of a huge Chinese-Russian dictionary of the characters. In any case, having been converted to Alexeief's and the League of Nations experts' ideas, I published an essay in 1934 showing that it was *technically* impossible to romanise literary Chinese, the *wen yen*, adding that I hoped to see a spoken *koinè*, the *kuo yu*, romanised. In 1947 I revised my essay, having come to the conclusion that the Chinese characters should be retained. Mao Tse-tung, on his coming to power, condemned romanisation.

Now let us listen to Claude Roy, one of the French Marxists who in 1953 disparaged the same alphabets that they had considered the only salvation of China in 1934. While the Chinese 'draw their script', we Occidentals can only 'jot the scrawls of a gaunt stenography'. When the Chinese 'offer us a *character*', we ingrates can only 'give a *word* in return', a wretched word, made up of 'little utilitarian signs' (one might almost call them *capitalist* or *feudal*) or 'cheap and limp' scribbles, like the cyrillic alphabet, I suppose. Whereas the brush of Mao Tse-tung gives us the whole world, the real world (one might almost say *socialist-realist* world)—idea and picture in one stroke—our fountain pen and typewriter present just an algebra of the world (one might say an *abstractivist* picture).

'Watching you write, Hau Lien Tuan, I saw you *draw the writing*. How poor I felt next to you! As pure and elegant as my letters may be, I know that they will always seem as odd to you as algebraic notations, and you will be right.' Well, then, the Chinese asks, shall we get on with 'the revolution of the writing'? 'Revolution?' How marvellous is the power of forgetfulness, permitting you to write today the contrary of what you professed yesterday or the day before⁸ and with exactly the same assurance!

With the same assurance and the same excess! Is there any point in calumniating the phonetic alphabet? If I am glad to learn that Mao Tse-tung has adopted the characters without reproaching them for being a vestige of the feudalism that ends for him in 1940, it is not because I belittle our alphabets, which have, indeed, many virtues that the Chinese does not have. It is because I love the Chinese language as I love the culture that it made possible. Moreover, anyone who forced China to disown her ancient script would be robbing her of her entire heritage.

As long as the Chinese people know a *pei hua*, the vernacular, that is written in ideograms, why should it be more difficult for them to go on to classical Chinese than for the Bedouin to study literal Arabic, or the young French or Italian student, Latin? What is more, whoever has studied Chinese at the École des Langues Orientales, devoting the first year to the characters of the *pei hua*, knows that the transition to the administrative language and the *wen yen* the following year is painless. Now, without going as far as M. Margouliès who believes (if I understand *La Langue et l'Écriture chinoises*⁹ properly) that customs and ethics, politics and manners, even the philosophy of power depend on the characters, I must admit that the peculiar nature of this script and syntax has strongly influenced the thinking that it shaped.

The Indo-European languages are composed of words which one arrives at only by a progressive synthesis of letters and syllables which are directed to the ear. These words have no autonomous existence whatsoever, subjected, as they always are, to the play of inflections, to vocalic changes, and to conjugations (*orao, opsomai, eidon, éôraka*, I go, we are going, I went). The basic element of the Chinese language on the other hand is the ideogram, that is, the word given definitively, for all cases, genders, numbers, tenses, persons, voices, moods; the word in its visual, not in its auditory, form, the mere tracing of which often evokes the whole

⁸ In this connexion see *La Chair des Mots in Clés pour la Chine*, Gallimard, 1953, pp. 250-8.

⁹ Payot, 1943.

group of ideas or notions that it connotes.¹⁰ Margouliès contrasts the concreteness and subjectivity of the Occidental languages with the abstractness and objectivity of Chinese, a perfect instrument for the expression of ideas; the prolixity of our spoken tongues with the conciseness of a common language created for the eye; the loose individualism of the Western Press with the careful control which Chinese scholars exercised over the use of key-words (if it is true that they alone, and only the best of them at that, had the authority to impose a neologism or a derived meaning). Many consequences follow from this. Just as in the West the carpenter devotes himself for a considerable period to learning how to handle the plane, the rabbit-plane or the jointing plane, depending on the case, so, before being able to write, every Chinese scholar must study vocabulary and syntax at length. Since one cannot write Chinese without having read a great number of good authors, the Chinese reads, or did read, much more than the Occidental. And, unlike us, he reads for the purpose of mastering and appreciating rhetoric. So that in China genius without form simply does not exist; it is both expressed and apprehended by form.

Nor is that all. Since the standard of the literary language has nothing in common with that of the vernacular, the art of writing cannot be judged by the same criterion as the art of speaking. Every Chinese knows almost instinctively, having learned it little by little, that a good lecture is a bad article, and a fine discourse a poor piece of writing. Today when Western letters tend to be reduced to journalism, reporting and the stenographed dialogue, the Chinese language might well recall us to some elementary and important truths. At the rate that we are going our children will not be able to understand us. Every thirty years our language must die, and before being able to even touch our cultural heritage, we shall see it completely squandered. Now, in China, because of the power of the characters, nothing is in danger of becoming obsolete. After two thousand years the form of the *Li Sao* and the *Li Ki* will be clearer to an educated person than the language of Villon to a French student of today or the language of Chaucer to an Englishman. Thus, the Chinese literary tradition, inextricably bound to the script as it is, provides a guarantee against fickleness of taste, according to M. Margouliès.

One cannot deny that there is much to be said in favour of the characters

¹⁰If it is true that early Chinese had inflections (and Karlgren showed that it did) the Chinese we are discussing, the Chinese of the classics, had lost them; at most it preserved some vestiges.

and the quality that they give to the *wen yen* which seems to have some of the characteristics of the universal language Leibnitz desired and Margouliès too. And although I cannot say that I know the *wen yen* well, it has given me great joy, and still does. There are few languages more satisfying than Chinese for word-lovers, in spite of the fact that the poverty of the phonic system neutralises the richness of the script. But can one seriously think that the ideograms and syntax of Lao Tsu constitute the ideal language for the diplomat, the philosopher or the story teller? Only those who have never taken the trouble to count the number of Russian words, or calculate the scope of the English vocabulary (or the calumniated French) can be lost in admiration at the approximately forty thousand characters in a Chinese dictionary. As for the syntax, what expert would deny its ambiguity and rigidity?

The *wen yen* thus is far from having all the virtues that Margouliès attributes to it. Let us then turn to Achilles Fang's delightful essay on the difficulties of this written language, 'Some Reflections on the Difficulty of Translation'.¹¹ Take the simple and overworked word *min*, the *min* in *Kuomintang*. Who would dare to translate it after having read Mr. Fang? *Min* to a Chinese means something that is neither the French *peuple* nor the English 'people'. Mr. Fang's argument reminded me of T. E. Lawrence's scruples for once having translated the Arabic expression, *ya ahl es-Shams* as 'people of Damas'. And suddenly it occurred to me that the best translation of *min* would undoubtedly be the Arabic *ahl*. No, I will not cite the well known debate about a certain *Ko wu* which succeeded in dividing Chinese thinking completely, with one group deducing a metaphysics of intuition and a kind of spiritualism from *Ko wu*, and the other finding in it the essence of a positivist doctrine and something that could have become the experimental method. But I should like to say a few words about *Chong Yong*. Europeans hardly know this more or less Confucian treatise that historical hazard placed in the *Li Ki*. Without the *Chong Yong* it is impossible to study the Confucian doctrine seriously. But as for knowing what those two words mean! In more than two thousand years of studying them the confusion has only grown! Giving the meaning of 'centre' to *chong* and the same meaning to *yong* as *ch'ang*, that is, 'constant', 'lasting' (perhaps 'eternal' as well), Chu Hsi interpreted it as signifying the 'changeless mean' which has to satisfy us most of the time. But Cheng Kiuan glosses this *yong* with another character

¹¹ *Studies in Chinese Thought*, pp. 263-85.

that is also pronounced *yong* and which means 'to employ'! As for Marcel Granet, whose course on this treatise I attended,¹² he read this composite expression as a musical metaphor, the important word remaining *chong*, glossed by *chong-ho*, *ho* being 'harmony' and *chong ho* the 'just harmony'. According to this version, the Son of Heaven, who radiates harmony, is placed in the centre of the world at the particularly dense spot which is organised and illuminated by the *ho*. So that Granet suggests it be translated as 'Power of harmonious union', or even 'Radiating power of central harmony' in the ethical and social sense.

But the difficulty I have translating *chong yong* becomes almost agreeable whenever I am faced with the task of translating the rather commonplace *pu k'o* which appears so frequently in *wen yen* and the writings of the philosophers. It irremediably combines the idea of 'necessary' (in physics) and 'obligatory' (in ethics). Imagine what absurdities we are driven to by the 'necessary' (or perhaps 'obligatory') choice of one or the other translation. How can we know if the Confucian philosopher who writes *tao pu k'o* thinks of the *tao* as a moral force which 'is not permitted to' or as a blind natural force (in which case we should have to translate it as: 'It is not possible that the *tao*', etc. . . .). When Granet prefers to give *pu k'o* only the moral meaning, who can guarantee that he is not limiting or even falsifying the significance, because of the undeniable ambiguity of the Chinese language as well as his sociological prejudice?

Let us not claim, then, that the Chinese language, in addition to its many virtues, has also the clarity of the French. Take the other key word of Confucian thinking, the *t'ai ki*, a formula which has become famous because one of the 'fathers' of Neo-Confucianism, Chou Tuen-yi, curiously coupled it with one of the key words of Taoist metaphysics, *wu-ki*, as a kind of challenge. So that *wu-ki el t'ai-ki* (with the particle *el* having the same sense as our copulative 'is') constitutes one of the most daring formulas of philosophical syncretism, if Mr. Chow Yi-ching¹³ is justified in translating it as 'Without-Peak and Peak Supreme' or even 'Without-Peak is peak-supreme'. More explicitly, the Without-peak is the formula of Lao-tsu and Chung-tsu, a Taoist formula, *par excellence*. But it is also purely and simply what we Confucians call the Peak-supreme, the *t'ai-ki*, which is the metaphysical formula where the Taoists

¹²In 1930-1 at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises.

¹³*La Philosophie morale dans le Néo-Confucianisme* (Tcheou Touden-yi), preface de Paul Demiéville, P.U.F., 1954.

tried to define being negatively. It is also the good old cosmological formula of *yi-king*, the Book of Changes. How we all do agree!

One might just as well say that everything is in everything; that white is black; or that white is not white. Which is exactly the opinion expressed by the Chinese sophists and by the famous paradox of Kong-suen on the white horse which, in so far as it is white cannot be horse. After Forke and twenty other equally erudite commentators (among them Hou Che) Mr. Ignace Kou Pao-Koh¹⁴ has just stumbled against the famous phrase which sums up the debate, *pu k'o yi wei ma ma ye*. Here we come on the disturbing *pu k'o* again, less disturbing here than elsewhere. But what are we to make out of *ma ma ye*? *Ma* means 'horse', 'a horse', 'the horse', or 'some horses'. First difficulty. Here is the second difficulty—*ma ma*; the character that I have just said means 'horse', 'a horse', etc. is repeated. We suspect that this is not the first time that Chinese has played tricks like this on us. One of the best known precepts juxtaposes several pairs of repeated words, for example, *fu fu* and *tsu tsu* ('the father should act as father, or realise his quality of father; the son that of the son'). But try to use this key on the *ma ma* of Kong-Suen Long. It does not help. So it comes to mind that *jen jen* can have another meaning, the distributive, 'each man'. Hence the scholarly commentator Ts'ien Mu translated *ma ma* as 'each horse', which is perfectly plausible syntactically but which makes no sense whatever. The equally learned Sie Hi-chen reads it as 'two horses in one substance', which in the context means absolutely nothing. The distinguished scholar Yu Yue gets by with 'one horse like two' which has no meaning at all, as far as I can see. Then we have Mr. Kou Pao-Koh, Doctor of Letters and very lettered indeed, who says, 'the text is very obscure; it is hard to know what "a horse horse" can mean'. Now, if I, myself, do not find the text obscure, it is simply because I ignore the weakness of the syntax, letting myself be guided by a reasoning which *forces* me to understand: 'We can state, then, that there exists a horse [or some horses] (*ku ki wei yeu ma ye*), but we cannot state that there exists a horse [or some horses] *qua* horse[s] (*pu k'o yi wai ma ma ye*).' Chang Tong-suen glosses it in the same way, 'the horse in abstracto'; as does the scholarly historian of Chinese thought, Mr. Fong Yeu-lan, 'the horse as such'.¹⁵ Which does not prevent Mr. Ignace Kou Pao-Koh from modestly

¹⁴ *Deux Sophistes chinois: Houei Che e Kong-Suen Long*, Imprimerie et P.U.F. Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1953.

¹⁵ As a substitute for his history of philosophy (in Chinese) (7th edition, Tchong King, 1946) see *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, New York, 1948.

giving up the sponge, 'We do not see what the two words "the horse horse" mean. Is there another corruption of the text here?' By no means! What strikes us here is precisely the fact that in a text where the meaning is absolutely unambiguous, given the premises of the reasoning and everything we know about Kong-Suen Long's thinking, it has been possible, because of the nature of the language, for ten different scholars to become embroiled, to contradict each other and even occasionally delicately give up the attempt to understand.

And even worse. In the more than two thousand years that we have revered the *Tao Tō King* it has not been possible to agree on the meaning of these three characters that make up the title of one of the most widely translated works of China and the world. Stanislas Julien translated it as *Le Livre de la voie et de la vertu* (*The Book of the Way and Virtue*). Closer to us, Messrs. Huang Kia-Cheng and Pierre Leyris as *La voie et sa vertu* (*The Way and Its Virtue*)¹⁶, an interpretation where the word 'its' indicates a relation of determination between *tao* and *tō*. Stanislas Julien, on the contrary, makes *tao* and *tō* two words in apposition. First difficulty. Father Wieger, himself, treats *tao* and *tō* as Huang Kia-Cheng does, but he denies that those three words can mean anything but *Treatise of the Principle and Its Action*.

And here is the long-awaited translation of Mr. Duyvendak, *Le livre de la voie et de la vertu* (*The Book of the Way and Virtue*).¹⁷ After having enjoyed the charming introduction of the Dutch scholar, one pulls up with a start at the very first phrase of the text itself, the *tao k'ō tao fai chang tao*! One recalls the translation of Huang Kia-Cheng and Leyris: 'The way which can be uttered is not the way forever'; and Stanislas Julien's as well: 'The way which can be expressed by the word is not the eternal way'. Then the reader goes back to the traditional glosses and is sure that the second *tao* of the phrase is correctly translated as a synonym of *yen* which means 'word' or even 'utter'. There is no mistake about it, the *Tao Tō King* opens with a play on words, a literary trick. But here is Duyvendak translating: 'The really true way is other than a constant way'. No more playing on the two meanings of the character *tao*; and *k'ō* is no longer 'to be able', but 'to be worthy of'. Instead of the notion of eternity he gives us that of 'constancy'! Had Stanislas Julien perhaps suspected this interpretation? In a note on p. 2 of his *Tao Tō King*, after *Su-tsu-yen* he glosses: 'There are two ways (two *Tao*), the ordinary one, which is the

¹⁶ *La Voie et sa vertu*—Éditions du Seuil, 1949.

¹⁷ Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1953.

way of justice, rites, and prudence; it can be expressed by the word and its name can be named. The other is the sublime Way (the *Tao*) which Lao-Tsu speaks of.' On the basis of a Taoist edition published under the Ming he adds, 'This way, which hovers over time, has neither form, nor colour, nor name. If one looks for it with one's eyes one will not see it; if one listens with one's ears, one will not hear it. That is why it cannot be expressed by the word, nor indicated by means of a name.' In short, on the basis of the first phrase the *Tao* has always been regarded as a kind of Platonic Idea, almost a Kantian *noumenon*, or even as a purely transcendental value. But Mr. Duyvendak very simply declares, 'this conception seems wrong to me!' What is more, he then goes on to explain, 'the words here translated as the "really true way" (or, more literally, "the way which can be considered the way") [...] are *k'o tao*'. *Tao* would then be 'used as a factitive verb. *K'o* (whose perfidy I have already mentioned) has the meaning of "to be worthy of, to deserve".' As for this *tao* which a number of translators take to mean 'to express in words', 'it is true that the word means "to say", but it is not used in that sense anywhere else in the *Tao To King* [...]'. Nor is the negative *fai* a 'simple negative' here. It must be understood in the sense it has 'in the famous dictum of the sophist Kong-Suen Long: "White horse is not horse", that is, the notion of a white horse is not identical with the general notion of horse'. According to Mr. Duyvendak's translation, which I find convincing, *not a single one of the six words of this crucial phrase has the meaning or the grammatical function that has been attributed to it for more than two thousand years by thousands of glossarists. Tao suddenly shines with a new and startling meaning: 'The word tao means way. Now, the characteristic of an ordinary way is that it is unchangeable, constant, permanent. However, the way we are dealing with here is characterised by the exact opposite; this way is perpetual mutability itself. Being and Non-being, life and death constantly alternating. There is nothing that is fixed or unchanging.' Nothing, not even the way!*

It seems to me that we can now understand a little better what so bafflingly appears as a kind of intellectual lethargy or scholastic sterility in Chinese thinking and which has made possible so many translations of well-known texts differing according to the ambitions of each dynasty and each prince.

If the *wen yen* had the virtues Margouliès attributes to it, and if the characters deserved the indiscreet praise heaped on them by Claude Roy we should know what meaning to give the titles of the most famous works

of the two greatest traditions, the *Chong Yong* and the *Tao Tō King*. The Greeks can well be proud of their syntax and the French of their grammar. It is true that glossarists dwelled for two thousand years on a text of Aristophanes where a woman 'refuses to be the lioness on the cheese grater', but it is simply because they were not familiar with the shape and decoration of Greek cheese graters. After excavations had produced a grater embellished with a lioness offering herself to a lion they saw perfectly clearly that their word-for-word translation had been correct, if temporarily meaningless; syntax had guided them irresistibly. Whereas Chinese syntax only too often does the opposite.

It is obvious that a government concerned with efficiency cannot entrust propaganda slogans to so ambiguous a language. Besides, since the *wen yen* removes Chinese literature from the flux of history, that is, from 'the exigencies of daily living',¹⁸ it is the same as saying that this literary language (even though it lends itself to ceremonial poetry of, let us say, the Saint John Perse kind) cannot serve to express either the *ideas* which present-day China needs, or the *tone* of the newspapers or wall posters that are written for proletarians and schoolboys. Moreover, the richness of *wen yen*, like literal Arabic, is largely due to an abundance of unusual words. Now, the best Arab writers, the very ones who hope to play a role in the sciences, arts and philosophy equal to their forbears a thousand years ago, willingly admit that the beauty of their poetry does not help them find a language for medicine, physics, political economy, or simply art criticism. Just as the Chinese prose writers know perfectly well that they will not find a vocabulary for dialectical materialism in Chuang Tsu nor a language for heavy industry in Kiu Yan, nor the words for art criticism in the *Yo Ki*. They know this so well that, since the publication of the *Néologie*¹⁹ of Father Wieger who had collected several thousand new words, other neologies have appeared, becoming outmoded the day after publication, so swift is the influx of new notions. Wieger's 1936 *Néologie* began with the word, if I may call it that, *ai keue-seu koang-sien* which was followed by *ai-pi-si-ti*. (In *ai-pi-si-ti* you have undoubtedly recognised the *abcd* but I doubt if x-rays can clarify the meaning of *ai-kene-sen*!) The same *Néologie* ends with *yunn-yunn*, *et cetera*. From the *abcd* to x-rays, etc., these are the words that contemporary China needs—words for banking, commerce, industry, economy, biology, meteorology and many more. Words also had to be created for sociology,

¹⁸Preface to *Kou Wen* by Margouliès, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

¹⁹Imprimerie de Sien-hsien, 3rd Edition, 1936.

socialism, socialisation and the socialist state. These words (one might better say, periphrases) present innumerable difficulties, manufactured under the pressure of mechanical civilisations, as they have been. Today telephone in Chinese is written in two simple characters, *tien houa*, 'electric words', while as late as 1929 my professor of Chinese still taught me the phonetic transcription *tō-lu-fong* for which three characters had been practically sterilised, and then mobilised, without ever evoking 'telephone'. For the one word, centimetre, four characters were required, *chen-ti-mai-tang*, or something like that. How can any Chinese who respects or loves his past regard these foreign growths with anything but hostility? This *Ye-su*, the Jesus of the Christians! This *Ya Po La Han* with its four characters for the simple name of Abraham! This *Yeh Ho Hua*, three characters for the *One* (one for each person of the Trinity)! Thus the Christianised *T'ai p'ing* could never bring themselves to name their God *Ye Ho Hua*; they call Him *Chang Ti*, Lord on High, according to an old Chinese expression, thereby paganising and Sinising the concept. The Protestants themselves Sinised the Holy Bible when they invented—for their catechumens—the notion of *Ye-su hua-ti*, 'transformed into Jesus' (as if the 'Imitation of Jesus' raised man to the divine!). For similar reasons the vocabulary of socialism and communism will not get by without some difficulty. Accustomed as they are to get a notion from every character, the Chinese will have to think of socialism in four characters, *she-huei chu-yi*. Arthur Wright gives some amusing examples of this kind of puzzle in the essay he has just published, 'The Chinese Language and Foreign Ideas'.²⁰ We have guessed it! In Peking and elsewhere the newspapers have not stopped attacking 'American imperialism'. Now, in Chinese the United States is called *Mei li hien kuo* (in which *Mei-li*, the phonetic transcription of [A]meri[ca], was certainly chosen in order to evoke 'grace' and 'elegance' which they also mean). Four characters is a lot for just one country. So, it is simplified and becomes *Mei Kuo* (just as France, *Fa-lan-si Kuo*, in phonetic transcription, becomes *Fa Kuo*, 'the Country of Law'). But how to translate 'imperialism'? The word is analysed as 'empire plus doctrine'. So that 'empire' becomes *Ti-kuo* in two characters, with the same *Kuo*, 'country', that we have in the Chinese name for the United States. To render the '-ism' of 'imperialism' the Chinese have recourse to the *chu-yi* that we are already familiar with in 'socialism', *she-huei chu-yi*. If then, I put the words

²⁰ *Studies in Chinese Thought*, pp. 286-303.

New China and the Chinese Language

'American imperialism' together I get eight characters, *mei-li-hien-kuo ti-kuo-chu-yi*, or 'the imperialism of the country of niceness'. Cutting it down to *mei-kuo ti-kuo chu-yi* we have six characters but that is still too much! Using the technique of the various digests, one abridges the abridged, arriving at *mei-ti*, two words which can also mean (if one sees them in all their richness) 'emperor of America' (the character *mei*, 'beautiful', 'pretty', standing for America!) The strange results of these neologisms are enough to discourage the Chinese from accepting anything that comes from America or Europe!

And then we have the new vocabulary of dialectical materialism savagely erupting with a German-Russian scholasticism that no Chinese brain could ever think up. I have not yet been able to study the Chinese equivalents of the Marxist vocabulary, but I promise myself to do so with profit. However I can already sense something of its originality or weakness by going back to the translation of the *cogito* supplied by the best Chinese philosophical dictionary. *Ergo sum* is reduced to *ku wo tsai*, that is, 'therefore I am here' in the locative sense! Whereas Spanish distinguishes between *estar* and *ser*, and French has just one verb *être* ('to be'), this verb is completely lacking in Chinese; instead it gives us the *tsai* which always requires locative complements, 'at', 'in', 'to be there'. Reduced to this comical and puerile 'therefore I am here', there is no danger of the *cogito's* influencing Chinese thinking.

Just as the Chinese characters by their very nature and without the slightest ill will have resisted the *cogito*, they will defy German Marxism and Russian Stalinism. Moreover, they will be able to react all the more effectively since the thinking of the Sons of Han abounds in works, doctrines, and schools where the spirit of tradition will eventually lead them to find a foreshadowing of dialectic (in Taoism) or the Stalinist *praxis* (in the School of Legists, the Book of Lord Shang)²¹. Since Mao Tse-tung and his team have to create technicians and train Communist cadres, how can they avoid teaching them *at the very beginning* one of the languages of Marxism or one of the scientific tongues? In 1936 Victor Purcell raised the question as to whether or not the limitations (as well as the virtues) of the *wen yen* and the *kuo yu* were not going to make it mandatory for every Chinese who wanted to serve his country to learn at least one of our languages).²² The Arab élite have adopted this solution, and their native

²¹ Excellently translated and presented by Duyvendak in *Probsthain Oriental Series*, XVII, 1928.

²² *Problems of Chinese Education*, Kegan, London, 1936.

tongue has clearly benefited, as the writings of Taha Hussein and Bishr Fares show. With a bit of daring and imagination England or France, in 1949, could have offered China two spare languages to be used for its reconstruction, as gifts for the happy event. In spite of the fact that our languages are unpleasantly associated in the Communists' minds with the missionary tradition, merchants' trickery, unfair treaties, 'the white man's burden', in short, they have also benefited by a long past of friendship and symbiosis. Yet, the Chinese, if they want to survive, find themselves delivered, by our blundering, to Russian, the only European language whose exclusive influence they have to fear, they who have always been so wary of excessive and tyrannical Occidentalism!

But teaching the Chinese cadres the language of practical knowledge and true philosophy is not sufficient. The entire population must get an edifying literature within the comprehension of all, without delay. Luckily for Mao Tse-tung a group of liberal scholars had already decided to do away with the *wen yen* in 1917. Although many enemies of the Manchu dynasty had very ably defended the old style and the genres it produced (Chang Pin-lin, for example), the majority of those who appealed to this tradition did so only because it was a symbol of a past they wished to keep alive forever. Then Houn Che appeared with his manifesto in favour of the mixed language, the *pei hua*, which won over all of Peking from one day to the next. The Dean of the Faculty of Letters, Ch'en Tu-siêu, was converted by the document as soon as it appeared in *New Youth*. And in 1920 the Office of Public Education ordered that *pei hua* be taught in the elementary schools.

Suddenly it was not only the vocabulary that had to change. Under the impact of the *pei hua* and foreign models the structure of words and phrases began to alter. When one says that in Chinese a sign is a concept, and every sign a syllable, it applies only to *wen yen* and *ku-wen*. As far as the spoken language is concerned the poverty of sounds has necessitated various subterfuges and compromises. For example, take the sound *mao* which in *wen yen*, when it evokes a certain character, means 'the cat', or 'a cat' (unless it means 'some cats' or 'the cats'). Now in order to say 'a cat' in *pei hua* you have to add three characters, that is, three sounds, to the sound *mao*; *yi*, meaning 'a'; plus the numeral (which varies according to the nature of the being or thing) *ko*, in this case; and finally *eul*, a noun suffix. So that instead of the simple *mao* of the *wen yen* you have *yi-ko mao-eul* in *pei hua*. The so-called 'monosyllabism' of the Chinese develops into a *de facto* polysyllabism in *pei hua*. Little by little indivisible groups

are formed. An example of this can be seen in the idea of 'reciprocity'. It is impossible to make oneself understood with just a single one of the various characters of classical Chinese connoting this idea; *pei hua* had to put two of them together, *hu* and *siang*, forming the word *hu-siang*. Similarly, instead of using the single character *sing* of the *ku wen* for 'star', the *pei hua* doubles the ideogram and says *sing-sing*. Furthermore, in classical Chinese most words can have any 'grammatical function' whatever; depending on the context, they can be noun, verb, adjective, or adverb. Now the written phrase gives time to reflect, to re-read as often as necessary, whereas the spoken language, the *pei hua* has to be grasped on the spot. So, many words which are used as adjectives are given the suffix *ti*. The adverb often ends in *jan*. Other suffixes (*tsu*, *kia*, *fu*, *tsiang*) mark a great number of nouns, corresponding roughly to the French nouns ending in *-eur* or *-ier*. To indicate the future the auxiliary *yao*, the verb 'to wish', is used; another verb, *leao*, indicates the past. The romanised *pei hua* thus strongly resembles our language in its concealed forms.

The influence of foreign books has also served to destroy the structures of the *ku wen* whose synthetic, coalescent syntax has been replaced by an analytic discourse that is much less disturbing to us Westerners.

By the time Mao took power, *pei hua* had established itself everywhere. Having been converted to this new language thirty years before, almost all the 'bourgeois' writers zealously set about producing the vernacular literature that Hu Che had asked for. According to Mr. Wang Che Lieu (preface to Mao Tse-tung's directives *Artists and Writers in the New China*²³), these innovators could already translate foreign masterpieces into *pei hua*, and collect the scattered examples of *pei hua* to be found in the literature of *wen yen*. Thus Ken Ki-tche spent almost his whole life transcribing the great Russian writers into *pei hua*, and Cheng Cheng-to studied earlier novels and plays where the language showed that Chinese writers of the past had sought inspiration in the vernacular. By 1949 the *pei hua* had produced a literature which the specialist, Father Monsterleet, S.J., considers the equal of Soviet works of the same period—stories by Lu Siun, novel trilogies by Pa Kin and Mao Tuen, the early plays of Ts'ao Yu and the poems by Siu Che.²⁴

I wonder, nevertheless, if Mao Tse-tung really intends to extend the

²³ Pierre Seghers, 1949.

²⁴ *Sommets de la Littérature chinoise contemporaine*, Domat, 1953, pp. 19–20. This is the opening volume, containing summaries, biographical sketches, and unusual bibliographical information.

use of *pei hua* to the point of forbidding the exercise of *ku wen*. The cultivation of *pei hua* advocated by 'bourgeois' writers certainly serves the purposes of the revolutionary leader. But after having recently reproached those 'comrades who consider the *level* of culture more important than its diffusion', Mao Tse-tung goes on to say that since the 'leaders' of contemporary China 'have an intellectual capacity superior to that of the masses' it is absolutely essential that they have 'a superior literature and art'.

Did he merely have in mind better written and better reasoned texts in *pei hua*? Since he feels responsible for the future of China is he not tempted to rescue from the past all that has made her great? Does he not think of rehabilitating the *wen yen*, even partly? If Communist schools and universities limit themselves to teaching only the *pei hua*, the Chinese will end by having no access to the very foundation of their culture except by translation, once the last scholars of *wen yen* will have died. It is enough to read the demotic translation of a famous verse of Sophocles to be dismayed by the vulgarity which makes Antigone and Ismene talk in diminutives, and kills Sophocles; how can one think of translating the *Chuang-Tsu* in *pei hua*? Five lines of Claude Roy²⁵ confirm my conviction: 'Confronted by the gap between the literary and the spoken language . . . and between Chinese and the European tongues, the Chinese of the Revolution, as I see them, are hesitating and groping their way, advancing (and destroying), innovating (and constructing) only with great prudence, patience and wisdom.'

Am I wrong in concluding that neither Mao Tse-tung nor Kuo Mo Jo have decided to sacrifice the *wen yen*? How can a culture which really has the aim of leading every man as far as he can go on the road to beauty renounce the treasures revealed to us through the ancient language in spite of its many imperfections? The man who prides himself on giving 'Marxism a national form' can succeed in only one way—by providing the whole nation with a common tongue, the *pei hua*; by granting those who are worthy, the use of one or two foreign languages; and by according to the most gifted of all the privilege of studying the *wen yen*, which would play the role in China that Latin and Greek do in the West. Nor can we claim that this means the rebirth of the mandarin caste, unless we are prepared to say that the University of France produces French mandarins.

²⁵ *Clés pour la Chine*, p. 255.

New China and the Chinese Language

In the villages of ancient China there was a building that I often muse about, lingeringly. It was the pavilion of traced characters, the *hi-tsu t'a*. There the people carried every scrap of paper on which even the faintest trace of an old character could be discerned; and then religiously purified it by flame. I cannot see a people who revered their language that deeply toss away more than thirty centuries of *wen yen*. I shall say with the Taoists so cherished by Mao Tse-tung, 'a time for *pei hua*, a time for *wen yen*'. That is indeed the *tao*.

CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE

According to G. Childe, the history of mankind is dominated by two great revolutions: the invention of agriculture and the birth of cities. From the same socio-historical point of view, R. Redfield is inclined to think that the consequences of the invention of agriculture have been less decisive than the urban revolution. Hence, he is led to classify all civilisations in two categories: the 'pre-urban', and those that have known a greater or lesser urban development.

In pre-urban civilisation, men live in isolated communities which rarely consist of more than fifty or a hundred households. These communities are held together by a highly developed sense of solidarity; outsiders, those who do not belong to the community are considered not fully human, but rather specimens of an inferior race who need not be taken into account. The unity of such a community is based on a deep-seated agreement on the fundamental values of life and man's ultimate goals. Economic life itself has a non-economic basis, with the individual's impulse to work stemming from tradition or from a feeling of obligation rooted in religious and moral considerations as well as in the position of each individual

Cities and Countryside

within the social system. The essential social tie could not be economic, since everybody takes part in the acquisition of food and there are no full-time specialists. Hence, personal relations cannot be based on mutual utility but on a knowledge of all the aspects of one's neighbour's personality. Rapidly sketched, this is the image of the 'folk society' according to R. Redfield.

The birth of cities causes a radical change in these pre-urban communities, and they become 'peasant communities'. In fact, as long as there is no city there are no peasants, only 'savages'. The peasants are autochthonous rural people who live in the zone of influence of a city with which they have economic and intellectual relations. As distinguished from the 'savage', the peasant knows that outside his group there are other men, and he recognises them as his equals. These foreigners are not necessarily his enemies; the village, in fact, develops institutions designed to maintain relationships with them. Until recent times, the peasants were illiterate (while the 'savage' is pre-literate), but in every village there were specialists who knew how to read and write and who were in charge of keeping in contact with the city and the city authorities. In this sense it is possible to say that 'folk society' is the opposite of peasant society.

The city gives birth to specialisation and universalism. The first Maya cities, for example, were essentially religious centres characterised by the formation of a class of priests who were the first specialists devoting all their time to one single activity, religion. The Maya priests worked out a scholarly religion which was valid for the whole people and tended to take the place of the local cults in the old communities. Specialisation and universalism make the city the dynamic element in a given society. 'Urban civilisation is a conquering civilisation', E. Labrousse has said. The city is the motor of progress; technical inventions, revolutionary ideas and new ways of life, which will subsequently spread to the countryside around, are born in the city.

What was true of the Mayas remains true of contemporary France, as G. Le Bras has masterfully shown. The Gaul was first evangelised in the cities, and it is in the cities, especially Paris, that the movement of de-christianisation started, gradually spreading to the countryside around Paris and to other regions of France during the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, however, the Church begins to revive, and this revival starts in the cities, with new forms of missionary and communal Christianity cropping up in Paris, in Lyons, and in Limoges. The small towns play an ambivalent role in this movement; on one hand they are

the stopping places of the action started in the big cities, while on the other they function as 'small capital cities' exposed to the influence of the 'flat country' around them. 'To the extent to which it is small, the city resembles the countryside.'

It is also from the city that the peasant receives his amusements. In pre-urban society, dramatic and lyrical arts are inseparable from religion and local myths. Secular amusements and professional entertainers are a creation of urban society. The roving entertainers who were typical of medieval Europe, as they still are of contemporary India, can be replaced by the cinema, but, since such amusements are born in the city, they cannot but bring to the countryside the images and models of the city. The Mexican peasant calls upon roving musicians and circuses to enliven his *fiestas*, and the more urbanised the city from which they come, the greater the prestige of the village.

The fact that rural people borrow a great number of their social models from the city and that they tend to emulate city-dwellers does not mean, however, that they imitate and admire them in every respect. Peasants the world over are deeply convinced that, as far as certain essential qualities are concerned (physical stamina, passion for work, honesty, sexual morality) the peasant is superior to the city-dweller.

The opposition of city and countryside, on the other hand, is only partial, since, in certain respects, city and country people form a single society. They have a culture in common, sharing as they do the same beliefs and the same amusements. They also have an economic market in common, exchanging the products of their respective activities, which complement each other. Finally, the cities are full of rural people. In an average French town like Auxerre, 45 per cent of the population is of rural origin. This phenomenon raises the question as to the position of the rural world in an essentially urban civilisation like ours. Should rural emigration be considered a normal phenomenon of social progress in a single society? This would be tantamount to considering rural people the lowest of classes. Or should we admit the existence of two cultural *milieus* in the social body which, structurally speaking, are to be distinguished from each other?

In examining a Walloon village, H. Turney-High distinguishes three classes, each of which consists of three sub-classes, a pattern that applies not only to Château-Gérard but the whole of Belgium, according to him. For example, Mr. Turney-High puts 'small landowners who cultivate their land without the help of wage-workers' and white-collar folks in the same class, while he places skilled workers, foremen, and all those who

Cities and Countryside

live by farming without owning land in another. It seems, then, that the only division within Château-Gérard is that of social classes, a fact that makes of that village a miniature mirror of Belgian society in general.

In considering the whole of France rather than a village or a particular region, P. Coutin shows that only too often one tends to regard the peasantry as a homogeneous unit, whereas there exists, according to him, a peasant society with its own stratifications which is different from that of society as a whole. Between these parallel hierarchies, however, the exchanges usually occur within corresponding social groups: 'rural people who leave their village may become unskilled workers, but also station-chiefs or railway inspectors, depending on the social level from which they started. The woman who leaves her village to marry a doctor or a pharmacist is not the daughter of a labourer, but of a big landowner.'

It is interesting to note that the peasant shows a marked repugnance for factory and mine. A. Cholley has documented this fact in connexion with conditions in the Lorraine metallurgical region during the nineteenth century. One or two generations had to pass after families had moved to the cities, before their offspring began to work in factories, as a result of their having mixed with workers and changed their attitude. In Auxerre, as C. Bettelheim has shown, while 45 per cent of the population is of rural origin, only 18 per cent come from farming families. The sons of the peasants find it more or less difficult to adjust to industrial life, depending on whether they have themselves been working in the fields or not; hence professional instability is much greater among workers of agricultural origins than among the others. Usually the peasant comes to the city seeking the security and stability of the small civil servant. The attraction that a policeman's or customs officer's cap has for a Norman or Morvan peasant is well known. There is no doubt that in many respects the peasants are closer to the middle class than to the workers. J. Daric has supplied us with a startling demographic confirmation of this fact, showing that the death rate among industrial managers and farmers is about the same, while there is a considerable difference in this respect between these two groups and the industrial workers. It is hence normal that the peasants should try to integrate themselves in a group whose way of life, ideology and life expectation are the least different from their own.

The fast pace of industrial development in the nineteenth century has brought with it the creation of the 'tentacular cities'. At present, however, the progress in the means of transportation permits the construction of immense urban zones which are not really cities. On the other hand, new

sources of energy make possible the decentralisation of industry. As a result we have an urbanisation of the countryside paralleled by a ruralisation of the cities. This double trend leads M. Augé-Laribé to worry about what he calls 'the suburbanisation of France', while E. Juillard, speaking of Alsace, makes the following remark: 'The rural imprint had marked everything in the past, even the cities. Urbanisation is now going to penetrate everywhere, even the countryside.'

In the United States, the gigantic urban zone stretching for about 350 miles from Boston to Washington, or the less extensive but more homogeneous (because more recent) zone of Los Angeles, are good illustrations of this trend, which brings social changes with it. For example, the neighbourhood takes on a new importance. Until now the urban centre formed the core of the community, while the residential sections had no life of their own. At present, a local spirit is developing, together with a feeling of identification with the neighbourhood rather than with the community at large. Ways of life are changing accordingly, with clothes, for example, losing the importance they had acquired in the average towns, and informality becoming the rule.

In Europe this trend is less advanced. Regions like Liege, Darmstadt and Strasbourg show a disintegration of the village community which is partly due to the infiltration of urban life, with peasants forming a homogeneous group in contrast to workers and business people, who are considered agents of city culture. In the Alsatian villages, not only has inter-marriage between the two groups come to a stop, but they do not even mix on Sundays to play cards at the café. They go to Church together, but separate as soon as they have stepped beyond the Church portal. In the villages, primary family and neighbourhood relations have been replaced by secondary relations based on economic and cultural interests. One no longer goes to visit one's neighbour after dinner. The son goes to the playground, while his father goes to the meeting of the co-operative or the union. The old system of mutual help based on an exchange of unremunerated services is disappearing; in order to till his own field, the worker rents the horses of a big landowner. The disintegration of the traditional village society, and the economic basis of social relationships, become more marked the nearer one gets to the city.

In these three regions, there is practically not a single village which workers do not leave in the morning in order to go to work in town. Very often these workers own a little land. Until there are objective studies of these dormitory-villages, arguments in favour or against such a mixed

Cities and Countryside

way of life can go on indefinitely. H. Turney-High describes the picturesque local railway serving Château-Gérard, and the social connexions that are made on it, a real society being created twice a day on the commuters' train. On the other hand, the distance from the place of work has serious effects not only on the social life of the village, but on the mentality of the individuals exposed to such double conditioning, and on family life, whose internal harmony is threatened. H. Koetter has shown that in all the communities he has studied around Darmstadt, more than 70 per cent of the inhabitants want to continue to live in the country, basing their choice on tradition, low prices, the calm of the countryside, and the tranquillity of the small landowner. As we get nearer to the city, however, the people who want to go to work there become more numerous. What these people want is to combine the advantages of country life with a high salary, a strict working schedule and the varied resources of the city. On the other hand, it seems that a deeper knowledge of urban life has the effect of reawakening or reinforcing the appreciation of country life.

These considerations lead us to think that it would be wise to reform our stereotyped notions of city and countryside in order to adapt them to the actual evolution of the social structures in which men are living at present. This is what G. Friedmann has in mind in proposing the notions of 'natural environment' and 'technical environment', defined on the basis of their different psychological, sociological and technological conditioning of the individual. In the 'natural environment', the individual reacts to stimuli most of which come from natural elements, while his tools are a direct extension of his body; in the 'technical environment', on the contrary, the individual is caught in a web of complex techniques which tend toward automatism and supply him with stimuli that differ essentially from those of the natural environment, as modern psychology has shown. To give just one example, the notion and the perception of time are not the same in the two environments. A recent study by the French Institute of Public Opinion has shown how much greater the pressure of time is on the inhabitants of the big city as compared with the peasants. However, there are important cities which are still involved in the natural environment as were medieval towns, while there are small towns whose life is already fully caught in the technical environment. In certain respects, the farmer himself becomes technologically minded. Being as he is in harmony with the elements rather than in conflict with them, the Hopi peasant feels that he is working with nature, not against it, while the modern farmer exploits nature by trying to dominate it. Modern agricultural sciences give

man a control over natural phenomena similar to that with which industrial techniques provide city people.

There is little doubt that, stated in such terms, the problem becomes clearer. The distinction between natural environment and technical environment supplies us with an excellent analytical instrument to investigate the main trends of our civilisation.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

Villes et campagnes—Civilisation urbaine et civilisation rurale

by GEORGES FRIEDMANN

(Proceedings of the Second Sociological Week organised by the Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques)

Paris: Colin, 1953, pp. 480.

The Primitive World and its Transformations

by ROBERT REDFIELD

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953, pp. 185.

Château-Gérard—The Life and Times of a Walloon Village

by HARRY HOLBERT TURNER-HIGH

Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1953, pp. 297.

La Vie rurale dans la plaine de la Basse Alsace—Essay de Géographie sociale

by ETIENNE JUILLARD

Strasbourg: Le Roux, 1953, pp. 582.

Struktur und Funktion von Landgemeinden im Einflussbereich einer deutschen Mittelstadt

by HERBERT KOETTER

Darmstadt: Eduard Roether Verlag, 1952, pp. 182.

R

REVIEWS

PAUL-HENRI MICHEL

ON AUGUSTIN RENAUDET

LOUIS RENOU

ON R. C. MAJUMDAR AND

P. T. RAJU

Dante Humaniste

BY AUGUSTIN RENAUDET

Paris: 'Les Belles Lettres', 1952 ('Les classiques de l'humanisme', published under the patronage of L'Association Guillaume Budé. Études, 1).

In the vocabulary of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance the term 'humanist' literature refers only to profane, as opposed to sacred, writings. However, the greatness of the ancient authors appeared such that a certain confusion was created between profane and classical writings. Thus the idea arose of what was much later called humanism, and the feeling of a mission 'to revive dead things' (in the words of Machiavelli) gained ground. Today we like to give a wider meaning to the word humanism: to be a 'humanist' is to have faith in Man, to believe in his eminent dignity and in the potentialities of his genius. Such humanism is of all times, but it seems (and this is no mere

chance) that its golden age coincides with that of the renaissance of antiquity and that it has remained inextricably linked with classical culture—culture understood here in the two-fold sense of 'knowledge' and 'cult' of Graeco-Roman antiquity. The reason for this correspondence between certain ideas on the potentialities of Man and admiration for the ancients is founded not only on the fact that these latter were admirable because of their wisdom, their virtues and their arts, but also, and primarily, because in the eyes of the Christians (who had good cause to believe themselves their equals), these ancients, whether Latin or Greek, not having received the help of Revelation

and Redemption, had to accept on their own account the authority of moral law and to procure for themselves all the benefits of a truth envisaged only imperfectly. How could such triumph of Man, incomplete though it might have been, be arrived at? This was a crucial question, ever since the first centuries of Christianity, a question to which the Fathers of the Church, particularly the Greek Fathers, had found various answers. Some of them denied that the pagans had any knowledge whatever of Truth, others admitted that whatever they had learned or divined of Truth could be due merely to chance Hebraic influence or to the grace of partial revelation.

Profoundly Christian and at the same time a passionate admirer of Roman classicism, Dante found himself face to face with a problem he could not evade. The solutions he found for it in *Il Convivio*, in the *Monarchia*, and above all in the *Divine Comedy* are presented in Augustin Renaudet's excellent book with all the authority we have the right to expect from one of the best historians of the Renaissance, who has undoubtedly been most painstaking in his definition of humanism.

How was it possible that Virgil was chosen as guide through the worlds of the damned and the penitent? How did it come about that Cato, 'who knew nothing of the Hebraic revelation and in his person represents the highest level of virtue arrived at by the mere force of reason' (p. 501), was not only absolved of his suicide, but, while he was awaiting his final salvation, is raised to the dignified office of Guardian of Purgatory?

How is it possible that the virtuous pagans banned from Paradise are, nevertheless, gathered together in a relatively happy place and rewarded for their deserving deeds as far as the law of Christ permits it? How does it happen that the giants who rebelled against Jupiter are punished for their crime and thrown into the same abyss as the wicked angels? Why are the Roman conquests defended and regarded as the necessary forerunners of redemption? These are some of the points—there are many others—cleared up by the reading of *Dante humaniste*.

They are explained but not always to the reader's full satisfaction. While enumerating in detail what Dante knew about antiquity and what he thought of the pagan world, Renaudet reveals the limits of a culture and of a horizon. Certainly Dante should not be reproached for the fact that his humanism was almost exclusively Latin, nor that he knew Greek literature, history and mythology only through the mediums of Horace, Virgil, Ovid and Statius, and Greek philosophy for the better part through his knowledge of Cicero; nor should he be blamed because he understood and kept company only with the Aristotle of the Arab scholars. Nevertheless it is difficult to reject the suspicion that he knew too little, denied too much, of the Platonism which had been the prop of the early Christian philosophic systems, and tended rather to cherish the doctrines in fashion since the thirteenth century. We see in fact that in the 'palace of wisdom' Socrates and Plato occupy a high position though they are over-shadowed by Aristotle.

Reviews

The total neglect of Lycurgus in the list of great law-givers, Dante's partiality towards Rome as against her enemies, against Greece, against Florence, the Ghibelline favouring of the Empire as opposed to the Capetian monarchy, and a host of other prejudices, joined at times to hate and nourished by bitterness—all these compensating faults of genuine passion and an authoritarian genius tend to diminish the universality which the very word, humanism, calls up and lets us anticipate.

But, after all, is it important that this or that classical source, this or that aspect of the legend be ignored or misunderstood? What do prejudices and partialities matter since Dante has arrived by divination at what he does not know, and has breathed renewed life into legends which have been recaptured with their eternal verities intact?

In several instances (particularly in the chapter entitled *Les Mythes Heroïques*) Renaudet notes how the greatness of a man is left untouched even when he is damned. He says (p. 542), 'Ulysses—as well as Jason or Achilles—is one of those ancient heroes who preserve the majesty of their character in Dante's *Inferno*'. Ulysses, Achilles, Jason and others . . .

Jason, whose example we remember, is one of the crowd of wrong-doers and seducers eternally hunted by demons and suffering the degrading punishment of whipping. And yet Virgil points him out to Dante with respect, noting that he shall forever remain the undaunted sailor, the head of the Argonauts, the possessor and conqueror of the Golden Fleece.

Look on that great one who
advances now
And seems in all his pain no
tear to shed,
How regal still is the aspect
of his brow.¹

'The head of the expedition to Colchis,' thus comments Renaudet, 'united in his person genius and courage. He sinned only because of human weakness and human love. This love and this weakness have led him to lie and to betray, which he expiates. . . . But Dante recognises in him the nobility of a human soul which, from the very beginning of the world's existence, in spite of its fall from grace, in spite of its imperfect cognisance of divine realities, its false beliefs and superstitions and illusions, in spite of temptation and sin, carries within it an element of majesty: *celsa creatura in capacitate majestatis*.'²

Referring to the same episode in the *Inferno*, Josef Baruzi has written in a book unfortunately not published: 'In Dante there is always something which recoils in horror before the terrors which he describes. He never spares himself as he imagines punishments. There is always a latent rejection and a need for compensation. Even in the darkest moments there trembles in the depths of his soul a glimpse of other worlds.'

Without softening in the slightest

¹ *Inferno*, XVIII, 83-85 (Translation by Lawrence Binyon).

² The final citation "sublime creature, bearing in power its majesty", is taken from Saint Bernard, *In canticum canticorum*, sermo 80. Renaudet, p. 371.

degree the chastisement of one who abandoned first Hypsipyle, then Medea, the poet has placed before us the great stature of the Argonaut chieftain. Thus one of the great myths of humanity is formulated by recalling that two-fold destiny of the adventurer and the seducer, 'the eternal prisoner of his ever-rambling strength and of his victory'.

Even more than by the fact that he raised to Purgatory, even to Heaven, a Cato, a Trajan; that he spared the pagans the sufferings of Hell, Dante's

humanism shows itself in his reflections on the classic myth, in his illumination of its human content. Above all it is exemplified by the presence in every one of Hell's circles of those men, no matter what their origin or their time, whose greatness has withstood the two-fold degradation of sin and of punishment and still withstands it. In the deepest profundities of the abyss their avenging faces emerge bearing witness to a majesty that nothing can destroy, that of the image of God.

The Classical Age

Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1954, pp. LX—745 in—8vo (47 maps and plates)
(*The History and Culture of the Indian People*, Vol. III).

Idealist Thought of India

BY P. T. RAJU

London: Allen and Unwin, 1953, pp. 454, in 8vo.

The great history of India conceived by K. M. Munshi, the first undertaking of this magnitude to be carried out entirely by Indian scholars, is continued with Vol. III, which covers roughly the period from 320 to 750. After an interval of about ten months, it follows Vol. II, *The Age of Imperial Unity*, which embraced the period between 600 before our era and 320 after; the first volume, which appeared in 1952, had, naturally, dealt with the sources ('up to 600 B.C.'), or what is conventionally known as 'the Vedic period'. As is well known, the scientific editor is the esteemed historian R. C. Majumdar. To him, in this volume, has fallen the all important task of compiling the chapters on dynastic history which occupy the

first three hundred pages, with the exception of the history of the Deccan monarchies, which was entrusted to the epigraphist D. C. Sircar (who has undertaken also Ceylon and the Chālukyas), another exception being the period of the Pallavas and other kingdoms of the South, treated by R. Sathianathaier.

An original characteristic of the work is the important part—in this volume actually preponderant—occupied by the elements constituting Indian culture at the epoch under consideration: literature (G. V. Devasthali, H. D. Velankar, Srinivas Iyengar), political and juridical theory (U. N. Ghoshal), religion (Nalinaksha Dutt, A. D. Pusalker, A. M. Ghatage, D. C. Sircar and others), art (S. K. Saraswati, N. R.

Ray), general social questions (U. N. Ghoshal). Finally R. C. Majumdar returns to describe India's exchanges with the outside world and adds a summary of the expansion of Indian culture in Asia.

When *The History and Culture of the Indian People* is finished, which may require from three to four years at most, we shall have at our disposal, on putting together the varied information dispersed throughout the projected ten volumes, a series of fairly detailed monographs on the great typical systems regulating ancient India and their prolongations up to the threshold of modern times, on the styles of literature both in the Aryan and Dravidian languages, on social and economic facts, etc.: all domains more or less unsuitable to the strict chronological framework which the plan of the production demands.

The work, in its material plan, leaves little to be desired, except that in our opinion the subdivisions could have been better organised, and a more deliberate choice made between the style of erudition and the 'essay' type of writing. Annotations (unevenly distributed) serve to indicate the epigraphic or literary source supporting the most important statements, or to direct the reader to some modern monograph on the subject. The book ends with a bibliography which is not without omissions, especially regarding French works, but which is none the less welcome, and has also some useful genealogical tables, a good index, ample illustrations including, in particular, four maps. In many ways the work is

superior, for the quality of its information, to the two preceding volumes.

The title stresses the main feature which creates the unity of the present volume. If ever the word 'classic' had any sense, it would apparently apply to the India of that period: As in the century of Louis XIV, an enlightened empire made itself the protector of literature and the arts; India seems to have known a prosperity, a 'golden age' (far more than under Louis XIV), which she was never again to experience, and lastly, the social and cultural standards elaborated in the preceding centuries gave birth to a blossoming mass of brilliant works, conceived as so many illustrations of those standards, and as if to respond to the pre-established notion of classicism. This privileged period assumes its full significance when it is compared with the two Middle Ages which enclose it: the properly so-called Indian Middle Ages, which lasted from the end of the Vedic epoch and whose apogee was marked by the third century, a period of political disintegration following on an attempted humanist renaissance (under the auspices of Buddhism) with Kanishka (middle of the second century or end of the first century). After came the Middle Ages common to the whole of our Western civilisation, which, provoked in India by the Mussulman invasions, were prolonged with various vicissitudes until the beginning of the Mogul empire, that is to say, up to the sixteenth century.

There is, however, a certain amount of fallacy in this idea of classicism, as well as in that of a 'renaissance' which,

Reviews

in the time of Max Müller, was already applied to the Gupta epoch. A sort of crystallisation has formed itself around the Guptas, due above all to the obscurities and gaps in our information concerning the previous epochs. The history of India has been constructed out of literary material (essentially from the epigraphs, highly formalised, of royal panegyrics), composed by holders of the Brahmanic ideals; a history written by Buddhists, or even simply by non-Indians, would doubtless have had another orientation. The empire of the Guptas—short-lived and not devoid of internal and external strife—was merely one of those fairly numerous empires which saw the light in India, generally as a result of outside pressure, since the times of the Mauryan kings up to Akbar and beyond. As to works of art, poems and sculptures, in so far as they are datable, account must also be taken of the considerable losses which seem to have marked the centuries involving the Christian era. It is unlikely that the disciplinary systems which began to be established towards the end of the Vedic period should have only begun to bear fruit in the fifth or sixth century. Mr. Ghoshal points out that the Gupta era is that of the decline of political speculations, whilst in the juridical domain, which constitutes one of the keystones of the Indian system, there is a movement of transition towards new forms: it would accordingly appear that, on certain points, that privileged age did not attain the creative standard somewhat too generously attributed to it.

The fact however remains that the period of the Gupta monarchy was an important moment in Indian history. It was during that period that the Hindu *dharma*, or codified social order, attained its full development, giving birth to well-known structures, such as the systematisation of the caste régime, etc. We witness, so to speak, the realisation, the illustration in practice, in the courts and gatherings, of everything that the old texts had been able to teach concerning both lay and religious ritual. Even the Vedic sacrifices had their revival. The Guptas moreover allowed (as is excellently brought out in the book under review) certain oligarchic clans, certain small republics, some of which, like the Licchavi, dated back to the time of Buddha, to live quietly in their shade. These clans tended to form themselves into vassal States, and this brings us face to face with the problem of Indian feudality, which so far has never been squarely confronted.

The empire of the Guptas pursued its course within stricter limits, but with continued strengthening of Hindu characteristics, among the Pallavas in the south-east, the Chālukyas at Bādāmi in the western Deccan: it was they who became the true successors of the Guptas rather than the empire of Harsha (seventh century), to which an undue importance has been attached, and which should actually be defined in the light of the Harsha-Pulakeçin-Mahendravarman synchronism. As Mr. Majumdar says, if heroes make history, it is equally true, especially in India, where outstanding

personalities are comparatively rare, that history makes heroes.

The chapter on religion, however instructive it may be, bears further witness to our incapacity to reconstitute an authentic image of Indian religious life between the fourth and eighth centuries. Only the sectarian Hinduism of the later epochs, with its chiefs of regional groups, its exclusive habits, and the differentiated handling of the neo-Aryan languages, made it possible to approach the problem. What we have here are doctrines seen through the medium of literary texts: the height of the puranic period, with its unworldly mixture, feebly localised, of great religious schemes robbed in conventional mythology. From out of this mass, some salient features are noticeable: Vedism driven back to the status of an archaeological vestige; the appearance on the scene of some sectarian movements within the great frame-works of Vishnuism, Shivaism, Tantrism (the latter still somewhat unstable). As regards Buddhist theories, noticeable is the development of the Great Vehicle with the corresponding reduction of the forms of the Little Vehicle which preserved their vitality only in certain outlying points of the Indian world. Jainism also suffered losses, at least in its native land of Magadha, losses which were not made good by its later push to the West. Buddhism had also soon lost its early bonds with the native land of Buddha and with the great centres of his early preaching: there is a centrifugal force in these Indian religions, which will be observed later in several other Hindu sects.

The work, which touches on so many realms of Indian culture, would lend itself to many other reflections of which the authors themselves have often suggested the nature. It suffices to repeat that, taken as a whole, the work is a tribute to the competence, as well as the open-mindedness of the historians who have collaborated in it under the inspiring aegis of Mr. K. M. Munshi. It will be one of the good works of reference placed at the disposal of students and, more generally, of the reader anxious to follow in some detail the developments of a great civilisation.

It has often been observed that Indian meditations or conjectural opinions have had more autonomy, more internal connexions than are usually accorded to them in classic or modern descriptions, which all admit, whether tacitly or not, the primacy of the *advaita* or 'non-dualism' partly negativist, represented by Śaṅkara and his successors.

It is certain that the *Upanishads* and even the *Bhagavadgītā*, anonymous and collective works, were extremely composite, that the Brahmanic 'systems' are the issue of various preoccupations: in part to give a rational explanation of the world and of human thought, in part to satisfy 'philologically' (so to speak) the essence of certain speculative attempts. Bordering on the systems there had been a materialistic movement, traces of which can be found almost everywhere, and notably in primitive Jainism and Buddhism.

One way of writing the history of Indian thought is therefore to draw

Reviews

attention to these incongruous sources which combined, as was to be expected, with the traces of the cosmogonic and mythological thought of the earliest times. These had a tenacious survival in India. It is this aspect of discontinuity which has just been stressed, brilliantly if somewhat partially, by W. Ruben in his recent *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*.

An inverse method, no less plausible, is to show how the greater part of Indian conjectural opinions, whatever their origin, tended towards a type of thought that could be given the ready name of 'idealism', not so much because it denied the reality of the world (even the *Vedānta* under its strictest form does not go so far as that), but because it submitted reality to an absolute principle and aimed at escaping from matter by transforming it. With all possible internal shades of meaning, this has been the principal tendency of the *Vedānta*, from the *Upanishads* down to our times, including the 'sectarian' systems which draw their doctrine from a *Vedānta* mixed with Sāṅkhya or reinforced by a theological superstructure. It was also the tendency of Buddhism which, starting from a certain measure of realism rejecting equally the internal absolute (soul) and the transcendent absolute (brahman), arrived equally at idealistic conceptions, in the course of which it sought for substitutes for the conception of the absolute (even if negative: and was not the *brahman* of the *Upanishads* already so?): whether it was called *vijñāna*, 'conscience', *ālaya* 'substratum', *śūnya* 'void', or sometimes *dharma* 'entity',

or simply *tat*, 'that', *tanmātra*, 'only that', recalling the *tat tvam asi*, 'thou art That' of the *Chāndogya*.

Mr. Raju is accordingly justified when he considers idealism as the central theme of Indian traditions; which he does, after having attempted, somewhat lengthily and as if feeling his way, to define it with the help of the doctrines of classical antiquity or of the modern West. The cleavage which he operates on the dense mass of these traditions reveals at every level this need to establish, not only an absolute, but several stages between the world and the absolute, making it possible, within an idealistic framework, to safeguard the postulates of a thought which only step by step can detach itself from reality.

The work proceeds with a study on the thinkers of contemporary India. They, on the whole, preach 'activism'; they intend to integrate matter, no longer as formerly to 'explain it away'. For Tagore and Radhakrishnan, the hold which we have on the absolute is commanded by our interests and our needs. Tagore's Absolute is humanised, Radhakrishnan's is intellectualised. Certain polemical attitudes are noticeable; for instance, Bhagavan Das reproaches the ancient doctrines for not having included the world of nature in the Absolute. The poet Iqbal (whom Mr. Raju includes in his study, as representative of the Sufi tendencies in India) glorifies desire, propounds a superman of the instincts, whilst Aurobindo, less aggressive, imagines a superman who would make use of the power of *brahman* to transform the

world. Gandhi applied Indian metaphysics to the affairs of this world. For Radhakrishnan as for others, it is possible (and therefore, necessary) to make a positive approach to the Absolute. Only Krishnamurti, who has no longer anything Indian about him but the tinsel of his Sanskrit terminology, resolutely rejects tradition; all the others admit it (on the metaphysical plane, not necessarily on the social plane), while feeling free

to reinterpret it according to their views. On the whole they remain faithful to the great ideological figurations dear to traditional India: concepts of the *sakti*, of the *māyā*, of the *karma*. Even when they seem to discuss them or to endow them with new shades of expression, they are merely underlining their adhesion to modes of thought which seem to be an indissoluble part of their being.

Notes on the Contributors

SIR ERNEST BARKER was born in 1874 in East Cheshire. After attending the Church elementary school in his village, he won a scholarship to the Manchester Grammar School, and afterwards, in 1892, he was elected to a classical scholarship at Balliol College, Oxford, where he studied both classics and modern history. At the end of his university course he was elected to a prize fellowship in classics at Merton College; but devoting himself to modern history he became a tutor and lecturer in that subject—first at Wadham College, then at St. John's College, and finally at New College—down to 1920. From 1920 to 1927 he was Principal of King's College in the University of London. He was then invited to be the first

holder of the Chair of Political Science in Cambridge; and relinquishing his Principalship in order to return to the work of lecturing and teaching he held that chair, along with a Fellowship at Peterhouse, down to his retirement in 1939. He has continued to live in Cambridge, and has written a number of books (mostly in the field of Political Theory, and nearly all published by the Press of his old University) during the years of his retirement: *Greek Political Theory*; *Plato and his Predecessors*; *Reflections on Government*; a translation, with Introduction and Notes, of the *Politics* of Aristotle. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and an Honorary Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, and Peterhouse, Cambridge. He holds

honorary degrees from American, Commonwealth, and Continental universities; and he has been decorated by a number of Governments (France, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece) in recognition of services rendered during the late war to the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education.

AMÉRICO CASTRO, born in 1885, was Professor at the Universities of Madrid and Princeton. He is Doctor *honoris causa* of the Universities of Paris and Poitiers, and an Officer of the Légion d'Honneur. Professor Castro began his university career as a historian of Spanish language and literature. His most important works, prior to 1936, are: *La vida de Lope de Vega* (Madrid, 1919); *El pensamiento de Cervantes* (Madrid, 1925); *Santa Teresa y otros ensayos* (Madrid, 1929); *Cervantes* (Paris: Rieder, 1931); *Glosarios latino-españoles de la Edad Media* (Madrid, 1936). Since 1936, his particular field of interest has been the Hispanic peoples, their way of life and their problems. In order to understand this form of life and make it understandable to others, he had to go beyond the scope of positivist and intellectualist historiography. First he gave us a picture of the modern Argentine in the light of its history from the seventeenth century on (*La peculiaridad lingüística rioplatense*, Buenos Aires, 1941). He employed this same method again in a work of ampler scope: *Iberoamérica* (New York: Dryden Press, 1954 [3rd ed.]). The history of Spain herself is the subject of a series of works published since 1940: 'Lo Hispanico y el

Erasmismo' (Buenos Aires, *Revista de Filología Hispanica*, 1940); *España en su historia* (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1948); *Aspectos del vivir hispanico* (Santiago de Chile: Cruz del Sur, 1949); *La realidad historica de España* (Mexico: Porrum Hermanos, 1954); *The Structure of Spanish History* (Princeton University Press, 1954). Professor Castro sees history as an ensemble of 'pluralities', as an expression of different forms of human life. His essay on the role of Saladin in the Romance literatures illustrates this way of conceiving history and is exemplary for a historical method which the author plans to apply to the study of other European peoples as well.

JOSÉ EMPERAIRE directed the two French ethnographic missions to austral Chile in 1946-48 and 1951-53. He also took part in the Franco-Brazilian archeological mission to the State of São Paulo, until October 1954. His published works include: 'Evolution démographique des Indiens Alakaluf', *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, XXXIX, 1950; 'La grotte du Mylodon', *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, 1954 (publication forthcoming); *Les Nomades de la mer* (Collection 'L'espèce humaine'), Gallimard (publication imminent).

ANNETTE LAMING has taken part in various excavations in France, England, and Switzerland. She also was a member of the second French ethnographic mission to austral Chile. Her bibliography includes: *L'art préhistorique* (Paris: Braun et Cie, 1951); *La Découverte du Passé*—an account of recent

Notes on the Contributors

developments and new techniques in prehistorical and archeological research, in collaboration with various authors (Paris: A. et J. Picard, 1952); 'La grotte di Mylodon', *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, 1954) (publication imminent); *Hommes et bêtes du bout du monde* (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, publication forthcoming).

JEAN DOMARCHI, born in 1916, took his degree in Law in 1943. The theme of his thesis was: the economic thought of J. M. Keynes and his influence in England (Paris, 1944, vol. I). In 1945 he was appointed Agrégé des Facultés de Droit at the University of Dijon, where he is now a Full Professor. He has published various articles in *Temps Modernes*, in *La Revue Internationale*, *Esprit*, *Critique*, and other journals. At present he is working on a book on the economic foundations of historic evolution.

HENRI MENDRAS was born in 1927. He specialised in philosophic and political studies and holds a degree from the Institut d'Etudes politiques. After a year of post-graduate studies at the University of Chicago, he is now Research Associate at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Centre d'Etudes sociologiques). Among his publications should be mentioned: *Etudes de Sociologie rurale: Novis (Aveyron) et Virgin (Utah)* (Paris: A. Colin, 1953); 'La sociologie religieuse aux Etats-Unis', *Lumen Vitæ*, VI, (1951), 1-2; 'Le Mormonisme, religion native des Etats-Unis', *Chronique Sociale de France* (1952), 5-6. His translation of R. K. Merton's *Elements of Sociological Method* was published by Plon (Paris) in 1953. At present he is engaged in research on the social and psychological transformations among rural populations.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF *DIOGENES*, published quarterly at Brooklyn 25, N.Y., for October 1, 1954.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Intercultural Publications Inc., 477 Madison Ave., NYC 22; Editor, James Laughlin, 477 Madison Ave., NYC 22; Managing Editor (none); Business Manager, Ronald Freeland, 477 Madison Ave., NYC 22.

2. The owner is: Intercultural Publications Inc., 477 Madison Ave., NYC 22. Intercultural Publications Inc. is a non-profit corporation organized under the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New York and is exempt from tax under Section 101 (6) of the Internal Revenue Code.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities, are: Not applicable.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

(Signed) J. LAUGHLIN (publisher)

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 8th day of October, 1954.

JANICE B. LA VINE, Notary Public,
State of New York. No. 4172273675. Commission expires March 30, 1955.

Diogenes

The investigations of *Diogenes* extend to many fields which are the proper domain of various sciences. But *Diogenes* deals with these sciences only in so far as they are directly concerned with the knowledge of Man, the first measure and the ultimate, the *raison d'être* of so much care, patience and invention.

In coming issues of *Diogenes*:

RAYMOND ARON

The Evolution of the Concept of the Proletariat

CHARLES G. BELL

Modern Poetry

JEAN DOMARCHI

Recent Discoveries on the Origin of Rome

MIRCEA ELIADE *Mythology and the History of Religions*

DARYLL FORDE

The Human Record

LEWIS MUMFORD

On Arnold Toynbee

O. MANNONI

*Psychology and Objectivity in the
Human Sciences*

RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI

The Spirit of Paganism

RENÉ ROUX

Puritanism and Democracy

PERSPECTIVES

*An international quarterly devoted to the culture
of the United States*

NUMBER 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>The Dark Dance</i>	CARL CARMER
<i>American Luminism</i>	JOHN I. H. BAUR
<i>Industrial Design in the United States</i>	JAMES S. PLAUT
<i>Faith and Skepticism</i>	
<i>in American Constitutional Law</i>	MARK DEWOLFE HOWE
<i>Notes on a Horse Thief</i>	WILLIAM FAULKNER
<i>The Big Change in Suburbia</i>	FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN
<i>America's Ethnic Pattern</i>	NATHAN GLAZER
The Creative Artist and his Audience:	
<i>The Writer and the Audience</i>	SAUL BELLOW
<i>Poetry and Survival</i>	ROBINSON JEFFERS
<i>The Painter and the Audience</i>	ROBERT MOTHERWELL
<i>The Composer and the Public Today</i>	ROGER SESSIONS
<i>Five Poems</i>	ARCHIBALD MACLEISH
<i>Letter from New York</i>	F. W. DUPEE

Book reviews by Frederick Osborn and Charles J. Rolo

Also: Book notes, a digest of American periodicals, notes on and
photographs of the contributors

192 pages, plus 28 pages of photographic illustrations

Price 2/6 Annually 12/-

Published quarterly in Great Britain by Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 90 Great
Russell Street, London, W.C.1, for Intercultural Publications Inc. of New York

NUMBER 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Federalism in America</i>	PAUL A. FREUND
<i>The Microscopic Eye</i>	JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH
<i>Eight Poems</i>	RICHARD EBERHART
<i>The Poetry of Richard Eberhart</i>	SELDEN RODMAN
<i>Terror and Self-Pity:</i>	
<i>Alban Berg's Wozzeck</i>	JOSEPH KERMAN
<i>The Visionary Painting of</i>	
<i>Morris Graves</i>	KENNETH REXROTH
<i>The Indian Feather</i>	THOMAS MABRY
<i>American Townscape</i>	CHRISTOPHER TUNNARD
<i>The American Organizational</i>	
<i>Economy</i>	CALVIN B. HOOVER
<i>Letter from New York</i>	F. W. DUPEE

Book Reviews by Dan Herr, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and
Delmore Schwartz

American, French, German and Italian editions are also published. Available from:

PERSPECTIVES USA: Paragon Mailing Service, 1 Lefferts Avenue,
Brooklyn, 25, New York

PROFILS: Calmann-Lévy, Editeurs, 3 rue Auber, Paris, 9e

PERSPEKTIVEN: S. Fischer Verlag, Falkensteinerstrasse 24,
Frankfurt-am-Main

PROSPETTI: G. C. Sansoni, Viale Mazzini 46, Florence

A list of Distributors in other countries may be secured from Intercultural Publications Inc., 477 Madison Avenue, New York 22, New York

PERSPECTIVE OF JAPAN

Intercultural Publications Inc. announces the publication in English of *Perspective of Japan* (January 1955), the third in a series of supplements to *The Atlantic Monthly*. The first two collections were *Perspective of India* (October 1953) and *Perspective of Holland and Belgium* (April 1954).

PERSPECTIVE OF JAPAN presents:

<i>Japan Speaks to America</i>	NOEL BUSCH
<i>Japan's Place in Asia</i>	SHIGERU YOSHIDA
<i>A New Japan?</i>	SHIGETO TSURU
<i>The Japanese Theater</i>	TSURUO ANDO
<i>The Religions of Japan</i>	IICHI OGUCHI
<i>Two Samurai Tales</i>	SAIKAKU IBARA
<i>Contemporary Japanese Art</i>	C. F. YAMADA and J. LAUGHLIN
<i>In Praise of Shadows</i>	JUNICHIRO TANIZAKI
<i>Popular Entertainments of Japan</i>	KOJI OZAKI
<i>Japanese Architecture</i>	MOSUKE MORITA
<i>Modern Japanese Literature</i>	K. NAKAJIMA and E. SEIDENSTICKER
<i>Forms of Japanese Poetry</i>	EARL ROY MINER
<i>Japan's "Cultural Democracy"</i>	NYOZEKAN HASEGAWA

Stories by Osamu Dazai, Kan Eguchi, and Yasunari Kawabata. A selection of poetry; color reproductions of art, and photographs of Japanese architecture.

Perspective of Japan is available as a separate booklet and may be ordered through Paragon Mailing Service, 1 Lefferts Avenue, Brooklyn 25, New York, U.S.A. (\$0.35); Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 90 Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1, England (2s. 6d.); Carlos Hirsch, Florida 165, Buenos Aires, Argentina (5 pesos); Calmann-Lévy Editeurs, 3 rue Auber, Paris, France (125 francs); S. Fischer Verlag, Falkensteinstrasse 24, Frankfurt/Main, Germany (D.M. 1.50); International Book House Ltd., 9 Ash Lane, Bombay, India (1/10 rupees); Lion Bookshop, 181 Via del Babuino, Rome, Italy (200 lire); Charles E. Tuttle Company, c/o Nippon Shuppan Kyokai, 1, 1-chome, Kasuga-cho, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan (100 yen); and Meulenhoff & Co. N.V., Beulingstraat 2, Amsterdam-C, Holland (1.25 florins).

Similar collections now in preparation will be devoted to the contemporary culture of the Arab World, Greece, Indonesia, and Brazil.

ENCOUNTER

A new international monthly of Literature, Arts and Politics

Sponsored by The Congress for Cultural Freedom

Edited by STEPHEN SPENDER and IRVING KRISTOL

DECEMBER 1954

<i>The Choice of Comrades</i>	IGNAZIO SILONE
<i>Land Through Love</i>	HALLAM TENNYSON MINOO R. MASANI
<i>The Cartouche (a story)</i>	WALTER DE LA MARE
<i>Men and Ideas: Machiavelli</i>	IRVING KRISTOL
<i>In Defence of 'Big Business'</i>	PETER WILES

Also, contributions by: D. W. Brogan, Maurice Cranston,
Jibanananda Das, Louis MacNeice, W. S. Merwin, William Petersen,
Anthony Quinton, Harold Rosenberg, Christopher Sykes,
David Sylvester, R. S. Thomas.

JANUARY 1955

<i>The Drift of Modern Poetry</i>	HERBERT READ
<i>Nations and Ideologies</i>	RAYMOND ARON
<i>One of My Londons</i>	CYRIL CONNOLLY
<i>Men and Ideas: Walt Whitman</i>	LESLIE A. FIEDLER

and many other interesting articles, reviews and poems

ENCOUNTER is published monthly at Panton House, 25 Haymarket,
London, S.W.1, 2s. 6d. per number.

Yearly subscription 30s. (U.S. \$6.00. India 12 rupees).

diogenes

*Published under the auspices of The International Council for
Philosophy and Humanistic Studies with the assistance of UNESCO.*

CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

ERNEST BARKER

Elections in the Ancient World

AMÉRICO CASTRO

The Presence of the Sultan Saladin in the Romance Literatures

J. EMPERAIRE and A. LAMING

The Last Fuegians

JEAN DOMARCHI

The Decline of the Ancient World:

The Economic Evolution of the Hellenistic States

GEORG DRZYMALLA

Freedom and Authority

ÉTIEMBLE

New China and the Chinese Language

HENRI MENDRAS

Cities and Countryside

REVIEWS by

PAUL-HENRI MICHEL

LOUIS RENOU

75 CENTS

